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Introduction to Media Economics
After the rise of mass media and the increasing consolidation and concentration across the media in-
dustries, media economics emerged as an important area of study in order to deal with the economic
aspect of mass communication and to understand the activities and functions of media companies as
economic institutions This ﬁeld of studies has experienced a considerable growth and development
over the past 40-50 years, resulting in a huge theoretical and empirical literature.4 Media economics
embodies theoretical and practical economic questions speciﬁc to media of all types. Of particular con-
cern are the economic polices and practices of media companies and disciples including journalism and
the news industry, ﬁlm production, entertainment programs, print, broadcast, mobile communications,
Internet, advertising and public relations.
The economic study of media industies encompasses a variety of methodological approaches, both from
a qualitative and quantitative perspective, as well as studies using ﬁnancial, historical, and political
data. The economic analysis of media markets implies the application of economic theories, concepts,
and principles to study diﬀerent aspects (competition, concentration, economic characteristics, market
structure, ownership) of mass media companies and industries.
In terms of theoretical analysis, much of the existing work deals with microeconomic theories and
studies related to political economy, while just a limited amount of work involves a macroeconomic
analysis.5 With respect to themicroeconomic literature, the economic analysis of media markets can be
located between the ﬁelds of industrial organization and information economics. The political economy
of the media also encompasses many areas, from sociology to communication to political science. In
the ﬁrst case, media economics considers as important all the dimensions linked to the structure, the
functioning and the performance of media ﬁrms and industries; in the second, the focus is on the the
interplay of economy, policy, audience behaviors and preferences.
Media as Two-Sided Markets
Looking at the microeconomic literature of media economics, I consider a particular stream which have
recently gained considerable importance. This stream focuses on the key role of media as platforms
in the correlation between the audience and advertisers. This approach is know as two-sided (or
multi-sided) market approach.
Many industries are characterized by the presence of distinct groups of customers who need each other
in some way. In these markets there are businesses acting as platforms with the role of providing
a common meeting place and facilitating the interactions between members of the customer groups.
These platforms play a crucial role by minimizing transactions costs between the diﬀerent sides of the
market. Hence the presence of one or more of these platforms makes possible exchanges that would
not occur without them and create values for both sides. In this persepective, all sides of the market
may be evaluated as customers by the platforms. A key problem of this kind of markets is to get both
(or all) types of customers on board to make the market itself to exists. Indeed, the a wrong pricing
4The1988 was the year of the debut of the Journal of Media Economics (JME).
5This branch of literature tends to focus on topics as labor and capital markets , as well as the impact of policies
and regulatory actions.
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6structure could imply the non-existence of the product at all. The importance that the optimal pricing
structure has is the main diﬀerence with industries based on one-sided markets.
Two-sided markets represent a reﬁnement of the concept of network eﬀects. There are both same-
side and cross-side indirect network eﬀects; in principle, each network eﬀect can be either positive
or negative, strongly aﬀecting prices and other platforms' strategies. The presence and the eﬀects of
indirect network externalities among diﬀerent sides of the market aﬀect almost all aspects of antitrust
analysis - from market deﬁnition, to the analysis of cartels, single-ﬁrm conduct and eﬃciencies. 6
The notion of two-sided (multi-sided) markets ﬁrst emerged with the pioneering works of Rochet and
Tirole (2002) and Caillaud & Jullien (2001; 2003).7 While the theory was ﬁrst developed in relation to
payment cards, it was quickly extended to a number of other markets such as newspapers, video games,
computer operating systems. Although they seem very diﬀerent, these markets are all characterized
by the fact that the platform must get both sides on board for there to even be a market.
The ﬁrst part of the present work is devoted to the two-sided approach. In particular, I give special
attention to media market case - a unique and well-known species of two-sided market. The idea is
that there exists a platform taking on board two opposite side of the market. On one side, the media
market in which they sell magazines, newspapers, TV channels and web sites, to a population of readers,
viewers and users; on the other, the advertising market in which they sell spaces to advertisers. In this
perspective, media platforms generate network externalities in the interaction between advertisers and
the audience.
In this particular setup, the equilibrium conﬁguration depends on the role of the advertising: advertisers
and platforms seek to expose audience to advertisements, while audience considers advertising as a
nuisance. However, it could be argued that advertisments in magazines and newspapers are not as
much of a nuisace as they are in TV, radio or web-pages.8
There is a burgeoning literature on media platforms.9 This literature has dealt with diﬀerent aspects
related to the media market price structure and performance. In this perspective, beside the two-sided
mechanism, fundamental questions deal with the eﬀect of competition, the analysis of the pricing
structure, quantity, diﬀerentiation and quality. In particular, a couple of prominent characteristics have
deserved some further attention: the quality and the content variety of the supply. Given that standard
IO theory has dealt deeply with the issue of quality (vertical) diﬀerentiation and variety (horizontal)
diﬀerentiation, these classes of models have been extensively used to manage media markets as well,
with a peculiar focus on the broadcasting market encompassing both paid and free on air television.
The Political Economy of Media
News media are widely recognized as a vital element for the health of modern democracies. Indeed,
the political race to public oﬃces is not limited to electoral competition between candidates but it also
includes issues on information acquisition by the electorate. How political information is collected and
selected by sources of information and when news are acquired by voters, are essential elements to be
considered. In situations of uncertainty about the quality of political candidates, media outlets play
an essential role by making available valuable information for electoral decisions. By learning more
about candidates, voters are more likely to replace bad types with good ones.
Despite the essential role played by news media in modern democracies, the economic literature has
started analysing the market for news only recently. However, this literature has grown rapidly over a
6For instance, see Filistrucchi et al. (2013) for discussion and suggestions for the deﬁnition of the relevant market in
cases involving two-sided platforms.
7For a short overview of the literature on two-sided markets see Armstrong (2006), Armstrong and Wright (2007),
Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2004), Nocke and Peitz (2007), Hagiu (2006).
8This point has been made in Anderson and Gabszewicz (2006).
9For a review of the two-sided literature of the media market see Chapters 1 and 2.
7large range of research questions. In particular, there is a growing number of contributions discussing
the role and the eﬀects of news media on political and public outcomes and inquiring the existence of
distortions in the market for news. They have so far analyzed the eﬀects of news media on political
selection by looking at whether news media aﬀect the chances of incumbent politicians being re-elected
(incumbency advantage) and whether news media have an impact on the type of politicians getting
into oﬃce (characteristics of elected politicians). Several surveys have been written on this topic:
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2008) focus on the issue of the eﬀects of competition on accuracy; DellaVigna
and Gentzkow (2010) survey the eﬀects and the drivers of persuasions; Prat and Strömberg (2011)
provide an extensive review of the political economy of mass media; Blasco and Sobbrio (2012) deeply
discuss the literature on commercial media bias and the inﬂuence of advertisers on the accuracy of news
media; Sobbrio (2014) provides a survey of the literature and discuss some open research questions.
There are many possible dimensions along which to categorize this literature. Sobbrio (2014) has
identiﬁed three fundamental questions:
1. Do news media have an eﬀect on political/public policy outcomes?
2. Does media bias exists, why does it exist and what type of bias do we observe?
3. Does media bias matter and, if so, to what extent?
The political literature of media market has tried to assess the eﬀects of the presence of news media
and the extent of pluralism on policy outcomes; secondly, it has focused on the speciﬁc characteristics
of the market for news and on establishing whether or not there is a systematic bias; ﬁnally, it has
looked at the eﬀects of speciﬁc media outlets on political outcomes in order to assess the eﬀects of
biased news media.
In this respect I will discuss in Chapter 3 the eﬀects of media sources on audience decision and
the possibility for political parties and lobbies to manipulate sources of information to gain electoral
consensus.
In the present work, I focus on micro-industrial organization's and political economy's theories used
in the study of media economics, referring to two particular streams of the recent literature: media
as two-sided market (I.O. ﬁeld) and the eﬀects of the presence of media bias (political economy ﬁeld).
I provide three diﬀerent essays on the issue of media markets. In the ﬁrst part, I deal with the I.O.
analysis of media as two-sided markets: the ﬁrst chapter provides a general framework of vertical
diﬀerentiated media, analysing the eﬀects of real and potential competition; the second work extented
the setting of the ﬁrst, by comparing diﬀerent markets structures from a welfare point of view. Finally,
in the second part, I move to the political economy approach of media markets, by presenting a
theoretical essay on the issue of the interaction between media and politicians during elections.
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Chapter 1
Quality Competition among Platforms: a
Media Market Case 1
1.1 Introduction
Quality is a relevant feature of the media market even though it is hard to shape. For instance, when
we consider the press, quality is related to accuracy, truth, impartiality and immediacy of information
which helps forming public opinions, expressing diﬀerent/minority voices and performing a watchdog
role for public interest. Similarly in broadcasting, content's quality is associated with the purpose
of providing not only entertainment, but also education, learning and cultural excellence, without
ignoring niche interests (Collins 2007). Furthermore, technological innovations have deeply aﬀected
broadcasting quality, for example with higher deﬁnition images or interactive services.
Given this multiplicity of meanings, it is also puzzling to ﬁgure out the economic framework which
better ﬁts media quality. In this respect, there is not a clear distinction between horizontal and
vertical diﬀerentiation. Indeed, what is conventionally deﬁned as quality is not always attached with
a positive value by all individuals. If quality is measured on the extent of informing and educating
people (eg. BBC programs), it will be controvertial to assume that all individuals consider it as a
net beneﬁt.2 In this case, it would be more accurate to refer to a taste for variety and to use an
horizontal diﬀerentiation framework.3 Instead, accurancy and real time of information, the presence
of star journalists, the possibility of live performance events (including sposts, music and dance), are
well-known examples of a vertical quality dimension.
IIn this respect, the present paper aims to analyze the role of competition in a two-sided market
characterized by quality diﬀerentiation. In particular we refer to a vertical dimension. We believe
that the quality issue should deeply aﬀect the policy debate among free-to-air televisions, pay-tvs and
public broadcasters, as well as the debate about newspapers subsidization.
Furthermore, we want to focus on the role of competition in a media market with particular attention
to its two-sided market nature. It is a peculiar feature of two-sided markets, that platforms compete on
both sides. Platforms, let say broadcasters or newspapers, compete both for audience 4 and advertisers
in order to maximize proﬁts, namely they should attract consumers' demand as well as advertising
spaces. On the one hand, advertising is typically considered as a nuisance for the audience or, in other
words, a negative externality; while on the other hand, the audience exerts a positive externality for
1This chapter refers to the joint paper Battaggion and Drufuca (2014) "Quality Competition among Platforms: a
Media Market Case", Working Papers (2013-) 1402, University of Bergamo, Department of Management, Economics and
Quantitative Methods. The authors would like to thank Simon Anderson, Maria Grazia Romano and all partecipants
at the 12th Conference on Media Economics (2014) for helpful comments and discussion.
2Consider how many people would prefer a low-quality soap-opera to a BBC documentary.
3An alternative interpretation is related to the distinction among news and entertainment, or what has been deﬁned
as "hard-news" and "soft-news" (see Hamilton 2004).
4With the term "audience" we encompasse both viewers (Tv) and readers (Newspapers).
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the advertisers. Therefore, competition has a broader meaning with respect to the standard industrial
organization literature and it might generate diﬀerent results with diﬀerent policy implications.
As a ﬁrst step, we provide a model to analyze platforms' behavior, in monopoly as well as in duopoly,
with vertical diﬀerentiation. In a context where platforms endogenously provide their quality levels,
we calculate the equilibrium values of advertising, the optimal subscription fees of the viewers/readers
and the quality provision in both monopoly and duopoly cases. Then, by considering a duopoly with
sequential moves, we investigate how the possibility of entry by a potential competitor not only aﬀects
the market share, but also the quality provision of each platform. In this respect we illustrate the
feasibility and the proﬁtability of entry deterrence strategy in a two-sided market.
More speciﬁcally, due to the single-homing assumption for readers/viewers, while advertisers are multi-
homing, platforms have monopoly power in providing access to their single-homing customers to the
multi-homing side. In this respect platforms act as "bottlenecks" between advertisers and consumers,
by oﬀering sole access to their respective set of consumers. This assumption is crucial to explain
the prevailing competition on consumers' side. Furthermore, this is the driving force of the proﬁt
neutrality result in duopoly.5 We also model advertisers as not strategic: their payoﬀs do no depend
on what other advertisers do, but from an advertising beneﬁt, related to market demand. This behavior
suits the case of informative advertising.
We think that the eﬀects of endogenous quality provision with diﬀerent market structures in a two-
sided framework deserve a closer attention. In fact, in this set up, we have two forces at stake.
Higher quality induces consumers to pay higher subscription fees to join the platform. In turn, the
platform can extracts surplus on the advertisers side and "invest" them in a reduction of subscription
fees, implying that advertisers cross-subsidize single-homing consumers. Therefore, given the proﬁt
neutrality, a sort of substitution between quality and advertising comes up. To anticipate the results,
we show that the threat of entry may induce a lower diﬀerentiation in terms of quality.
1.1.1 Related literature
Media market represents an idiosyncratic example of a two-sided market (see Caillaud and Jullien
(2001, 2003), Anderson and Coate (2005), Armstrong (2006), Rochet and Tirole (2006) as seminal
references). In particular, our paper belongs to the approach of two-sided markets with vertical
diﬀerentiation. In this stream of the literature, Armstrong (2005) and Weeds (2013) provide a model
with endogenous quality provision in the two-sided context of digital broadcasters. By comparing
competition in two diﬀerent regimes, free-to-air and pay-TV, they show that programme quality is
higher in the pay-tv which is also optimal by a social point of view. In a similar setting, Anderson
(2007), analyzes the eﬀect of an advertising cap on the quality provision of a monopoly broadcaster and
on welfare. He shows that advertising time restriction may improve welfare, but it may also decrease
programme quality. More recently, Lin (2011) have extended the analysis to the direct competition
among two platforms, where one operate as free-to-air broadcaster, while the second one is a pay-
TV broadcaster. In this framework he shows that platforms vertically diﬀerentiate their programmes
according to the degree of viewers' dislike for advertising. In the same stream, Gonzales-Mestre and
Martinez-Sanchez (2013) study, in the free-to-air broadcasting industry, the role of a publicly owned
platforms in providing quality, social welfare and optimal level of advertising.
Roger (2010) and Ribeiro et al. (2014) are also close to the present work. They both consider a two-
sided structure in the media market, with vertical diﬀerentiation as described by Gabszewicz, Wauthy
(2012). On one side, in a slightly diﬀerent context, with respect to the present model, Roger fully
characterizes a duopoly equilibrium in pure strategy (and mixed one), with respect to prices, market
shares and quality. While Ribeiro et al. (2014) show that a negligible shock on the consumers' side
can be disruptive for the market equilibrium when platforms compete on two sides.
5For a further discussion on the role of the single-homing or multi-homing assumption see Roger (2010).
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Notice that, diﬀerently from our model, all the above contributions but Anderson (2007),6 focus on
the duopoly case, neglecting the monopoly behavior.
For what concerns competition between broadcasters, we refer in particular to Crampes et al. (2009),
and Peitz and Valletti (2008). The former paper examines a free-entry model of broadcasting with
exogenous programme quality, while we consider competition and entry with endogenous quality pro-
vision. The second paper compares advertising intensity and content programming in a market with
duopoly broadcasters choosing the degree of horizontal diﬀerentiation (i.e. platforms choose the de-
gree of programme diversity in the horizontal space, rather than vertical programme quality). In this
perspective, our model might be interpreted as a translation to the vertical diﬀerentiation context to
the Peitz and Valletti (2008) work, with also the extension to the analysis of entry competition.
Finally, our paper is related to an older stream of the literature on industrial organization about vertical
diﬀerentiation. In particular we are in debt with the well known work of Shaked and Sutton (1982,
1983), which illustrates market equilibrium when ﬁrms compete in a vertical diﬀerentiated framework
and they are ranked according to their quality levels. We extend their conditions to our two-sided
framework in order to explain the role of entry and competition.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the general model, while Sections 1.3 and 1.4
respectively provide the full characterization of the equilibrium in monopoly and duopoly. Section 5
deals with competition issue. Finally, Section 1.6 investigates the strategy of entry deterrence. Some
conclusive remarks (Section 1.7) close the paper.
1.2 Set up
1.2.1 Individuals
There is a continuum of individuals of mass N . They constitute the buyer side in the market. If
individuals join a platform they are exposed to contents 7 and to some informative advertising about
market products. All individuals value quality of information in the sense of vertical diﬀerentiation:
quality of platforms' content is denoted by the parameter θ ∈ Θ = [θ, θ] with θ > θ > 0. Individuals
have private valuation β for quality of information, which can be interpreted as their willingness to pay
for it. The individual taste for quality β is distributed uniformly on an interval [β, β] with β > β > 0.
Moreover, individuals are assumed to dislike advertising. In presence of ads, their utility loss is δa,
where a denotes the advertising level and δ the disutility parameter for being exposed to it. Diﬀerently
from β , the parameter δ is assumed to be invariant across individuals. All individuals can access at
most one platform (single-homing).
The utility of an individual from joining platform i of quality θ is:
ui = V − δai + βθi − si (1.2.1)
where V is the utility of accessing the platform independently of its quality, θi denotes platform i 's
quality and ai the level of advertising. Finally, si stands for the subscription fee or the price to access
the platform i. Each individual has a a reservation utility u0 = 0.
We are able to characterize the individual indiﬀerent between assessing a platform i or not assessing
at all :
β0i =
δai − V
θi
+
si
θi
(1.2.2)
While the individual indiﬀerent between two platforms is described as follows:
6Also Kremhelmer and Zenger (2008) consider a monopoly set up. However, they focus on the problem of adverse
selection in the provision of advertising, overlooking the issue of quality.
7Media contents are meant in a broad sense, including both information (or hard news) and entertaiment (or soft
news).
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βik =
δ (ai − ak)
(θi − θk) +
(si − sk)
(θi − θk) (1.2.3)
for k 6= i and i > k.
The expression of β0i and βik deﬁne Bi, namely the share of individuals willing to join the platform i.
1.2.2 Advertisers
The supply side is made by producers who access the platform to advertise their products. They
sell products of quality α which are produced at constant marginal costs, set equal to zero. Product
quality α is distributed on a interval [0, α] according to a distribution function F (α). Individuals have
willingness to pay α for a good of quality α. Each producer has monopoly power and can therefore
extract the full surplus from individuals by selling their product at price equal to α. As standard in
this class of models, we assume advertising to be informative and that just individuals watching the
advertisement buy the good. Hence, we refer to producers as advertisers. Advertisers are allowed to
multihome and they can advertise in none, one or more platforms. Advertisers have to pay to the
platform i an advertising charge ri. Therefore, advertisers' proﬁts on platform i are:
Πa = NαiBi − ri (1.2.4)
The advertising charge ri is endogenously determined by each platform. Due to assumption of single
homing on the buyer side, each media platform behaves as a monopoly in carrying its audience to
advertiser. Therefore, the advertising charge ri is set in order to leave the marginal advertiser with
zero proﬁt, Πa = NαiBi − ri = 0:
αi =
ri
NBi
(1.2.5)
Thus, the amount of advertising for each platform is the share of advertisers with α > αi:
ai = 1− F
(
ri
NBi
)
(1.2.6)
1.2.3 Platforms
Media markets are characterized by a broad range of business models,8 both under private or public
ownership:9 free-to-air Tv under which broadcast platforms are ﬁnanced just trough advertising rev-
enues, pay-TV under which they are ﬁnanced through subscription revenues and mixed regime under
which they are ﬁnanced through both subscription fees and advertising. Therefore, to encompass all
these cases, we consider a very general framework where platforms are ﬁnanced both by advertising as
well as subscription fees.
Platforms set the advertising space, the subscription prices, which might be positive or negative (sub-
sidies) and their qualities. We assume neither constraints on advertising space (caps)10 nor costs of
running ads. Quality however is costly to provide. We assume that this quality cost is independent
of the number of units and is ﬁxed at K (see e.g. Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Hung and Schmitt
8In a recent work Calvano and Polo (2014) endogenize the choice of business model by platforms, namely the choice
between Free-to-Air and Pay- TV's. In their model they analyse the incentives to a strategic diﬀerentiation by business
models and they show under which conditions an asymmetric equilibrium exists in which the two ﬁrms opt for opposite
business models.
9In Italy, for instance, we have a public broadcaster ﬁnanced both by subscription fees (canone RAI) as well as
advertising revenues. At the same time we have both free-to-air private operators, such as Mediaset, totally ﬁnanced
through advertising, and private pay-TVs ﬁnanced through subscription fees and advertising revenues (e.g. Sky).
10Advertising is trivially just assumed to be positive or null.
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(1988)).This assumption ﬁts very well the structure of the ICT and media markets, where there is a
prominent role of ﬁxed costs compared to marginal ones (see e.g. Shapiro and Varian (1998), Areeda
and Hovenkamp (2014)).11 In other words, once the cost is occurred, the higher quality outlet can be
handed out to individuals without any additional charge.12
Hence, a media platform collects revenues from both individuals and advertisers. For any platform i
the objective function takes the form:
Πi (si, ai, ri, θi) = NBisi + airi −K (1.2.7)
1.2.4 Timing
We assume a three-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, platforms choose quality levels of their contents.
Then, in the second stage, subscription fees and advertising spaces are set. Finally, in the third stage
individuals and advertisers simultaneously decide whether to join a platform or not. Individuals can
join at most one platform (single-homing) while advertisers might join more than one (multi-homing).
The game is solved backward for a monopoly structure and a duopoly one.
1.3 Monopoly
1.3.1 Monopoly: Individuals' and Advertisers' Demands
By considering the individual indiﬀerent between accessing the monopoly platform or not accessing at
all, we obtain the demand function of individuals.
From (1.2.2), by assuming V = 0:
β0M =
δaM
θM
+
sM
θM
(1.3.1)
Since individuals are uniformly distributed between β and β, the demand for the monopoly platform
is simply given by the fraction of population with a taste for quality greater than β0M :
NBM = N(β − β0M ) = N
(
βθM − sM − δaM
θM
)
(1.3.2)
Notice that the demand is positive if:
βθM ≥ δaM + sM (1.3.3)
From (1.2.6), the share of advertisers willing to join the platform becomes:
aM = 1− F
(
rM
NBM
)
(1.3.4)
Having deﬁned the demand function of individuals and advertisers for given prices rM and sM , by
simultaneously solving equations (1.3.2) and (1.3.4) we get:
rM (sM , aM , θM ) = F
−1(1− aM )N(βθM − sM − δaM
θM
) (1.3.5)
This equation describes how advertising charges react to changes in subscription price, advertising and
quality.
11This cost assumption can be justiﬁed in the theory of innovation, by the idea that product innovations, endowed
with a better quality, depends upon a ﬁxed investment in R&D.
12For a further discussion on the role of cost function see Conclusions.
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1.3.2 Monopoly: Platform's Subscription Fees and Advertising Level
According to the above assumptions, the monopoly platform maximizes proﬁts subject to a positivity
constraint on the advertising level:{
max
aH ,sH
ΠM = NBMsM + aMrM −K
s.t.aM ≥ 0
(1.3.6)
First order conditions are:
∂ΠM
∂aM
= N
∂BM
∂aM
sM + rM + aM
∂rM
∂aM
≤ 0 (1.3.7)
and
∂ΠM
∂sM
= NBM +N
∂BM
∂sM
sM + aM
∂rM
∂sM
= 0 (1.3.8)
Then, according to the literature, we deﬁne the advertising revenues per individual as ρ(ai)
ρ(ai) =
airi
NBi
=
aiF
−1(1− ai)NBi
NBi
= aiF
−1(1− ai) (1.3.9)
We assume ρ(ai) to be concave in the interval a ∈ [0, 1]. Given that ρ(ai) = 0 for ai = 0 and ai = 1,
the function is single-peaked.
Using the deﬁnition (1.3.9) for the monopoly platform we can rewrite optimality conditions, proving
the following Proposition.
Proposition 1. The optimal advertising level of the monopoly media platform is:
ρ′(aM ) = δ (1.3.10)
Proof. Given (1.3.9) for the monopoly platform
ρ(aM ) =
aMrM
NBM
=
aMF
−1(1− aM )NBM
NBM
= aMF
−1(1− aM )
we have:
rM =
NBMρ(aM )
aM
(1.3.11)
Therefore optimality conditions (1.3.7) and (1.3.8) rewrite into (1.3.12) and (1.3.13):
NsM
∂BM
∂aM
+ rM + aM
[(
NBMρ(aM )+N
∂BM
∂aM
ρ(aM )
)
aM−NBMρ(aM )
a2M
]
≤ 0 (1.3.12)
NBM +NsM
∂BM
∂sH
+ aM
∂rM
∂sM
= 0 (1.3.13)
By easy calculation, (1.3.12) and (1.3.13) become respectively:
∂BM
∂aM
(sM + ρ(aM )) +BMρ
′(aM ) ≤ 0 (1.3.14)
∂BM
∂sM
(sM + ρ(aM )) +BM = 0 (1.3.15)
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Given that
∂BM
∂aM
= − δ
θM
and
∂BM
∂sM
= − 1
θM
, we get:
∂BM
∂aM
= δ
∂BM
∂sM
Therefore, plugging in (1.3.14) and (1.3.15), we get the following system:δ
∂BM
∂sM
(sM + ρ(aM )) +BMρ
′(aM ) ≤ 0
∂BM
∂sM
(sM + ρ(aM )) +BM = 0
Finally, if aM > 0 the above inequality is satisﬁed by equality. Therefore, given that ρ(aM ) is single-
peaked, aM is uniquely determined by the following condition:
ρ′(aM ) = δ
with δ < α. Otherwise it is zero.
The above Proposition 1 states that for a monopoly platform the best reply is to set a ﬁxed advertising
space just depending on the disutility of the individuals, as measured by parameter δ. However, the
platform does not set the maximum amount of advertising. Notice that our result is in contrast with
the suggestion of Peitz and Valletti (2008), where the market is covered and the monopoly advertising
space would be maximum at ρ′ (aM ) = 0.
We can now solve for the equilibrium values, as stated in the following Proposition.
Proposition 2. With ρ(aM ) concave, we obtain the equilibrium price s
∗
M and demand B
∗
M as function
of quality, revenues per viewer and advertising level.
Proof. By plugging the expression for BM in the optimality condition (1.3.15) we obtain:
s∗M =
βθM − ρ (a∗M )− δa∗M
2
(1.3.16)
Then,
B∗M =
βθM + ρ (a
∗
M )− δa∗M
2θM
(1.3.17)
The above Proposition 2 shows the result of proﬁt neutrality. Revenues from the advertising side are
counterbalanced by a decrease in the subscription fee. However, just half of the revenues from advert-
ising is involved in this pass-through eﬀect (see equation (1.3.16)). Moreover, given that subscription
fee positively depends on quality, a sort of substitutability between advertising and quality emerges.
1.3.3 Monopoly: Platform's Quality
In order to solve the quality stage, we maximize monopoly proﬁts ΠM (s
∗
M , a
∗
M , r
∗
M , θM ) with respect
to quality θM . We obtain the following FOC, subject to θM ≥ 0 :
∂ΠM
∂θM
= N
(
β
2
θ2M − (ρ (a∗M )− δa∗M )2
4θ2M
)
= 0 (1.3.18)
By computing the second order condition, we show the convexity of the proﬁt function:
17
∂2ΠM
∂θ2M
=
N(ρ (a∗M )− δa∗M )2
2θ3M
> 0 (1.3.19)
Unfortunately, in this general framework we cannot determine analytically the equilibrium solution
θ∗M . However, we restrict ourselves on the increasing slope of the proﬁt function (1.3.6). Therefore,
we restrict the technological range of quality (Θ) to a narrower set:
ΘR =
[
θ, θ¯
]
with θ =
ρ (a∗M )− δa∗M
β
Therefore, we can prove the following result,
Proposition 3. In equilibrium, under ΘR, the monopoly platform chooses the maximum quality.
Proof. By comparing monopoly proﬁt functions in θ and θ¯, given ΘR =
[
θ, θ¯
]
with θ =
ρ(a∗M )−δa∗M
β ,
respectively:
Π∗M (θ) =
N(βθ + ρ (a∗M )− δa∗M )2
4θ
−K
Π∗M
(
θ¯
)
=
N(βθ¯ + ρ (a∗M )− δa∗M )2
4θ¯
−K
we get:
Π∗M
(
θ¯
)−Π∗M (θ) = 14θ¯N (δa∗M − ρ (a∗M ) + βθ¯)2 > 0
For θ ∈ ΘR proﬁt are convex and increasing in quality. Therefore to maximize proﬁt the monopoly
platform set θ∗M = θ¯.
Given our result on quality, we obtain equilibrium values for subscription fee and individuals' share:
s∗M =
βθ − ρ (a∗M )− δa∗M
2
(1.3.20)
B∗M =
βθM + ρ (a
∗
M )− δa∗M
2θM
(1.3.21)
Equilibrium proﬁts are:
Π∗M
(
θ¯
)
=
N(βθ¯ + ρ (a∗M )− δa∗M )2
4θ¯
−K (1.3.22)
Notice that all equilibrium values depend on β, on the technological constraint, namely the upper
bound θ¯, and on the disutility of advertising δ.
We also provide equilibrium results considering a uniform distribution of advertisers, as a special case.
Lemma 1. In the special case where p.d.f. of advertisers F is uniform on [0, 1], equilibrium values
are:
a∗M =
1− δ
2
(1.3.23)
s∗M =
4βθ − (1− δ) (1 + 3δ)
8
(1.3.24)
and
B∗M =
βθ +
(
1−δ
2
)2
2θ
(1.3.25)
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1.4 Duopoly
Moving to the duopoly case, we consider two platforms, namely i = 1, 2. Without loss of generality
we assume that i = 1 is the low quality platform, while i = 2 is the high quality one. Thus we set
i = L,H.13 For the remaining we maintain the same assumptions as in the general set up (Section
1.2).
In this framework, we consider a market structure where both ﬁrms are active (meaning that the
individuals' demands for platform H and L are positive) and we look for an equilibrium in the covered
market. First, we rule out the trivial case in which the low-quality platform always faces zero demand in
the price game. As standard in the vertical diﬀerentiation literature (see Tirole 1988), the individuals'
heterogeneity has to be suﬃciently high:
β > 2β (1.4.1)
Second, for the market to be covered, we introduce the following condition:14
βθL ≥
(
β − 2β) (θH − θL)
3
− (ρ (a∗L)− δa∗L) (1.4.2)
which states that in equilibrium also the individual with the lowest taste for quality, gets some positive
utility joining the low-quality platform. If we choose Θ such that condition (1.4.2) holds, we obtain
ex-ante market coverage for every quality belonging to the technological range.15
Therefore, we deﬁne the demand function for the high-quality NBH and for the low-quality NBL,
respectively:
NBH = N
(
β − βLH
β − β
)
= N
(
β
β − β −
δ(aH − aL)
(θH − θL)
(
β − β) − sH − sL(θH − θL) (β − β)
) (1.4.3)
NBL = N
(
βLH − β
β − β
)
= N
(
δ(aH − aL)
(θH − θL)
(
β − β) + sH − sL(θH − θL) (β − β) − ββ − β
) (1.4.4)
The amount of advertising for each platform becomes:
aL = 1− F
(
rL
NBL
)
(1.4.5)
aH = 1− F
(
rH
NBH
)
(1.4.6)
Proﬁt function (1.2.7) rewrites as follow, respectively for the high-quality platform and for the low-
one:16
ΠH (sH , sL, aH , aL, rH , rL, θH , θL) = NBHsH + aHrH −K (1.4.7)
13We relax this ex-ante assumption when we look at the choice of quality (stage 1).
14This condition is obtained with equilibrium results of stage 3 and 2, as it will be clearer later on. Notice that,
compared to the condition ensuring market coverage in a single side framework (see Tirole 1988 p.296) there is an
additional part related to the presence of externalities.
15In a diﬀerent paper, Battaggion and Drufuca (2014), we provide comparative statics for an appropriate set of
parameter values allowing us to deal also with uncovered market.
16Notice that we assume the cost K to be the same for the low-quality and the high-quality case. In fact, assuming
KL 6= KH would introduce an ex-ante asymmetry among platforms which just aﬀect the quality stage.
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ΠL (sH , sL, aH , aL, rH , rL, θH , θL) = NBLsL + aLrL −K (1.4.8)
Analogously to the monopoly case, we solve the game backwards. Thus we omit technical details for
stage 3 and 2.
Let just point out that we obtain the same result on advertising as in the monopoly solution:
Proposition 4. For each platform i, if the proﬁt maximizing advertising level is positive, then it is
constant and it is determined by
ρ′(ai) = δ
Proof. See Appendix 1.7.
The above Proposition 4 states that, for both platforms, a ﬁxed advertising space is the best reply.
In particular, the equilibrium level of advertising depends on the advertising disutility of the indi-
viduals, suggesting that both platform just compete on individuals. In this respect, platforms act as
"bottlenecks" between advertisers and individuals, by oﬀering sole access to their respective set of
individuals.
Notice that our result replicates the outcome of Weeds (2013) in a context of vertical diﬀerentiation
but with quadratic costs.17 We share the same insight that what really matters for competition, in
two-sided markets, is the single-homing part.
Moreover, we point out that:
Remark 1. The strategic advertising choice is the same, regardless the market structure:
ρ′(a∗i ) = δ for i = H,L,M
However, in the duopoly structure, the total amount of advertising doubles the monopoly level. In
particular in the uniform case,
a∗L + a
∗
H = 1− δ = 2a∗M
The above Remark specify that individual platform's strategic advertising choice is neutral with respect
to competitive market structure.18
We can now compare the subscription fees and the advertising prices of the two platforms.
Proposition 5. Platform H sets a higher subscription fee and a lower advertising price, with respect
to platform L: s∗H (θH , θL) > s
∗
L (θH , θL) and r
∗
H (a, ρ) > r
∗
L (a, ρ). Moreover, they share the market in
a ﬁxed proportion: B∗H > B
∗
L.
Proof. See Appendix 1.7.
Looking at equilibrium subscription fees and market shares, B∗H and B
∗
L , it is straightforward to see
a "proﬁt neutrality" result: advertising does not directly aﬀect the market shares and therefore the
equilibrium proﬁts, but it just have an impact on the subscription fees.
s∗H (θH , θL, a
∗, δ) =
(
2β − β) (θH − θL)
3
− ρ(a∗) (1.4.9)
s∗L (θH , θL, a
∗, δ) =
(
β − 2β) (θH − θL)
3
− ρ(a∗) (1.4.10)
17Peitz and Valletti (2008) also ﬁnd a similar result in a context of horizontal diﬀerentiation.
18This intuition is in line with Ambrus et al. (2014). They show that platform ownership does not aﬀect advertising
levels, despite non trivial strategic interactions between platforms.
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In particular, comparing monopoly with duopoly, it is straightforward to see how the proﬁt neutral-
ity result is stronger under the latter. Indeed, advertising revenues are entirely devoted to reduce
subscription fees, while in the monopoly case we just have half displacement (see equation (1.3.16)).
We can now solve the initial stage of the game, namely the quality choice. To anticipate results, we get
that proﬁts increase in qualities' distance as standard in vertical diﬀerentiation models with single-side.
Given our assumption on costs, platforms have the incentive to maximal diﬀerentiate.
Proposition 6. In equilibrium the high quality platform chooses a quality level, θ∗H = θ¯ and the low
quality platform chooses the minimum quality level, θ∗L = θ.
Proof. Rewriting proﬁt function for H and L respectively, (1.4.7) and (1.4.8) we have:
Π∗H (θH , θL) = s
∗
HNB
∗
H + ρ(aH)NB
∗
H −K = N (
β−2β)2(θH−θL)
9(β−β) −K (1.4.11)
Π∗L (θH , θL) = s
∗
LNB
∗
L + ρ(aL)NB
∗
L −K = N (
β−2β)2(θH−θL)
9(β−β) −K (1.4.12)
Computing the FOCs, under the assumption of non-negativity constraint of qualities, we obtain:
∂Π∗H
∂θH
=
(
β − 2β)2
9(β − β) N > 0
∂Π∗L
∂θL
= −
(
β − 2β)2
9(β − β) N < 0
Hence:
θ∗H = θ, θ
∗
L = θ
To make our results comparable with the monopoly case, we also provide equilibrium results with the
uniform distribution of advertisers.
Lemma 2. In the special case where the p.d.f. of advertisers F (·) is uniform on [0, 1] equilibrium
values are:
a∗L = a
∗
H = a
∗ =
1− δ
2
(1.4.13)
s∗H (θH , θL, δ) =
(
2β − β) (θ − θ)
3
− 1− δ
2
(
1 + δ
2
) (1.4.14)
s∗L (θH , θL, δ) =
(
β − 2β) (θ − θ)
3
− 1− δ
2
(
1 + δ
2
) (1.4.15)
Notice that, the advertising level is decreasing in the disutility parameter δ. Instead, both subscription
fees s∗L and s
∗
H are increasing in δ. This result is in line with our ﬁndings about proﬁt neutrality: a
higher δ implies lower advertising revenues to be used in the reduction of fees. As expected, proﬁts
are neutral in δ, diﬀerently from the monopoly case (see equation (1.3.22))
Finally, equilibrium market shares and qualities are not aﬀected by the assumption on F (·).
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1.5 Competition
In this Section we take into account the eﬀects of competition on market structure and on platforms'
qualities. We have already considered both monopoly and duopoly situation and their comparison.
However, the above framework does not allow to deal with the potential competition and the issue
of incumbency advantage. Therefore we analyze quality diﬀerentiation in a framework of sequential
entry. We slightly modify our timing by considering an Incumbent platform and an Entrant platform.
We split the quality choice stage: the Incumbent platform (I) sets quality ﬁrst, followed by the Entrant
platform (E). Technology structure and proﬁt function are the same, but for the entry cost F , as it
is standard in this literature. In this framework we focus on the existence conditions of a duopoly
equilibrium and we check robustness by looking at the entry deterrence strategy by the Incumbent.
1.5.1 Sequential Duopoly
As already mentioned, in order to deal with a sequential equilibrium, we slightly modify the timing
of the game. Nothing change for stages 3 and 2, while we separate the quality decision of the two
platforms: the Incumbent platform sets quality ﬁrst, followed by the Entrant platform. After quality-
choice the two platforms set simultaneously their prices for advertising and subscription fees, ri and si,
as in the previous setting. Hence, the equilibrium solutions for stages 3 and 2 still hold (see Proposition
5). Recall that equilibrium proﬁts of the high-quality platform were higher with respect to the low-
quality one. Therefore the Incumbent platform will exploit its advantage, behaving as the high quality
one and just living room to entry at the low quality level. Equilibrium solutions of the simultaneous
framework, with E = L for the Entrant and I = H for the Incumbent are as follows.
Equilibrium subscription fees:
s∗I =
(
2β − β) (θI − θE)
3
− ρ(a∗)
s∗E =
(
β − 2β) (θI − θE)
3
− ρ(a∗)
(1.5.1)
Equilibrium demands:
NB∗I = N
2β − β
3
(
β − β)
NB∗E = N
β − 2β
3
(
β − β)
(1.5.2)
Equilibrium advertising prices:
r∗I = N
ρ(a∗)
a∗
2β − β
3
(
β − β) (θI − θE)
r∗E = N
ρ(a∗)
a∗
β − 2β
3
(
β − β) (θI − θE)
(1.5.3)
Equilibrium proﬁts
Π∗I = N
(
2β − β)2
9
(
β − β) (θI − θE)−K
Π∗E = N
(
β − 2β)2
9
(
β − β) (θI − θE)−K − F
(1.5.4)
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Indeed, the Entrant platform ﬁxes its quality in order to maximize proﬁts given the quality choice of
the Incumbent .
Π∗E = N
(
β − 2β)2
9
(
β − β) (θI − θE)−K − F
∂Π∗E
∂θE
|θI = −N
(
β − 2β)2
9
(
β − β) < 0
Given the negative sign of the derivative, platform a E has the incentive to choose the minimum quality
θ.
The ﬁnal stage involves the quality choice of the Incumbent platform:
Π∗I = N
(
2β − β)2
9
(
β − β) (θI − θ∗E)−K
= N
(
2β − β)2
9
(
β − β) (θI − θ)−K
∂Π∗I
∂θI
= N
(
2β − β)2
9
(
β − β) > 0
Given the positive sign of the derivative, platform I has the incentive to choose the maximum quality.
In equilibrium, proﬁts of the sequential duopoly are:
Π∗I = N
(
2β − β)2
9
(
β − β) (θ − θ)−K (1.5.5)
Π∗E = N
(
β − 2β)2
9
(
β − β) (θ − θ)−K − F (1.5.6)
As in the simultaneous case, we obtain a result of maximal diﬀerentiation. Revenues are not changed
for both platforms, however I has the incumbency advantage to be ﬁrst on the market, behaving as
the high quality platform and saving entry costs.
1.5.2 Threat of Entry
In this Section we analyze the eﬀect of potential competition, by means of potential entrance of new
competitors. As above mentioned, the Incumbent platform would behave as the high quality one,
just living room to entry at the low quality level. Given this framework, we point out the impact of
potential competition on platforms' qualities and on their diﬀerentiation.
On the one hand, notice that with ﬁxed cost of entry a potential entrant cannot proﬁtably leapfrog
the high-quality incumbent. In fact, the quality is already at maximum, therefore the only possibility
is to charge lower prices with the same quality. However, the cost of entry prevent this strategy to
be proﬁtable. On the other hand, the existence of positive proﬁts for the low quality platform make
convenient for a potential entrant to get in the market. In this case, by setting a slightly larger
quality the entrant will capture all the low-quality demand. According to Shaked and Sutton (1982)
in a traditional model of vertical diﬀerentiation, there are at most two ﬁrms having positive market
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share and covering the entire market with diﬀerent qualities, for a convenient heterogeneity of the
individuals.19 We show that this condition applies to the two-sided market context too.20
Lemma 3. Let 2β < β < 4β . Then of any n platforms oﬀering distinct qualities, exactly two will
have positive market shares on the buyers' side (audience) at equilibrium. Moreover at equilibrium the
market is covered.
Proof. See Appendix 1.7.
Therefore by assuming 2β < β < 4β we know that in equilibrium the market is covered by the two
highest platforms' qualities. Hence, we can state that a survival strategy for the low quality platform
would be to drive proﬁt to zero. In this way no other platform has the incentive to get in. Given that,
we have to check how quality levels of the Incumbent (high quality) and the Entrant (low quality)
might be aﬀected.
Proposition. Under the threat of entry the equilibrium quality of the Incumbent platform θ∗I lies
in the interval [max(θ˜I ,
˜˜
θI), θ¯] while the product quality choice of ﬁrm E is such that θ
∗
E = θ
∗
I −
(K + F )
9(β−β)
N(β−2β)2
.
Proof. Let start with platform E. Platform E should drive its proﬁt to zero, in order to prevent the
entrance of a new platform:
Π∗E = N
(
β − 2β)2
9
(
β − β) (θI − θE)−K − F = 0 (1.5.7)
then
θ∗E = θI − (K + F )
9
(
β − β)
N
(
β − 2β)2 (1.5.8)
Given the choice of platform E the proﬁt of the Incumbent becomes:
Π∗E (θ
∗
E) = 0
Π∗I (θ
∗
E) =
3β
2 − 3β2(
β − 2β)2K +
(
2β − β)2(
β − 2β)2F
Incumbent proﬁts are constant (independent of quality) and positive. However, we should assess
a range of quality for the platform I compatible with the duopoly equilibrium, such that a second
platform can just survive as a low quality. We calculate two threshold values for the Incumbent, θ˜I
and
˜˜
θI , such that the proﬁts of the Entrant are driven to zero if it enters with the lowest quality θ or
with the highest quality θ¯ respectively:
Π∗E(θ˜I , θ) = 0
θ˜I = θ + (F +K)
9
(
β − β)
N
(
β − 2β)2 (1.5.9)
19That is: 2a < b < 4a, where a and b are the lower and the upper bounds of the distribution respectively (Shaked,
Sutton (1982), p.5).
20We focus on the buyers' side which is the crucial one. In fact, according to the assumption of multi-homing
advertisers the competition on this side does not aﬀect the equilibrium values. Furthermore the optimality condition on
advertising is irrespective of the number of platforms (see Remark 1).
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and
Π∗E(
˜˜
θI , θ¯) = 0
˜˜
θI = θ¯ − (K − F )
9
(
β − β)
N
(
2β − β)2 (1.5.10)
Indeed, if θI > θ˜I then it is possible for platform E to enter at the low level with quality θ
∗
E . If, also,
θI >
˜˜
θI then platform E cannot leapfrog the high quality. Hence under the threat of entry a duopoly
equilibrium exists for θ∗I ∈ max(θ˜I , ˜˜θI), θ¯] and θ∗E = θ∗I − (K + F )
9(β−β)
N(β−2β)2
.
Remark 2. In equilibrium, under the threat of entry the quality diﬀerentiation may decrease: (θ∗I − θ∗E) ≤(
θ¯ − θ).
This statement follows Proposition 1.5.2, by noting ﬁrst that the Incumbent platform does not ne-
cessary reach the maximum quality. While the Entrant platform sets a quality above the minimum
unless the entry cost F and K are suﬃciently high. Notice that if we assume K = 0 and we consider
the minimum θ = ρ(a
∗)−δa∗
β¯
as in the monopoly case, then if (θ∗I − θ∗E) <
(
θ¯ − θ) certainly holds if
θ¯ > F
9(β−β)
N(β−2β)2
+ ρ(a
∗)−δa∗
β¯
.
The threat of entry shakes the equilibrium conﬁguration. The quality of platform I might decrease,
while the quality of platform E might increase. Therefore quality diﬀerentiation may shrink. In
this respect there is no evidence that increasing competition positively aﬀect the high quality of the
Incumbent. Conversely, potential competition, namely the threat of entry, can boosts the quality of
the Entrant from a minimum level.21
1.6 Entry Deterrence
To check the robustness of the previous equilibria, we wonder if investment in quality might be a
successful deterrence strategy. More precisely, we state under which conditions an incumbent prevents
entry in the market. In this way we endogenize the monopoly structure in a two-sided framework with
a quality choice. The diﬀerence in equilibrium qualities between the accommodation case (duopoly)
and the deterrence case (threatened monopoly), measures the eﬀects of the potential competition.
This analysis is performed introducing a new stage of the game, where the Entrant platform has to
take the decision to enter the market or to stay out, while the Incumbent platform is already in. In
order to distinguish from the previous case, we slightly modify the notation such that the Incumbent
is deﬁned as platform 1 and the Entrant as platform 2.
In this framework we check whether or not deterrence is a feasible strategy. We compute proﬁts of
platform 1 in case of deterrence. If platform 1 decides to preempt the entry of the potential entrant,
it behaves as a threaten monopolist. In this case, all the assumptions of the monopoly - uniform
distribution of advertisers between (0,1) and θ =
(1− δ)2
4β
- hold. Having deﬁned threshold values θ˜1
and
˜˜
θ1 (see equations (1.5.9) and (1.5.10) ), as in Proposition 1.5.2, we prove the following statement.
Proposition 7. Given θ˜1 and
˜˜
θ1, if:
• θ˜1 < ˜˜θ1 monopoly platform cannot prevent entry for θ ∈ (θ, θ¯), therefore deterrence is an
unfeasible strategy (a)
21Notice that our insights are in the same line with results of Hung and Schmitt (1988) in a traditional one-side
market.
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• θ˜1 > ˜˜θ1 monopoly platform can prevent entry for θD1 = θ˜1 − ε, with ε enough close to zero,
therefore deterrence is a feasible strategy (b)
Proof. (a) According to Proposition 1.5.2, to prevent the entry of a high quality platform, the in-
cumbent should set θ1 >
˜˜
θ1, while it prevents entry on low quality level if θ1 < θ˜1. Therefore it is
straightforward to see that if θ˜1 <
˜˜
θ1 it does not exist any θ1 such that entry is prevented at both high
quality and low quality levels.
(b) According to Proposition 1.5.2, we know that for θ˜1 >
˜˜
θ1 it exist a value of θ1 such that the
incumbent can prevent the entry on both high quality and low quality sides. In particular for ∀θ ∈(˜˜
θ1, θ˜1
)
entry can be deterred. Recalling that for a quality θ ≥ θ = (1− δ)
2
4β
the monopoly proﬁts
are increasing in quality. Hence, the incumbent optimal deterrence strategy is to set θD1 = θ˜1− ε close
enough to θ˜1.
The above proposition states under which conditions platform 1 is able to deter entry. In case (a) the
only equilibrium strategy is accommodation, while in case (b), entry deterrence is feasible but it is not
necessarily an equilibrium. To be an equilibrium, monopoly proﬁt in the deterrence quality θD1 must
be higher than duopoly's one (accommodation). Otherwise, platform 1 should accommodate even if
θ˜1 >
˜˜
θ1.
According to Proposition 7, if θ˜1 >
˜˜
θ1platform 1 can prevent entry for θ
D
1 = θ˜1 − ε, with ε enough
close to zero. Now, we should check when the entry deterrence strategy is proﬁtable with respect to
the accommodation strategy. We calculate deterrence proﬁt in θD1 :
ΠM (θ
D
1 ) =
N
(
βθD1 +
(
1−δ
2
)2)2
4θD1
−K (1.6.1)
Considering θD1 =θ˜1 − ε and taking the limit of (1.6.1), we obtain:
lim
ε→0
ΠM (θ
D
1 ) =
N
(
β
(
(1− δ)2
4β
+ (F +K)
9
(
β − β)
N
(
β − 2β)2
)
+
(
1−δ
2
)2)2
4
(
(1− δ)2
4β
+ (F +K)
9
(
β − β)
N
(
β − 2β)2
) −K (1.6.2)
We compare (1.6.2) with the duopoly proﬁts (accommodation case) as previously calculated in Pro-
position 1.5.2:
Π1 =
3β
2 − 3β2(
β − 2β)2K +
(
2β − β)2(
β − 2β)2F (1.6.3)
Under the assumptions K = 0, N = 1 and 2β < β < 4β we compare (1.6.1) and (1.6.3). There exists
a threshold value of the ﬁxed cost of entry F
(
δ, β, β
)
which makes the accommodation and deterrence
proﬁts equal. According to these values, we deﬁne the condition under which deterrence is proﬁtable
with respect to accommodation. Indeed, for F < F
(
δ, β, β
)
accommodation proﬁts are lower then the
deterrence ones, making preemption a proﬁtable strategy.
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1.6.1 Entry Deterrence: a Numerical Simulation
Unfortunately we are not able to ﬁnd an analytical solution for F
(
δ, β, β
)
and, in turn, the conditions
such that F < F
(
δ, β, β
)
holds. However, we can perform a numerical simulation to ascertain the
existence of a set of parameter values such that entry deterrence strategy is proﬁtable with respect to
the accommodation.
Given that F depends upon δ, β, β we start by restricting the set of values of β, β according to Lemma
3. Doing that we set the value of β as a function of diﬀerent values of β. Then, we compute deterrence
proﬁts, (1.6.2), and accommodation ones, (1.6.3), for every combination of β and β
(
β
)
.22 This simula-
tion has been repeated for three diﬀerent values of δ ∈ (0, 1), namely 0.01, 0.5 and 0.9. The numerical
simulation does not make any remarkable diﬀerence according to the δ change, therefore we just show
the results for δ = 0.5.
Table 1.6.1: Monopoly (ΠM (θ
D
1 )) and Duopoly (Π1) Proﬁts for δ = 0.5
β β = 2.00001β β = 3β β = 4β
0.00001 ΠM (θ
D
1 ) =
(1.8×1011F+0.125)2
3.6×1016F+12500
Π1 = 9.0001× 1010F
ΠM (θ
D
1 ) =
(54F+0.125)2
7.2×106F+8333.3
Π1 = 25F
ΠM (θ
D
1 ) =
(27F+0.125)2
2.7×106F+6250
Π1 = 12.25F
0.5 ΠM (θ
D
1 ) =
(1.8×1011F+0.125)2
7.2001×1011F+0.25
Π1 = 9.0001× 1010F
ΠM (θ
D
1 ) =
(54F+0.125 )2
144F+0.16667
Π1 = 25F
ΠM (θ
D
1 ) =
(27.0F+0.125)2
54.0F+0.125
Π1 = 12.25F
1 ΠM (θ
D
1 ) =
(1.8×1011F+0.125)2
3.6×1011F+0.125
Π1 = 9.0001× 1010F
ΠM (θ
D
1 ) =
(54F+0.125 )2
72F+8.3333×10−2
Π1 = 25.0F
ΠM (θ
D
1 ) =
(27F+0.125)2
27F+0.0625
Π1 = 12.25F
5 ΠM (θ
D
1 ) =
(1. 8×1011F+0.125)2
7.2001×1010F+2.5×10−2
Π1 = 9.0001× 1010F
ΠM (θ
D
1 ) =
(54F+0.125)2
72
5
F+1.6667×10−2
Π1 = 25.0F
ΠM (θ
D
1 ) =
(27F+0.125)2
27
5
F+0.0125
Π1 = 12.25F
12 ΠM (θ
D
1 ) =
(1.8×1011F+0.125)2
3.0×1010F+1.0417×10−2
Π1 = 9.0001× 1010F
ΠM (θ
D
1 ) =
(54F+0.125)2
6F+6.9444×10−3
Π1 = 25.0F
ΠM (θ
D
1 ) =
(27F+0.125)2
9
4
F+5.2083×10−3
Π1 = 12.25F
A closer look at the deterrence and accommodation proﬁts (see Table 1.6.1) helps to grab more in-
sights. The key point is that Π1 decreases in the taste for quality β
(
β
)
, which appears to be a quite
counterintuitive ﬁnding. This is the result of a pass-trough eﬀect of a change in the proﬁt of the
entrant platform. Indeed, as already described in Proposition 1.5.2, in case of potential entry, the
platform 2 has to drive proﬁt to zero in order to not induce the entry of further competitors. Given
that the entrant platform's proﬁt would have been increasing in β (see equation 1.5.7), the quality
of the platform 2 must to increase in order to reduce diﬀerentiation and meet again the zero-proﬁt
condition, as stated in equation (1.5.8). Hence, due to a lower diﬀerentiation, Π1 decreases. Therefore,
accommodation proﬁts for the incumbent platform are decreasing in β. In the case of a decrease in
β
(
β
)
analogous results hold (see Tables 1.7.1 and 1.7.2 in Appendix 1.7). For what concerns the
deterrence case, Table 1.6.1 shows a similar path in ΠM (θ
D
1 ). Hence, monopoly proﬁts are decreasing
in β
(
β
)
. To better ﬁgure out this result, we focus on the relationship between quality and β in the
entry deterrence case. From Proposition (7) we have θD1 = θ˜1− ε. By taking the limit of θD1 for ε close
to zero, we get:
θD1 = θ + (F +K)
9(β−β)
N(β−2β)2
= (1−δ)
2
4β
+ (F +K)
9(β−β)
N(β−2β)2
(1.6.4)
By simple calculation from equation (1.6.4) we have:
22We also checked the values of β as a function of diﬀerent values of β, (see Tables 1.7.1 and 1.7.2 in Appendix 1.7) ,
without any relevant diﬀerence in the results. Thus, for the sake of exposition we focus on the β
(
β
)
case.
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∂θD1
∂β
< 0
Given that monopoly proﬁts are increasing in quality, it is straightforward to see that deterrence
proﬁts ΠM (θ
D
1 ) are decreasing in β. The intuition is similar to the accommodation case. Given that
the entrant's proﬁts are increasing in β, the incumbent platform need a lower quality to prevent entry.
Therefore for the platform 1 the cost of deterrence is increasing in β. The same happens in case of a
decrease of β
(
β
)
(see Table 1.7.1).
According to proﬁt functions, we are able to calculate the value of F
(
δ, β, β
)
. As we said, we just
report the result for δ = 0.5 in Table 1.6.2.
Table 1.6.2: Values of F
(
δ, β(β
)
) for δ = 0.5
β β = 2.00001β β = 3β β = 4β
0.00001 F = 1.3889× 10−17 F = 7.5× 10−8 F = 2.0408× 10−7
0.5 F = 1.1236× 10−12 F = 1.5153× 10−2 ∀F > 0
1 F = 9.375× 10−8 ∀F > 0 ∀F > 0
5 ∀F > 0 ∀F > 0 ∀F > 0
12 ∀F > 0 ∀F > 0 ∀F > 0
First, notice that for suﬃciently high levels of β deterrence proﬁts are always larger than the accom-
modation ones for every values of F . Therefore in these cases, without calculating the threshold value
F , we can state that deterrence strategy dominates accommodation. Second, for the remaining cases,
the above Table 1.6.2 shows the values of F such that deterrence and accommodation proﬁts equal.
Therefore, for 0 < F < F deterrence is admissible and proﬁtable, as shown in the graphical example
below (Figure 1.6.1). Otherwise accommodation strategy is preferable.
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Figure 1.6.1: Deterrence (solid line) and accomodation (dashed line) proﬁts.
Given that deterrence (ΠM (θ
D
1 )) and accommodation (Π1) proﬁts move in the same direction according
to changes in β or β (see Table 1.6.1), we where expected an ambiguous eﬀect on the threshold value F .
Coversely, has shown in Table 1.6.2, it is immediate to see a clear path also for F which is increasing
in β
(
β
)
. Apparently, when β goes up, the decrease of deterrence proﬁts is softened by a reduction
of deterrence costs trough the drop of accommodation proﬁts.23 This could be explained a sort of
position advantage of the incumbent platform.
1.7 Conclusions
This paper provides an analysis of vertical diﬀerentiation of two-sided platforms where competition
prevails on one side of the market, namely on the individuals.
We provide a full characterization of the equilibrium for what concerns advertising, subscription fees,
market shares and qualities, both for the monopoly and duopoly cases. In the comparison between the
two market structures, three main results emerge. First, for each platform, if the proﬁts maximizing
advertising level is positive, then it is constant and it is just determined by the disutility parameter δ.
This means that the strategic advertising choice is the same, regardless the market structure. However,
in the duopoly structure, the total amount of advertising doubles the monopoly level. Second, in
duopoly there is a full proﬁt neutrality eﬀect: there is a pass-through of advertising revenues into
lower pay-per-view prices. This eﬀect is reduced in the monopoly case. This result is strongly related
to the issue of competitive bottlenecks and the prevailing competition on individuals' side. Finally,
the monopoly platform chooses the maximum quality while duopoly platforms choose to maximally
diﬀerentiate.
23Coversely in the case of an increase in β(β), we obserse a decrease of F due to a raise of the opportunity costs of
deterrence.
29
Furthermore, we focused on the role of competition by considering potential entry in the two-sided
market and the associated behavior of an incumbent platform. We consider three diﬀerent situations:
a sequential duopoly, a sequential duopoly threaten by the possibility of entry by new competitors
and, as last case, when the incumbent platform may decide to prevent the entry of a second one.
In the case of sequential duopoly threaten by entry, we extend the Shaked and Sutton (1982) result
to a two-sided structure: under some conditions on individuals' heterogeneity, we show that of any n
platforms oﬀering distinct qualities, exactly two will have positive market shares on the buyers' side
(audience) at equilibrium, covering the market. Therefore, the threat of entry shakes the equilibrium
conﬁguration of the sequential duopoly. Indeed, the Incument platform's quality might decrease, while
the quality of the entrant platform might increase and quality diﬀerentiation may shrinks. In this
respect, the model predicts that competition, or the threat of entry, does not necessarly comes out
with a higher quality. However, we show that, for appropriate values of F (δ, β, β), entry deterrence is
a feasible and proﬁtable strategy for the Incumbent platform. Therefore a quality investment might
be a deterrence strategy, restricting competition among platforms.
To conclude, let us point out that our result on quality partially depends on the cost structure used in
this model. Under the assumption of ﬁxed costs, monopoly proﬁt function is convex in quality. One
might expect that this shape strictly depends on the assumption of K, ﬁxed cost of quality. In fact,
in a single-side framework the standard model of vertical diﬀerentiation is solved with quadratic costs
of quality, inducing concavity of proﬁt function. However, in a two-sided setting the issue of concavity
of proﬁt function is more complex. As expectd, linear cost of quality does not solve the problem of
convexity of proﬁt function. But, more surprisingly, even increasing costs of quality do not guarantee
well-shaped monopoly proﬁt function. For instance, quadratic cost of quality (see Weeds (2013)) do
not make concave the monopoly proﬁt function, for what concerns quality, without ad hoc assumptions
on the derivatives. One possible way out would have been to have implicit quality cost functions (see
Anderson (2007)), that, however, should unable us to provide a close solution of the model. Therefore
we chose to introduce a simplest cost function and a technological range bounding the levels of quality,
allowing us to characterize the equilibrium conﬁguration.24
24In Battaggion and Drufuca (2015) we consider also the case of a monopoly platform choosing the minimum quality.
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Appendix
Proof Proposition 4
Proof. Platforms maximize proﬁts, (1.4.8) and (1.4.7), subject to ai ≥ 0 with i = H,L. The ﬁrst
order conditions with respect to the advertising spaces ai and subscription fees si are:
Nsi
∂Bi
∂ai
+ ri + ai
∂ri
∂ai
≤ 0 (1.7.1)
NBi +Nsi
∂Bi
∂si
+ ai
∂ri
∂si
= 0 (1.7.2)
with i = H,L.
Given (2.6.33) for platform H we have rH =
NBHρ(aH)
aH
and:
∂rH
∂sH
=
1
aH
Nρ(aH)
∂BH
∂sH
∂rH
∂aH
=
[NBHρ
′ +Nρ(aH)∂BH∂aH ]aH −NBHρ(aH)
a2H
Therefore optimality condition (1.7.2) and (1.7.1) rewrite:
BH + (sH + ρ(aH))
∂BH
∂sH
= 0 (1.7.3)
BHρ
′(aH) + (ρ(aH) + sH)
∂BH
∂aH
) ≤ 0 (1.7.4)
Since:
∂BH
∂sH
= δ
∂BH
∂sH
(1.7.4) becomes:
ρ′(aH)
δ
BH + (ρ(aH) + sH)
∂BH
∂sH
) ≤ 0 (1.7.5)
Together with (1.7.3), we obtain the following conditions:{
−BH = (sH + ρ(aH))∂BH∂sH
(ρ
′(aH)
δ − 1)BH ≤ 0
(1.7.6)
If aH > 0 the above inequality is satisﬁed with equality. Therefore, given that ρ(aH) is single-peaked,
aH is uniquely determined by the following condition:
ρ′(a∗H) = δ
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Analogously, for platform L, if aL > 0 we get:
ρ′(a∗L) = δ
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. In the second stage of the game, with ρ(ai) concave, we obtain the equilibrium prices s
∗
H , s
∗
L
and r∗H , r
∗
L as function of qualities, revenues per viewer and advertising. From condition (1.7.3) for
platform H and the analogous condition for platform L, we get:
sH =
sL + β (θH − θL)− δ(aH − aL)− ρ(aH)
2
sL =
sH − β (θH − θL) + δ(aH − aL)− ρ (aL)
2
(1.7.7)
Then, the solution of the above system becomes:
s∗H (θH , θL, ρ(aH), ρ (aL)) =
2
3β (θH − θL)− 13β (θH − θL)− 13δ (aH − aL)− 23ρ(aH)− 13ρ (aL)
(1.7.8)
s∗L (θH , θL, ρ(aH), ρL) =
1
3β (θH − θL)− 23β (θH − θL) + 13δ (aH − aL)− 13ρ(aH)− 23ρ (aL)
(1.7.9)
If we plug s∗H and s
∗
L in the demand function obtained at stage three, (1.4.3) and (1.4.4), we get:
B∗H (θH , θL, ρ(aH), ρ (aL)) =
β
β − β −
(β+β)(θH−θL)+δ(aH−aL)−ρ(aH)+ρ(aL)
3(
β − β) (θH − θL) (1.7.10)
B∗L (θH , θL, ρ(aH), ρ (aL)) =
(β+β)(θH−θL)+δ(aH−aL)−ρ(aH)+ρ(aL)
3(
β − β) (θH − θL) − ββ − β (1.7.11)
Finally, considering
rL ((sH , sL, aH , aL, θH , θL)) =
F−1(1− aL)NBL (1.7.12)
rH (sH , sL, aH , aL, θH , θL) =
F−1(1− aH)NBH (1.7.13)
we end with:
r∗H (θH , θL, ρ(aH), ρ (aL)) =
ρ (aH)
aH
N
((
2β − β) (θH − θL)− δ (aH − aL) + ρ(aH)− ρ (aL)
3
(
β − β) (θH − θL)
)
(1.7.14)
r∗L (θH , θL, ρ(aH), ρ (aL)) =
ρ (aL)
aL
N
((
β − 2β) (θH − θL) + δ (aH − aL)− ρ(aH) + ρ (aL)
3
(
β − β) (θH − θL)
)
(1.7.15)
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If aL = aH = a
∗ then ρ(aH) = ρ(aL) = ρ(a∗), it will be straightforward to see:
s∗H (θH , θL, a
∗) =
(
2β − β) (θH − θL)
3
− ρ(a∗) >(
β − 2β) (θH − θL)
3
− ρ(a∗) = s∗L (θH , θL, a∗)
and
r∗H (a, ρ) =
ρ (a∗)
a∗
N
( (
2β − β) (θH − θL)
3
(
β − β) (θH − θL)
)
>
ρ (a∗)
a∗
N
( (
β − 2β) (θH − θL)
3
(
β − β) (θH − θL)
)
= r∗L (a, ρ)
Finally,
B∗H =
2β − β
3
(
β − β) > β − 2β3 (β − β) = B∗L
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. We have already stated that for 2β < β low-quality platform has a positive audience (see
Section 1.4).
For β < 4β we follow Shaked and Sutton (1982) with appropriate transformations to ﬁt our two-sided
structure.
From Section 1.4, we know that in equilibrium subscription fees are:
s∗H =
(
2β − β) (θH − θL)
3
− ρ(a∗) (1.7.16)
s∗L =
(
β − 2β) (θH − θL)
3
− ρ(a∗) (1.7.17)
Looking at equilibrium subscription fees, it is straightforward to see that the "proﬁt neutrality" result
still holds. Advertising revenues per viewers ρ(a∗) are entirely spent in reducing subscription fees s∗i .
Due to this neutrality result, we can apply the following transformation to equilibrium demands in
order to have a single price, which is always positive:
pi = si + ρ(ai) > 0
In this way we are able to obtain a framework similar to the one of Shaked and Sutton (1982). We
consider a situation of n platforms ordered by their quality θ1 < θ2 < ... < θn competing for an uniform
audience (same assumptions as in previous sections) covering the entire market25.
Given the equilibrium of stage 2 (a1 = a2 = ... = an = a
∗), indiﬀerent viewers are deﬁned as follows:
25As in Shaked and Sutton (1982), the assumption of market coverage does not change the result of the proof.
However, for the sake of simplicity, we assume it throughout the proof.
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β2 =
p2 − p1
(θ2 − θ1)
β3 =
p3 − p2
(θ3 − θ2)
...
βn =
pn − pn−1
(θn − θn−1)
Demands become:
NB1 = N
(
p2 − p1
(θ2 − θ1) − β
)
NB2 = N
(
p3 − p2
(θ3 − θ2) −
p2 − p1
(θ2 − θ1)
)
...
NBn = N
(
β − pn − pn−1
(θn − θn−1)
)
Platforms' Revenues are:
R1 = p1NB1 = p1N(β2 − β)
R2 = p2NB2 = p2N(β3 − β2)
...
Rn = pnNBn = pnN(β − βn)
Proﬁt maximization w.r.t. quality gives the following optimality conditions:
(β2 − β) + p1( −1
(θ2 − θ1) ) = 0
(β3 − β2) + p2(− 1
(θ3 − θ2) −
1
(θ2 − θ1) ) = 0
...(
β − βn
)
+ pn
(
− 1
(θn − θn−1)
)
= 0
Recall from indiﬀerence conditions:
βn−1 =
pn−1 − pn−2
(θn−1 − θn−1) = pn−1
1
(θn−1 − θn−1) − pn−2
1
(θn−1 − θn−1)
which can be written as:
pn−1
1
(θn−1 − θn−1) = βn−1 + pn−2
1
(θn−1 − θn−1)
Hence we re-write optimality condition for (n− 1)th platform :
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(βn − βn−1)− pn−1 1
(θn − θn−1) − βn−1 − pn−2
1
(θn−1 − θn−1) = 0
βn − 2βn−1 − pn−1 1
(θn − θn−2) − p1
1
(θn−1 − θn−2) = 0
This condition implies that:
βn > 2βn−1 (1.7.18)
We do the same for the optimality condition of nth platform , obtaining:
β − 2βn − pn−1 1
(θn − θn−1) = 0
which implies:
β > 2βn (1.7.19)
Taking conditions (1.7.18) and (1.7.19) together we get:
β ≥ 2βn > 4βn−1
which implies:
β > 4βn−1
Having assumed β < 4β we end up with:
4βn−1 < β < 4β
This inequality implies:
βn−1 < β (1.7.20)
The inequality (1.7.20) implies that market is completely covered by the (n−1)th and the nth platform,
namely those with the highest qualities. This means that all other platforms face a zero market share
on viewers' side.
Notice that we can also show that in a triopoly case, given β < 4β, only the two platform with highest
qualities survive and cover the market. We consider the same framework as in the duopoly case but
with three platforms ranked by quality θ1 < θ2 < θ3. Under market coverage, indiﬀerent consumers
are identiﬁed by:
β12 =
δ (a2 − a1) + (s2 − s1)
θ2 − θ1
β23 =
δ (a3 − a2) + (s3 − s2)
θ3 − θ2
Demands from the consumers' side are respectively:
NB1 = N
1
β − β
(
β12 − β
)
=
N
1
β − β
(
δ (a2 − a1) + (s2 − s1)− β (θ2 − θ1)
θ2 − θ1
)
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NB2 = N
1
β − β (β23 − β12) =
N
1
β − β
(
δ (a3 − a2) + (s3 − s2)
θ3 − θ2 −
δ (a2 − a1) + (s2 − s1)
θ2 − θ1
)
NB3 = N
1
β − β
(
β − β23
)
=
N
1
β − β
(
β (θ3 − θ2)− δ (a3 − a2)− (s3 − s2)
θ3 − θ2
)
Resolution for stages 3 and 2 is standard. From optimality conditions we obtain:
si =
−Bi
∂Bi/∂si
− ρ
where ρ = ρ(ai). Since in equilibrium a1 = a2 = a3 = a
∗ and ρ = ρ(a∗) = ρ∗, we get the following
system:
s1 =
s2 − β (θ2 − θ1)
2
− ρ
∗
2
s2 =
s3 (θ2 − θ1) + s1 (θ3 − θ2)
2 (θ3 − θ1) −
ρ∗
2
s3 =
s2 + β (θ3 − θ2)
2
− ρ
∗
2
Equilibrium access prices are:
s∗1 =
1
6 (θ3 − θ1)
((
β − β) (θ2 − θ1) (θ3 − θ2)− 3β (θ3 − θ1) (θ2 − θ1))− ρ∗
s∗2 =
1
3 (θ3 − θ1)
(
β − β) (θ3 − θ2) (θ2 − θ1)− ρ∗
s∗3 =
1
6 (θ3 − θ1)
((
β − β) (θ3 − θ2) (θ2 − θ1) + 3β (θ3 − θ2) (θ3 − θ1))− ρ∗
Given s∗1 , s
∗
2 and s
∗
3, we check whether or not β12 > β under the condition of 4β > β. If this is the
case, platform 1 faces zero demand and platforms 2 and 3 cover the whole consumer market, conﬁrming
the result of Shaked and Sutton (1982).
β12 =
(s∗2 − s∗1)
θ2 − θ1
=
1
6 (θ3 − θ1)
((
β − β) (θ3 − θ2) + 3β (θ3 − θ1))
β12 − β = 1
6 (θ3 − θ1)
((
β − β) (θ3 − θ2)− 3β (θ3 − θ1))
Which is negative since
(
β − β) < 3β and (θ3 − θ2) < (θ3 − θ1).
Hence β12 < β: the two platforms with highest qualities cover the market, leaving no room for the
low-quality platform.
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Numerical Simulation
Table 1.7.1: Monopoly (ΠM (θ
D
1 )) and Duopoly (Π1) Proﬁts for δ = 0.5
β β = 1
4
β β = 1
3
β β = 1
2.00001
β
0.00001
Π1 = 12.25F
ΠM (θ
D
1 ) =
(27.0F+0.125)2
1.08×107F+25000
Π1 = 25.0F
ΠM (θ
D
1 ) =
(54.0F+0.125)2
2.16×107F+25000
Π1 = 9.0001× 10F
ΠM (θ
D
1 ) =
(1.8×1011F+0.125)2
7.2001×1016F+25000
0.5
Π1 = 12.25F
ΠM (θ
D
1 ) =
(27.0F+0.125)2
216.0F+0.5
Π1 = 25.0F
ΠM (θ
D
1 ) =
(54.0F+0.125)2
432.0F+0.5
Π1 = 9.0001× 10F
ΠM (θ
D
1 ) =
(1.8×1011F+0.125)2
1.44×1012F+0.5
1
Π1 = 12.25F
ΠM (θ
D
1 ) =
(27.0F+0.125)2
108F+0.25
Π1 = 25.0F
ΠM (θ
D
1 ) =
(54.0F+0.125)2
216F+0.25
Π1 = 9.0001× 10F
ΠM (θ
D
1 ) =
(1.8×1011F+0.125)2
7.2001×1011F+0.25
5
Π1 = 12.25F
ΠM (θ
D
1 ) =
(27.0F+0.125)2
21.6F+0.05
Π1 = 25.0F
ΠM (θ
D
1 ) =
(54.0F+0.125)2
43.2F+0.05
Π1 = 9.0001× 10F
ΠM (θ
D
1 ) =
(1.8×1011F+0.125)2
1.44×1011F+0.05
12
Π1 = 12.25F
ΠM (θ
D
1 ) =
(27.0F+0.125)2
9.0F+2.0833×10−2
Π1 = 25.0F
ΠM (θ
D
1 ) =
(54.0F+0.125)2
18.0F+2.0833×10−2
Π1 = 9.0001× 10F
ΠM (θ
D
1 ) =
(1.8×1011F+0.125)2
6.0001×1010F+2.0833×10−2
Table 1.7.2: Values of F
(
δ, β(β)
)
for δ = 0.5
β β = 14β β =
1
3β β =
1
2.00001β
0.00001 F = 5.102× 10−8 F = 2.5× 10−8 F = 6.9444× 10−18
0.5 F = 3.0226× 10−3 F = 1.4726× 10−3 F = 4.0093× 10−13
1 F = 9.0989× 10−3 F = 4.3611× 10−3 F = 1.1236× 10−12
5 ∀F > 0 ∀F > 0 ∀F > 0
12 ∀F > 0 ∀F > 0 ∀F > 0
Chapter 2
Broadcasters Competition on Quality: a
Welfare Perspective 1
2.1 Introduction
Television broadcasting has a long history of salient regulation problems which have been recently
emphasized by the convergence among Internet, computer software and telecommunications. Conven-
tionally, regulatory issues in media markets are classiﬁed into economic and non-economic features.
Where the former are related to the structure of the supply side: the deﬁnition of the relevant market,
the assessment of the degree of concentration and competition, the impact of the ownership structure
and the conditions of the access to the broadcasting service. While the latter mainly focus on the
broadcasting contents and the control of advertising. (Rowat (2007)). The interplay among these eco-
nomic and non-economic issues, which is a peculiar feature of broadcasting, deserves a closer attention
from policy makers and antitrust authorities.
In this respect, our paper would provide a uniﬁed framework to deal with all these issues and to analyze
broadcasting competition with particular concern on quality, prices, share of audience and consumers'
surplus. More precisely, it analyzes the role of competition in a two-sided market characterized by
vertical diﬀerentiation.
Quality is a ﬁrst ingredient of our model. Despite the fact that quality is a relevant characteristic of
broadcasting market, it lacks a clear and common economic deﬁnition (Born and Prosser (2001)). At
a ﬁrst glance quality could be associated with the technological innovations that have deeply aﬀected
broadcasting, such as higher-deﬁnition images or interactive services. In this perspective, quality of
broadcasting can be interpreted in the standard vertical approach. However if we focus on content,
quality is more complex to be deﬁned. As matter of facts, content's quality can be related to accuracy,
truth, impartiality and immediacy of information that helps form public opinion, expresses minority
voices and performs a watchdog role for the public interest.2 For instance Collins (2007), in the public
service broadcasting debate, associates quality to the purpose of providing not only entertainment but
also education, learning and cultural excellence.3 However it is worth to notice that viewers' perception
might diﬀer concerning these dimensions. Indeed, audience has also a taste for variety of broadcasting
output, including cultural programme, popular genres, and sport events. Therefore an increase in
content quality does not necessarily translate into an upward shift of demand and audience. Hence,
some dimensions of content's quality may encompass an horizontal feature.
1This chapter refers to the joint paper Battaggion and Drufuca 2015 "Broadcasters Competition on Quality: a
Welfare Perspective", mimeo.
2Mepham (1990) argues that there is a general rule for assessing television quality, and that is `whether or not [its
production] is governed by an ethic of truth-telling'.
3Ellmann (2014) distinguishes between "soft" and "hard" attributes to media consumption. He deﬁnes hard or
informative attributes of media those generating positive social externalities, whilesoft attributes are those with only
private value, such as graphic quality, sensationalism and entertainment.
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Nevertheless, in a speciﬁc genre, all viewers prefer high quality contents rather than low quality con-
tents,which implies vertical competition on the market. Given these consideration, in the present paper
we assume that broadcasters provide vertically diﬀerentiated output with respect to quality.
A second important aspect we would like to address is the role of competition in a two-sided market.
The reason to consider this kind of market structure is that broadcasting networks compete on two
sides, namely audience and advertisers, in order to maximize proﬁts. Advertising is typically perceived
as a nuisance by the audience and it represents a negative externality, while the audience exerts a
positive externality on advertisers. Therefore, competition has a broader meaning with respect to the
standard industrial organization and might generate diﬀerent results and policy implications. In our
setup, viewers are single-homing, while advertisers are multi-homing, meaning that platforms have
monopoly power in providing access to their single-homing customers. In this respect, platforms act
as "bottlenecks" between advertisers and consumers by oﬀering sole access to their respective set of
consumers. This assumption is crucial to explain the prevailing competition on the consumer side.4 We
also model advertisers as non-strategic: their payoﬀs do not depend on what other advertisers do but
rather on beneﬁts related to market demand. This behavior suits the case of informative advertising.
Finally, is well known that media markets are characterized by a broad range of business models, both
under private and public ownership:5 free-to-air TV, where broadcast platforms are only ﬁnanced
through advertising revenues, pay TV, where broadcast stations are ﬁnanced through subscription
revenues, and a mixed regime,where broadcast platforms are ﬁnanced through both subscription fees
and advertising. We consider a very general framework in which platforms are ﬁnanced both by
advertising and subscription fees.6
As previously mentioned, we provide a model of platforms' competition in a framework of vertical
diﬀerentiation. In a context where platforms endogenously provide their quality levels, we calculate
the equilibrium values of advertising, the optimal subscription fees for viewers and the provision of
quality. In particular, we take into account a single-channel and multi-channel monopoly, as well
as a duopoly. In our analysis, we want to stress the importance of having a market which is never
covered ex-ante. We believe indeed that the potential demand has a relevant role and might shake the
equilibrium conﬁguration, in terms of price, quality, audience size and advertising. Furthermore, the
uncovered market conﬁguration ﬁts very well the case of broadcasting market, which is characterized
by continuos technological turmoil with the creation of new market segments. We also calculate the
consumers' surplus for each market conﬁguration to ﬁgure out whether the interplay among contents
quality, subscription fees and advertising might beneﬁt the audience.
To anticipate the results, we show that viewers are always better oﬀ when they are free to choose among
channels of diﬀerent qualities. In our framework, there are two forces at stake. Higher quality induces
consumers to pay higher subscription fees to join the platform. In turn, the platform can extract a
surplus on the advertiser side and "invest" them in a reduction of subscription fees, implying that
advertisers cross-subsidize single-homing consumers. Therefore a sort of substitution between quality
and advertising arises. We also show that competition is beneﬁcial for the audience, resulting in a
viewers' surplus which is larger in the duopoly conﬁguration then in the monopoly, even when both
provide high and low-quality channels. Finally, we illustrate that the chance of catching extra viewers,
as the uncovered market share, disciplines the platforms' behavior in duopoly making consumers'
surplus higher.
4For a further discussion on the role of the single-homing or multi-homing assumption, see Roger (2010).
5In Italy, for instance, there exists a public broadcaster ﬁnanced by subscription fees (canone RAI) as well as
advertising revenues. At the same time, there exist both free-to-air private operators such as Mediaset that are totally
ﬁnanced through advertising and private pay-TV providers ﬁnanced through subscription fees and advertising revenues
(e.g., Sky).
6Subscription fees are set in general terms and could be both positive or negative, encompassing the possibility of
subsidization.
41
2.1.1 Related Literature
Our paper belongs to the literature of vertically diﬀerentiated two-sided markets dealing with welfare
issues. In this stream, Armstrong (2006) and Weeds (2013) provide a model with endogenous quality
provision in the two-sided context of digital broadcasters. By comparing competition in two diﬀerent
regimes, free-to-air and pay TV, they show that program quality is higher for pay TV, which is also
optimal from a social point of view. In a similar setting, Anderson (2007) analyzes the eﬀect of an
advertising cap on the quality provision of a monopoly broadcaster and on welfare. He shows that
advertising time restrictions may improve welfare but may decrease program quality.7 Kind et al.
(2007) perform a welfare analysis with endogenous quality provision and ﬁnd that a merger between
TV channels may be welfare improving. More recently, Lin (2011) extended the analysis to direct
competition between diﬀerent business model, where one platform operates as a free-to-air TV while
the second as a pay-TV. In this framework, he shows that platforms vertically diﬀerentiate their
programs according to the degree of viewers' dislike of advertising. In the same approach, Gonzales-
Mestre and Martinez-Sanchez (2013) study how public-owned platforms aﬀects the program quality
provision, the social welfare and the optimal level of advertising. Diﬀerently, from our model, all
the above contributions focus on the duopoly case, neglecting monopoly behavior with the exception
of Anderson (2007). Furthermore, the duopoly setting is always assumed to be covered, preventing
any welfare consideration about the role of increasing demand. Conversely, we relax this assumption
introducing a set up of uncovered market. We also provide a comparison between the uncovered and
the covered market structure from a welfare perspective.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 illustrates the case of a multi-channel monopoly broad-
caster and Section 2.3 focuses on the welfare comparison between the multi-channel monopoly broad-
caster and a single-channel one. Then, Section 2.4 introduces competition among broadcasters, while
Section2.5 deals with the welfare eﬀects. Finally we provide some conclusions in Section 2.6.
2.2 The Multi-Channel Broadcaster
For the sake of exposition we describe ﬁrst the case of a multi-product monopoly platform and second
the duopoly case.8
A multiproduct monopoly platform can provide vertical diﬀerentiated channels to a uniform
distribution of individuals (viewers 9) of mass 1. We refer to this platform as the multi-channel
broadcaster.
Individuals are assumed to be single-homing. The utility of an individual accessing platform's channel
i is:
ui = V − δai + βθi − si (2.2.1)
and zero otherwise. V is the utility of accessing the platform independently of its quality. The channel's
quality is denoted by the parameter θi which belongs to a technological range Θ = [θ, θ] with θ > θ > 0.
Individuals have a private valuation for information expressed by the parameter β ∼ U [0, 1] which can
be interpreted as their willingness to pay for quality. Moreover, they incur in a nuisance cost δai due
to the presence of advertising on the channels.10 Finally si stands for the subscription charge.
If the platform provides two channels of diﬀerent quality, θH and θL (with θH > θL) it obtains the
following audience shares:
7Although without a speciﬁc reference to quality provision, Dukes (2004) and Anderson and Coate (2005) show that
monopoly media ownership may increase welfare.
8The model in this section builds on that of Battaggion and Drufuca (2014).
9We consider a broadcasting market, which well ﬁts our setting. However, in principle this model might be refered
also to a broader range media (newspapers, as example).
10This cost depends on the intensity of advertising on the channel ai and on a parameter of viewers' aversion to ads
δ. This parameter is assumed to be invariant across individuals.
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BH = 1− βHL = 1− δ (aH − aL)
(θH − θL) −
(sH − sL)
(θH − θL) (2.2.2)
BL = βHL − β0L = δ (aH − aL)
(θH − θL) +
(sH − sL)
(θH − θL) − (
δaL − V
θL
− sL
θL
) (2.2.3)
where βHL and β0L characterize respectively the individual indiﬀerent between the two channels and
the one indiﬀerent between accessing the low-quality channel or not accessing at all.
Advertisers are producers of mass 1 who access the platform to advertise their products to individuals.
They sell products of quality α that are produced at constant marginal costs set equal to zero. Product
quality α is distributed on an interval [0, 1] according to a distribution function F (α).11 Individuals
have a willingness to pay α for a good of quality α. Each producer has monopoly power and can
therefore extract the full surplus from individuals by selling its product at price equal to α. As
standard in this class of models, we assume advertising to be informative and that consumers watching
an advertisement always buy the good. Hence, we refer to producers as advertisers. Diﬀerently from
viewers, advertisers are allowed to multi-home. Advertisers have to pay an advertising charge ri
endogenously determined for each channel. Due to the assumption of single homing on the viewers'
side, each channel behaves as a "monopoly" in carrying its audience to advertisers. Therefore, ri is set
by the platform in order to leave the marginal advertiser with zero proﬁt:
αi =
ri
NBi
(2.2.4)
Thus, the amount of advertising for each channel is the share of advertisers with α > αi:
aH = 1− F
(
rH
BH
)
(2.2.5)
aL = 1− F
(
rL
BL
)
(2.2.6)
The platform sets advertising spaces and subscription prices (unconstrained) and it can provide its
channels' quality θH and θL by incurring a ﬁxed cost K.
12 In other words, once the cost is incurred,
the higher-quality outlet can be provided to individuals without any additional charges. Notice that
since our costs are also ﬁxed in quantity, they meet the requirement of separability.
The multi-product media platform collects revenues from both individuals and advertisers:
ΠMP = (BHsH +BLsL) + aHrH + aLrL − 2K (2.2.7)
Then, according to the literature, we deﬁne the advertising revenues per individual as:
ρ(ai) =
airi
Bi
=
aiF
−1(1− ai)NBi
Bi
= aiF
−1(1− ai) (2.2.8)
We assume ρ(ai) to be concave on the interval a ∈ [0, 1]. Given that ρ(ai) = 0 for ai = 0 and ai = 1,
the function is single-peaked. Hence, proﬁts rewrite as follow:
ΠMP = BH(sH + ρ(aH)) +BL(sL + ρ(aL))− 2K (2.2.9)
We consider a three-stage game. First the monopoly platform chooses the levels of quality. Second,
it sets subscription fees and advertising spaces Finally, in the third stage, viewers and advertisers
simultaneously decide whether to join a channel.
11In the discussion of our results, we will consider also the special case of a uniform distribution of advertisers.
12This assumption ﬁts very well the structure of the ICT and media markets, where there is a prominent role of ﬁxed
costs compared to marginal ones (see e.g., Shapiro and Varian (1998) and Areeda and Hovenkamp (2014)).
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2.2.1 Subscription Fees and Advertising Intensities
Having deﬁned the demand function of viewers and advertisers, for given prices we solve the game
backwards, from stage three. This determines how advertising charges react to pay-per-view prices si
and to advertising levels ai:
rH (sH , sL, aH , aL, θH , θL) = F
−1(1− aH)(θH − θL − (sH − sL)− δ(aH − aL)
θH − θL ) (2.2.10)
rL (sH , sL, aH , aL, θH , θL) = F
−1(1− aL)( (sH−sL)+δ(aH−aL)θH−θL − sL+δaL−VθL ) (2.2.11)
The commercial multi-channel broadcaster relies on advertising revenues and subscription fees to fund
its services. 
max
aH ,aL,sH ,sL
ΠMP = piL + piH = BH(sH + ρ(aH)) +BL(sL + ρ(aL))− 2K
s.t.aH ≥ 0
aL ≥ 0
The platform maximizes proﬁts (2.2.9), with respect to advertising intensity (aH , aL) and subscrip-
tion fees (sH , sL) for each channel, subject to a positivity constraint on advertising. The following
Proposition summarizes results regarding advertising.
Proposition 8. The multi-channel monopoly broadcaster chooses the same advertising intensity, in-
dependently of quality and subscription revenues:
ρ′(ai) = δ
for i = H,L.
Proof. First order conditions with respect to the advertising spaces and subscription fees are respect-
ively, for i, j = H,L with i 6= j:
∂piMP
∂si
=
∂Bi
∂si
(si + ρi) +Bi(1 +
∂ρi
∂si
) +
∂Bj
∂si
(sj + ρj) +Bj(
∂ρj
∂si
) = 0
∂piMP
∂ai
=
∂Bi
∂ai
(si + ρi) +Bi(
∂si
∂ai
+
∂ρi
∂ai
) +
∂Bj
∂ai
(sj + ρj) +Bj(
∂sj
∂ai
+
∂ρj
∂ai
) 5 0
where ρi = ρ(ai) to simplify notation. Given the construction of advertising revenues per individual
(see equation (2.2.8)), we have that ∂ρi∂aj = 0. Moreover
∂si
∂ai
= 0 and ∂si∂aj = 0. Hence, ﬁrst order
conditions simplify as follows:
∂piMP
∂si
=
∂Bi
∂si
(si + ρi) +Bi(1 +
∂ρi
∂si
) +
∂Bj
∂si
(sj + ρj) +Bj(
∂ρj
∂si
) = 0
∂piMP
∂ai
=
∂Bi
∂ai
(si + ρi) +Bi(
∂ρi
∂ai
) +
∂Bj
∂ai
(sj + ρj) 5 0
It is easy to show that ∂BH∂aH = δ
∂BH
∂sH
, ∂BL∂aL = δ
∂BL
∂sL
,∂BH∂aL = δ
∂BH
∂sL
and ∂BL∂aH = δ
∂BL
∂sH
. FOCs rewrite as
follows
∂piMP
∂sH
=
∂BH
∂sH
(sH + ρH) +BH +
∂BL
∂sH
(sL + ρL) = 0 (2.2.12)
∂piMP
∂sL
=
∂BL
∂sL
(sL + ρL) +BL +
∂BH
∂sL
(sH + ρH) = 0 (2.2.13)
∂piMP
∂aH
= δ
∂BH
∂sH
(sH + ρH) +BHρ
′
H + δ
∂BL
∂sH
(sL + ρL) 5 0 (2.2.14)
∂piMP
∂aL
= δ
∂BL
∂sL
(sL + ρL) +BLρ
′
L + δ
∂BH
∂sL
(sH + ρH) 5 0 (2.2.15)
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By substitution we get from (2.2.14) and (2.2.15)
BHρ
′
H + δ(−BH) 5 0
BLρ
′
L + δ(−BL) 5 0
If ai > 0 for i = H,L, then
ρ′(a∗H) = δ (2.2.16)
ρ′(a∗L) = δ (2.2.17)
According to Proposition 8 an optimal decision is to set a ﬁxed advertising space for each channel just
depending on the disutility of the viewers, δ. Moreover, the multi-channel broadcaster does not set
the maximum intensity of advertising (ai = 1) or the amount that maximize revenues per viewer, i.e.
ρ′(ai) = 0. This result is in line with the literature dealing with the issue of bottlenecks, suggesting
that competition just focuses on the audience side. From optimality conditions (2.2.12) and (2.2.13),
given a∗H and a
∗
L, we obtain equilibrium subscription fees, s
∗
H and s
∗
L, and shares on viewers' side, B
∗
H
and B∗L, as function of qualities, revenues per viewer and advertising level:
s∗H =
θH + V − a∗δ − ρ(a∗)
2
(2.2.18)
s∗L =
θL + V − a∗δ − ρ(a∗)
2
(2.2.19)
B∗H =
1
2
(2.2.20)
B∗L =
1
2
−
(
θL − V + δa∗ − ρ(a∗)
2θL
)
(2.2.21)
The above values show a proﬁt neutrality result, since revenues from the advertising side are coun-
terbalanced by a decrease on the subscription fees, irrespective of the channel. Moreover, given that
subscription fees positively depend on quality, a sort of substitutability between advertising and qual-
ity emerges. It is relevant to notice that the high quality channel always covers half of the viewers'
market, while the audience of the low quality channel relies on quality, fees and advertising. If the
monopoly would cover the whole market, it will equally divides the audience between the two channels.
Otherwise the low quality channel has always less viewers.
Recall that advertising revenues ρ(a∗) depend on the distribution function of advertisers. In this
respect, we can get a sharper intuition of our results by assuming a speciﬁc type of distribution. In
particular we consider the case of a uniform distribution of advertisers α ∼ U(0, 1), obtaining the
following equilibrium values:
a∗H = a
∗
L = a
∗ =
1− δ
2
(2.2.22)
s∗H =
θH + V − (1−δ)(1+3δ)4
2
s∗L =
θL + V − (1−δ)(1+3δ)4
2
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B∗H =
1
2
B∗L =
1
2
− θL − V − (
1−δ
2 )
2
2θL
In the uniform case equilibrium fees and advertising intensity just depend on quality, disutility from
advertising δ and V .
2.2.2 Quality
At stage 1, the multichannel platform chooses quality levels.13 Its proﬁts are:
piMP =
θH
4
+
(V + ρ(a∗)− δa∗)(2θL + V + ρ(a∗)− δa∗)
4θL
− 2K
Looking at ﬁrst order conditions we get:
∂piMP
∂θH
=
1
4
> 0 (2.2.23)
∂piMP
∂θL
= − 1
4θ2L
(V + ρ(a∗)− δa∗)2 < 0 (2.2.24)
Hence we get a result of maximal diﬀerentiation, as stated in the following Proposition
Proposition 9. Given a technological constraint Θ = [θ, θ], when viewers diﬀer in their willingness
to pay for quality, the multi-channel broadcaster chooses to maximally diﬀerentiate quality: it chooses
the minimal quality for the L channel while it sets the highest quality for the H one.
θ∗H = θ
θ∗L = θ
Moreover, it charges diﬀerent subscription fees for the two channels, according to the quality level:
s∗H(θ) > s
∗
L(θ)
According to Proposition 9, proﬁts become:
pi∗MP =
θ
4
+
(V − δa∗ + ρ(a∗))(2θ + V − δa∗ + ρ(a∗))
4θ
− 2K (2.2.25)
In the uniform case, equilibrium values for advertising, subscription fees, audience and proﬁts are
respectively:
a∗H = a
∗
L = a
∗ =
1− δ
2
s∗H =
θ + V − (1−δ)(1+3δ)4
2
s∗L =
θ + V − (1−δ)(1+3δ)4
2
13The result of this stage follows the assumption of ﬁxed cost of quality, K. However, we obtain similar outcomes
diﬀerent functional form for the cost of quality (see Appendix 2.6.1).
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B∗H =
1
2
B∗L =
1
2
− θ − V − (
1−δ
2 )
2
2θ
pi∗MP =
θ
4
+
(V + ( 1−δ2 )
2)(2θ + V + ( 1−δ2 )
2)
4θ
− 2K
2.2.3 Viewers' Surplus
We turn now to the welfare implications. Let us start by considering the general formulation of the
viewers' surplus:
SCMP =
ˆ β0L
0
(u0) dβ +
ˆ βLH
β0L
(uL) dβ +
ˆ 1
βLH
(uH) dβ (2.2.26)
= 12β
2
LHθL + βLH (V − δaL − sL)− 12β20LθL − β0L (V − δaL − sL) (2.2.27)
+ 12
(
1− β2LH
)
θH + (1− βLH) (V − sH − δaH) (2.2.28)
By substituting equilibrium values, we get
SC∗MP =
θ
8
+
(2θ + V + ρ(a∗)− δa∗)(V + ρ(a∗)− δa∗)
8θ
(2.2.29)
In the uniform case, provided that a∗ =
(
1−δ
2
)
, equation (2.2.29) rewrites as follows:
SCMP =
θ
8
+
(2θ + V + ( 1−δ2 )
2)(V + ( 1−δ2 )
2)
8θ
which helps in assessing the eﬀects of the nuisance parameter δ and the technological range Θ = (θ, θ).
The disutility parameter aﬀects the consumers' surplus in two ways. First, an increase in δ has a direct
negative impact on the individual utility, for a given advertising intensity. Second, there is an indirect
impact through advertising. Indeed, in equilibrium, an increase in δ reduces advertising intensity. In
turn, the eﬀect of a lower advertising is twofold; the advertising cost per viewer a∗δ drops back and
advertising revenues per viewers ρ(a∗) are reduced. This latter eﬀect induces a higher subscription fees
due to proﬁt-neutrality. The direct eﬀect and the indirect one on subscription fees prevail inducing a
negative impact on surplus:
∂SC∗MP
∂δ
=
1
32θ
(δ − 1) (δ2 − 2δ + 4θ + 4V + 1) ≤ 0
For δ < 1 the above eﬀect is strictly negative, while for δ > 1 the eﬀect is null due to the fact that the
platform does not broadcast advertising in any channel.
∂SC∗MP
∂θ
=
1
8
> 0
∂SC∗MP
∂θ
= − 1
128θ2
(
δ2 − 2δ + 4V + 1)2 < 0
The above derivatives explain the positive eﬀect of enlarging the technological range. Consumers
beneﬁt by widening diﬀerentiation between the two channels.
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2.3 Multi-Channel vs Single-Channel Broadcaster
In order to asses the welfare analysis it should be relevant to compare our previous insights with case
of a single-channel monopoly broadcaster. The equilibrium solution for the single-channel monopoly
is along the line of the previous subsections. As the structure of the analysis does not vary, the
mathematical analysis of this case can be found in the Appendix 2.6.2.14 The results provide an
equal ground for comparing the multi-channel case to the single-channel case. The results for the
single-channel case are summarized in the following Proposition:
Proposition 10. A single-channel monopoly platform which maximizes proﬁt in an uncovered market,
shows the following equilibrium levels of advertising, subscription fee and audience share:
a∗M =
1− δ
2
s∗M =
V + θ∗M − ρ(a∗M )− δa∗M
2
B∗M =
V + θ∗M + ρ(a
∗)− δa∗
2θ∗M
Moreover, regarding quality, two possible equilibrium conﬁgurations emerge, depending on the techno-
logical range
θ∗M = θ if ΘRL =
[
θ, θ¯
]
with θ = ρ(a)− δa
θ∗M = θ if ΘRH =
[
θ, θ¯
]
with θ > 0 and θ = ρ(a)− δa
Proof. See Appendix 2.6.2
We proceed by comparing viewers' surplus, subscription fees and audience shares in the multi-channel
case and the single one.
Proposition 11. In the multi-channel monopoly case, viewers' surplus is larger than in the single-
channel case, independently of the technological range of quality.
Proof. We consider ﬁrst the case of ΘRL =
[
θ, θ¯
]
with θ = ρ(a)− δa. We compare the multi-channel
platform with the single-channel platform that provides the maximum quality. Viewers' surplus are
respectively:
SC∗MP (θ, θ¯) =
θ
8
+
(2θ + V − δa∗ + ρ(a∗))(V − δa∗ + ρ(a∗))
8θ
SC∗M (θ) =
1
8θ
(
V + ρ(a∗)− δa∗ + θ)2
If θ > θ
SC∗MP (θ, θ¯)− SC∗M (θ) =
(θ − θ)(V − δa∗ + ρ(a∗))2
8θθ
> 0
Analogously, in the case ΘRH =
[
θ, θ¯
]
with θ > 0 and θ = ρ(a)− δa, we obtain the same result:
SC∗MP (θ, θ¯)− SC∗M (θ) =
θ − θ
8
> 0
14The results for the single-channel case rely on our previous paper Battaggion and Drufuca (2014).
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According to Proposition 11, the multi-channel monopoly is welfare improving, for what concerns
viewers, with respect to the single-channel one, independently of the technological range of quality,
i.e. independently of θ and θ. At a ﬁrst glance it seems that viewers beneﬁt from the presence
of multiple channels of diﬀerent quality. In order to ﬁgure out the driving forces of this result, we
compare equilibrium audiences and subscription fees. We make this comparison for two cases, either
the single-channel monopoly choosing θ¯ or the single-channel monopoly choosing θ.
Table 2.3.1: COMPARISON AMONG REGIMES
Case ΘRL Case ΘRH
Viewers' Surplus SC∗MP > SC
∗
M SC
∗
MP > SC
∗
M
Channels' Quality Levels
θ∗H = θ
∗
M
θ∗L < θ
∗
M
θ∗H > θ
∗
M
θ∗L = θ
∗
M
Viewers' Fees
s∗M = s
∗
H
s∗M > s
∗
L
s∗M < s
∗
H
s∗M = s
∗
L
Viewers' Market Shares B∗MP (θ, θ¯) > B
∗
M (θ) B
∗
MP (θ, θ¯) = B
∗
M (θ)
Advertisers' Market Shares a∗H = a
∗
L = a
∗
M a
∗
H = a
∗
L = a
∗
M
Note: In this table, we compare equilibrium values of the multichannel monopoly broadcaster and
the single-channel one. The case with the single-channel choosing maximum quality (Case ΘRL) is
shown in the ﬁrst column, the case with minimum quality (Case ΘRH) in the second column.
In the ﬁrst case we disentangle two eﬀects: one on subscription fees and the other on audience's
share.15 The multi-channel broadcaster serves a larger market share of viewers with respect to the
single-channel monopoly. Moreover it charges a lower price on the low quality channel. Hence, in this
case, the welfare improving eﬀect is driven by prices and market shares.
Similarly, we compare subscription fees and the audience's share for the second case: we can state that
viewers beneﬁt from the possibility of a multi-channel choice with a high quality option. Whereas,
there is no positive eﬀect on fees and share. Again, to highlight our ﬁndings, we illustrate our results
in the case of a uniform distribution of advertisers, as summarized in the following Remark:
Remark 3. We consider the case of a uniform distribution of advertisers. We show that viewers' surplus
is higher if they are served by a multi-channel monopoly compared to a single-channel one. This result
holds independently of the technological range of quality; that is, either if the single-channel chooses
the minimum quality ( ΘRL) or it chooses the maximum quality (ΘRH). For what concern prices and
audience's shares, we obtain the following equilibrium values (see Table 2.3.2), which conﬁrm our
previous insights on the diﬀerent eﬀects driving our results on surplus.
15Provided that V + ρ(a∗)− δa∗ > 0 .
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Table 2.3.2: EQUILIBRIUM VALUES (Uniform Case)
Case ΘRL Case ΘRH
Channels' Quality Levels
θ∗H=θ
θ∗L=θ=
(1−δ)2
4
θ∗M=θ
θ∗H= θ =
(1−δ)2
4
θ∗L=θ
θ∗M=θ
Viewers' Fees
s∗H=
θ+V− (1−δ)(1+3δ)4
2
s∗L=
θ+V− (1−δ)(1+3δ)4
2
s∗M=
V+θ−( 1−δ2 )( 1+3δ2 )
2
s∗H=
θ+V− (1−δ)(1+3δ)4
2
s∗L=
θ+V− (1−δ)(1+3δ)4
2
s∗M=
V+θ− (1−δ)(1+3δ)4
2
Viewers' Market Shares
B∗MP (θ, θ¯) =
V+θ+
(1−δ)2
4
2θ
B∗M (θ¯) =
V+θ+
(1−δ)2
4
2θ
B∗MP (θ, θ¯) =
V+θ+
(1−δ)2
4
2θ
B∗M (θ) =
V+θ+
(1−δ)2
4
2θ
Advertisers' Market Shares a∗H= a
∗
L= a
∗
M=
1−δ
2 a
∗
H= a
∗
L= a
∗
M=
1−δ
2
Proof. For what concerns consumers' surplus, if ΘRL =
[
θ, θ¯
]
with θ = ρ(a− δa), then:
SC∗MP (θ, θ¯) =
θ
8
+
(2θ + V + ( 1−δ2 )
2)(V + ( 1−δ2 )
2)
8θ
SC∗M (θ) =
1
8θ
(
V + (
1− δ
2
)2 + θ
)2
Then if if θ > θ:
SC∗MP (θ, θ¯)− SC∗M (θ) =
(θ − θ)(V + (1− δ
2
)2)2
8θθ
> 0
If ΘRH =
[
θ, θ¯
]
with θ > 0 and θ = ρ(a− δa):
SC∗MP (θ, θ¯) =
θ
8
+
(2θ + V + ( 1−δ2 )
2)(V + ( 1−δ2 )
2)
8θ
SC∗M (θ) =
1
8θ
(
V + (
1− δ
2
)2 + θ
)2
Then if if θ > θ:
SC∗MP (θ, θ¯)− SC∗M (θ) =
θ − θ
8
> 0
In the comparison between the single and the multi-channel monopoly broadcasters, we show that
consumers obtain an higher surplus in the second case. Our results show that the chance of choosing
among channels of diﬀerent qualities is always beneﬁcial for the viewers.
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2.4 Competition among Single-Channel Broadcasters
In this section we modify our set up by considering competition among broadcasters. We present
the case of a duopoly market where two single-channel platforms compete on viewers and advertisers.
Without loss of generality we assume that one broadcaster provides the low quality channel, while the
other the high quality one, setting i = L,H.16 For the remaining we maintain the same assumptions
as in multi-channel set up.
Notice that, diﬀerently from the ongoing literature on vertically diﬀerentiated media, we consider an
ex-ante uncovered market. This framework further complicates the model from an analytical point of
view, arising multiple equilibria. To overcome this issue,we restrict the analysis to a local equilibrium:
we identify a technological range of qualities allowing a local equilibrium of maximal diﬀerentiation to
exist. We strongly believe it is worth to maintain an uncovered set-up since it better point out the
eﬀects of competition and since it well ﬁts the features of broadcasting market.
2.4.1 Viewers' and Advertisers' Shares
We identify two marginal consumers: the one indiﬀerent between not accessing to any platform and
accessing the low quality platform
β0L =
sL + δaL − V
θL
(2.4.1)
and the one indiﬀerent between the low quality platform and the high quality one
βLH =
(sH − sL) + δ(aH − aL)
θH − θL (2.4.2)
Given our distribution of the willingness to pay for quality β, the trivial case in which the low-quality
platform always faces zero demand in the price game is automatically ruled out. Hence, we consider
an ex-ante market structure where both ﬁrms are active (meaning that the individuals' demands for
both platforms H and L are positive).
We do not impose any further condition on the conﬁguration: namely, we consider an ex-ante uncovered
duopoly structure.
Hence, the high quality platform's share on viewers side is
BH = (1− βLH) =
(
1− (sH − sL) + δ(aH − aL)
θH − θL
)
(2.4.3)
whereas the low quality platform's share is
BL = (βLH − β0L) =
(
(sH − sL) + δ(aH − aL)
θH − θL −
sL + δaL − V
θL
)
(2.4.4)
The intensities of advertising for the two platforms are respectively:
aH = 1− F
(
rH
BH
)
(2.4.5)
aL = 1− F
(
rL
BL
)
(2.4.6)
Having deﬁned the shares of viewers and of advertisers, for given prices, we solve the game backwards,
from stage three, as previously described for the monopoly. Therefore we obtain:
16We relax this ex-ante assumption when we look at the choice of quality (stage 1).
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rH (sH , sL, aH , aL, θH , θL) = F
−1(1− aH)( θH−θL−(sH−sL)−δ(aH−aL)θH−θL ) (2.4.7)
rL (sH , sL, aH , aL, θH , θL) = F
−1(1− aL)( (sH−sL)+δ(aH−aL)θH−θL − sL+δaL−VθL ) (2.4.8)
2.4.2 Subscription Fees and Advertising Intensities
According to the previous assumptions, each platform maximizes proﬁts subject to a positivity con-
straint on advertising: {
max
ai,si
Πi = Bi(si + ρi)−K
s.t.ai ≥ 0
for i = H,L.
Proposition 12. For each platform i = H,L, if the proﬁt maximizing advertising level is positive,
then it is constant and it is determined by
ρ′(ai) = δ
Proof. We consider ﬁrst the maximization problem of the L platform. Under the assumption that
∂BL
∂aL
= δ ∂BL∂sL and
∂BH
∂aL
= δ ∂BH∂sL , ﬁrst order conditions are:
∂piL
∂sL
=
∂BL
∂s
L
(sL + ρ(aL)) +BL = 0 (2.4.9)
∂piL
∂aL
= δ
∂BL
∂sL
(sL + ρ(aL)) +BL(ρ
′(aL)) 5 0 (2.4.10)
If aL > 0, optimality conditions rewrite as follows
∂BL
∂s
L
(sL + ρ(aL)) = −BL
δ
∂BL
∂sL
(sL + ρ(aL)) +BL(ρ′(aL)) = 0
Hence, by substitution we get
ρ′(aL) = δ (2.4.11)
The same applies to the high quality platform, giving us:
ρ′(aH) = δ (2.4.12)
Proposition 12 states that, for both platforms, a ﬁxed advertising space is the best reply. In particular,
the equilibrium intensity of advertising depends just on the nuisance parameter δ. If aversion to ads is
"too high", then is optimal to set advertising equal to zero. Hence, the optimal advertising intensity
considers just the negative externality of advertisers on viewers, suggesting that both platform just
compete on individuals. Indeed, platforms act as "bottlenecks" between advertisers and individuals,
by oﬀering sole access to their respective set of individuals.
Moreover, by considering the case of a uniform distribution of advertisers, we point out that:
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Remark 4. We consider the case of a uniform distribution of advertisers. The strategic choices of
advertising intensity of the two platform are the same and depend just on the nuisance parameter δ:
a∗i =
1− δ
2
for i = H,L
if δ < 1. Otherwise, is zero.
We can now compute the subscription fees, the advertising prices and the audience shares of the two
platforms.
Proposition 13. Platform H and platform L set the following equilibrium values for subscription
fees, audience shares and advertising prices:
s∗H =
(V − a∗δ + 2θH)(θH − θL)− 3ρ(a∗)θH
4θH − θL
s∗L =
(2(V − a∗δ) + θL))(θH − θL)− 2ρ(a∗)θH − ρ(a∗)θL
4θH − θL
B∗H =
2θH + V + ρ(a
∗)− a∗δ
4θH − θL
B∗L =
2θH
θL
1
2θL + V + ρ(a
∗)− a∗δ
4θH − θL
r∗H =
ρ(a∗)
a∗(4θH − θL) (V + 2θH + ρ(a
∗)− a∗δ)
r∗L =
2ρ(a∗)
a∗(4θH − θL) (V +
1
2
θL + ρ(a
∗)− a∗δ)
Proof. Given the results of Proposition 12, we compute equilibrium subscription fees for the two
platforms from the second FOCs
∂BH
∂sH
(sH + ρ(aH)) +BH =
(− 1θH−θL )(sH + ρ(aH)) +
(
1− (sH−sL)+δ(aH−aL)θH−θL
)
= 0
(2.4.13)
∂BL
∂s
L
(sL + ρ(aL)) +BL =
(− 1θH−θL − 1θL )(sL + ρ(aL)) +
(
(sH−sL)+δ(aH−aL)
θH−θL − sL+δaL−VθL
)
= 0
(2.4.14)
Since at equilibrium the advertising intensity is the same, ai = a and ρ(ai) = ρ(a) for i = H,L:
sH =
θH − θL + sL − ρ(a)
2
(2.4.15)
sL =
(V − aδ)(θH − θL)− ρ(a)θH + θLsH
2θH
(2.4.16)
Then, if θH > θL > 0
s∗H =
(V − a∗δ + 2θH)(θH − θL)− 3ρ(a∗)θH
4θH − θL (2.4.17)
s∗L =
(2(V − a∗δ) + θL))(θH − θL)− 2ρ(a∗)θH − ρ(a∗)θL
(4θH − θL) (2.4.18)
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Shares become:
B∗H =
2θH + V + ρ(a
∗)− a∗δ
4θH − θL (2.4.19)
B∗L =
2θH
θL
1
2θL + V + ρ(a
∗)− a∗δ
4θH − θL (2.4.20)
Diﬀerently from the multi-channel monopoly case, all the equilibrium values for each channel depend
upon both its own quality and the competitor's one. There is a strategic interdependence between the
two broadcasters resulting in prices and shares depending on quality diﬀerentiation.
We consider the case of a uniform distribution of advertisers, to get a sharper intuition of our results.
Equilibrium solutions of stage 2 rewrites as follows. Subscription fees:
s∗H =
(V + 2θH)(θH − θL)− 14 (1− δ) (3θH + δ(5θH − 2θL))
4θH − θL
s∗L = 2
(V + 12θL)(θH − θL)− 14 (1− δ) (θH + 12θL + 3δ(θH − 12θL))
(4θH − θL)
Viewers' Shares:
B∗H =
2θH + V + (
1−δ
2 )
2
4θH − θL
B∗L =
2θH
θL
1
2θL + V + (
1−δ
2 )
2
4θH − θL
Advertising prices
r∗H =
( 1+δ2 )
(4θH − θL)
(
V + 2θH + (
1− δ
2
)2
)
)
r∗L =
2( 1+δ2 )
(4θH − θL) (V +
1
2
θL + (
1− δ
2
)2)
2.4.3 Qualities
We can now solve the initial stage of the game, namely the quality choice.
At the ﬁrst stage, platforms' proﬁts are respectively for H and L:
pi∗H =
(2θH + V + ρ(a
∗)− a∗δ)2 (θH − θL)
(4θH − θL)2
−K
pi∗L =
(
4θH
θL
( 12θL + V + ρ(a
∗)− a∗δ)2(θH − θL)
(4θH − θL)2
)
−K
Then FOC with respect to quality are:
∂piH
∂θH
= (2θH+Z)[4(θH−θL)+2θH+Z](4θH−θL)−8(2θH+Z)
2(θH−θL)
(4θH−θL)3 = 0 (2.4.21)
∂piL
∂θL
= 4θH(
( 12 θL+Z)(4θH−θL)(θH−θL)( 12 θL−Z)−θL( 12 θL+Z)2(2θH+θL)
(4θH−θL)3θ2L
) = 0 (2.4.22)
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with Z = V + ρ(a∗)− a∗δ
Conditions (2.4.21) and (2.4.22) implicitly deﬁne the best replies in quality for the two platforms.
Unfortunately, the simultaneous solution does not give us a unique outcome. To make our duopoly
comparable with the multi-channel case, we decide to focus on an equilibrium with maximal diﬀer-
entiation in quality. Therefore, we restrict the technological range of quality (Θ) to a narrower set
Θd = (θ, θ¯) with θ > 47θ. For θH , θL ∈ Θd, we obtain the following result:
Proposition 14. In the restricted range of qualities Θd = (θ, θ¯) with θ > 47θ there is a unique local
equilibrium of maximal diﬀerentiation, where subscription fees and audience shares are:
s∗H =
(V − a∗δ + 2θ¯)(θ¯ − θ)− 3ρ(a∗)θ¯
4θ¯ − θ
s∗L =
(2(V − a∗δ) + θ)(θ¯ − θ)− 2ρ(a∗)θ¯ − ρ(a∗)θ
(4θ¯ − θ)
B∗H =
2θ¯ + V + ρ(a∗)− a∗δ
4θ¯ − θ
B∗L =
2θ¯
θ
1
2θ + V + ρ(a
∗)− a∗δ
4θ¯ − θ
Proof. If 4θH < 7θL, then we show that:
∂piH
∂θH
> 0 (2.4.23)
∂piL
∂θL
< 0 (2.4.24)
Hence, for every θ ∈ ΘD = (θ, θ¯) with θ > 47θ, (2.4.23) and (2.4.24) hold. Therefore:
θ∗H = θ¯
θ∗L = θ
Notice that, if the market were uncovered ex-ante, we would have obtained ﬁxed audience shares.17
Instead, we show that the audience shares depend on the quality distance of the two platforms. Hence,
we can use our results on audience shares to highlights the eﬀects of our assumption of uncovered
market.
Furthermore, in our analysis, the level of qualities are ﬁxed at maximum diﬀerentiation. However, our
setting also allows for modelling an endogenous decision on quality levels, though analytically hardly
tractable. Nevertheless, our results in the local equilibrium may give a suggestion on how these quality
levels would change if the decisions of quality were endogenous.
17See Weeds (2013).
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2.4.4 Viewers' Surplus
We now address the welfare analysis from the point of view of the viewers. Viewers' surplus in the
uncovered duopoly is:
SCD(θ, θ¯) =
ˆ β0L
0
(u0) dβ +
ˆ βLH
β0L
(uL) dβ +
ˆ 1
βLH
(uH) dβ (2.4.25)
At the local equilibrium, we obtain:
SC∗D(θ, θ¯) =
1
2
θ
θ
(
4θ − θ)2 ((4θ + 5θ) (θθ + Z2) + 2θ (8θ + θ)Z) (2.4.26)
with Z = V + ρ(a∗)− a∗δ.
2.5 The Welfare Eﬀects of Competition
Viewers' surplus is an important element to be considered when we analyze the eﬀect of potential
competition. In this perspective we ﬁrst compare our duopoly with the multi-channel monopoly case
described in the ﬁrst section. In this comparison we pay particular attention to the diﬀerence between
viewers' surpluses and we also consider how prices and audiences change according to the degree of
competition.
Proposition 15. If both the duopoly and the multi-channel monopoly conﬁguration show a situation
of maximum diﬀerentiation, viewers are better oﬀ with more competition (duopoly). That is:
SC∗D(θ, θ¯)− SC∗MP (θ, θ¯) > 0
Proof. Recall equilibrium viewers' surplus in duopoly (ex-ante uncovered) with maximal diﬀerentiation
(with Θd = (θ, θ¯) such that θ > 47θ) from equation (2.4.26)
SC∗D(θ, θ¯) =
1
2
θ
θ(4θ−θ)2
((
4θ + 5θ
)
(θθ + Z2) + 2θ
(
8θ + θ
)
Z
)
with Z = V +ρ(a∗)−a∗δ, and equilibrium viewers' surplus in the multichannel monopoly from equation
(2.2.29)
SC∗MP (θ, θ¯) =
1
8θ
(θθ + (V + ρ(a∗)− a∗δ)2 + 2θV + ρ(a∗)− a∗δ)
If we compare them we get:
SC∗D(θ, θ¯)− SC∗MP (θ, θ¯)
=
1
8
(
θ − 4θ)2
(
(28θ − θ) (Z2 + θθ)+ 2Z(16θ2 − θ2) + 24θθZ)
with Z = V + ρ(a∗) − a∗δ. The above expression is for sure positive, provided that ρ(a∗) − a∗δ > 0.
Notice that this is the case if we consider a uniform distribution of advertisers. Namely, in the uniform
case we have ρ(a∗)− a∗δ = ( 1−δ2 )2 > 0, which give us:
SC∗D(θ, θ¯)− SC∗MP (θ, θ¯) > 0
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As shown in Table 2.5.1, this result is driven by lower prices in the duopoly case, provided that
ρ(a∗) − a∗δ > 0 (as in the uniform case). In addition, there is a better market coverage by the two
competing ﬁrms, as emerges from the shares' comparison.18
Table 2.5.1: DUOPOLY vs MULTI-CHANNEL MONOPOLY
Viewers' Surplus SC∗D > SC
∗
MP
Channels' Quality Levels
θD∗H = θ
MP∗
H
θD∗L = θ
MP∗
L
Viewers' Fees
s
∗D
H < s
∗MP
H
s
∗D
H < s
∗MP
H
Viewers' Market Shares
B
∗D
H > B
MP
H
B
∗D
L > B
MP
L
Advertisers' Market Shares aD∗i = a
MP∗
i
Finally we make a last comparison between our duopoly (uncovered) and an ex-ante covered duopoly.
If we consider the restricted range Θd = (θ, θ¯) with θ > 47θ, both conﬁgurations show maximal
diﬀerentiation but diﬀerent subscription fees and audience shares.
Proposition 16. In the duopoly case, if both the ex-ante covered and the uncovered conﬁguration lead
to a situation of maximum diﬀerentiation, viewers are better oﬀ in the uncovered duopoly.
Proof. If the market is ex-ante covered we just need one marginal individual βLH . We compute viewers'
surplus in the ex-ante covered case using equilibrium values:
β∗LHDcovered =
1
3
B∗HDcovered =
2
3
B∗LDcovered =
1
3
s∗HDcovered =
2
3
(
θ − θ)− ρ(a∗)
s∗LDcovered =
1
3
(
θ − θ)− ρ(a∗)
18We compare a duopoly of single-channel broadcasters with a multi-channel monopoly broadcaster. We concentrate
on a local equilibrium where both market conﬁgurations exhibit maximal diﬀerentiation in quality. Hence, we must
impose some restrictions on the tecnological range Θ, namely Θd = (θ, θ¯) such that θ > 4
7
θ.
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SC∗Dcovered(θ, θ¯) =
−2θ¯ + 11θ
18
+ V + ρ(a∗)− a∗δ (2.5.1)
We compare this surplus with the one from equation (2.4.26), under the constraint Θd = (θ, θ¯) with
θ > 47θ:
SC∗D(θ, θ¯)− SC∗Dcovered(θ, θ¯) > 0
provided that ρ(a∗)− a∗δ > 0 (which is true in the uniform case).
Since we have considered the covered and the uncovered duopoly as two diﬀerent market conﬁgurations,
we have to check if this distinction still holds in equilibrium. In equilibrium, the duopoly broadcasting
market is ex-post uncovered if: 19
β0L > 0
θ − θ > 2θ + θ
θ
(V + ρ(a∗)− a∗δ) (2.5.2)
If this were the case, we can provide some more intuitions by looking at fees and audience shares.
When quality diﬀerentiation is suﬃciently high, the covered duopoly shows higher market shares but
also higher subscription fees on both channels compared to the uncovered scenario. Higher prices
explain the distance between covered and uncovered surpluses. Indeed, the possibility of catching
extra viewers, as it happens in the uncovered market, disciplines the behavior of platform in duopoly
making, consumers' surplus higher.
It is trivial to show that if:
θ − θ > 3
2
(V + ρ(a∗)− a∗δ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
(2.5.3)
then B∗Hcovered > B
∗
H and s
∗
icovered > s
∗
i for i = H,L.
Analogously if
θ − θ > 6θ
θ
(V + ρ(a∗)− a∗δ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
(2.5.4)
then B∗Lcovered > B
∗
L.
Recall from condition (2.5.2), that the market is uncovered (ex-post) if
θ − θ > 2θ + θ
θ
(V + ρ(a∗)− a∗δ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
It is possible to show that A < C < B. If θ−θ > B then s∗icovered > s∗i and B∗icovered > B∗i for i = H,L.
The covered duopoly has higher prices and audiences on both channels. If instead C < θ− θ < B then
s∗icovered > s
∗
i and B
∗
Hcovered > B
∗
H but B
∗
Lcovered < B
∗
L : prices are still higher but now the uncovered
has a higher share on the low quality channel. Finally if θ − θ < C the uncovered market becomes
covered. However, as already mentioned, a comparison between two covered market structures is
meaningless. Given that, when we considered a comparison between an uncovered (θ − θ > C) and a
covered structure, it must be the case that the covered one privileges the high quality channels and
sets higher subscription fees on both channels.
19Notice that the market is covered ex-post if condition (2.5.2) is not satisﬁed. However, we omit this case from our
analysis, since a comparison between two covered market structures is meaningless.
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2.6 Conclusions
In this paper we perform a welfare analysis in a setting of vertical diﬀerentiated two-sided broadcasters,
where competition prevails on one side of the market, namely on viewers. A broadcaster acts as
"bottleneck" between advertisers and viewers by oﬀering sole access to its audience. We provide a
full characterization of equilibria for what concerns advertising, subscription fees, market shares and
qualities, for a monopoly with a single-channel platform, multi-channel monopoly and duopoly cases.
For what concern the welfare analysis, we focus on the viewers side, calculating the consumers' surplus
for each market structure.
It important to stress that, diﬀerently from the ongoing literature on vertically diﬀerentiated media,
we consider an ex-ante uncovered market for the duopoly case. This framework further complicates
the model from an analytical point of view, arising multiple equilibria. To overcome this issue we
identify a technological range of qualities allowing a local equilibrium of maximal diﬀerentiation to
exist. Nevertheless, we strongly believe it is worth to maintain an uncovered set-up since to better
point out the eﬀects of competition on audience and prices.
Let us remark that equilibrium quality depends also on the cost structure used in this model. Under
the assumption of ﬁxed costs, monopoly proﬁt function is convex in quality. One might expect that
this shape strictly depends on the assumption of K, ﬁxed cost of quality. As matter of facts, in a
single-side framework the standard model of vertical diﬀerentiation is solved with a quadratic cost of
quality inducing concavity of proﬁt function. However in a two-sided setting the issue of concavity of
proﬁt function is more complex. As expected, even in the two-sided approach, linear cost of quality
does not solve the problem of convexity of proﬁt function. But, more surprisingly, even increasing
marginal cost of quality does not guarantee a well-shaped monopoly proﬁt function. For instance,
quadratic cost of quality (see Weeds (2013)) do not make concave the monopoly proﬁt function, for
what concerns quality, without ad hoc assumptions on the derivatives. One possible way out would
be having implicit quality cost functions (see Anderson (2007)), that, however, should unable us to
provide a close solution of the model. Therefore we chose to introduce the simplest cost function and
a technological range bounding the levels of quality.
Our results show that the chance of choosing among channels of diﬀerent qualities is always beneﬁcial
for the viewers. In the comparison between the single and the multi-channel monopoly broadcasters,
this result is mainly driven by two forces. On the one hand, the possibility of choosing among diﬀerent
qualities and, on the other, a larger audience coverage and a pricing eﬀect.
We also prove that competition is beneﬁcial for the audience. The audience surplus is larger in the
duopoly conﬁguration then in the monopoly setting, when both provide high and low-quality channels.
Indeed, on both channels, subscription fees are lower while the shares of viewer are larger. This result
suggests that the ownership in broadcasting markets matters. In this respect our model support the
existing regulation practice of setting limits on the ownership of TV channels in order to induce a more
fragmented market structure.
Finally, we highlight the comparison between the covered and the uncovered duopoly. In case of an
uncovered market, the chance of catching extra viewers disciplines the platforms' behavior in duopoly
making consumers' surplus higher. From the policy makers point of view, this result is crucial in the
broadcasting sector, where the convergence between television and internet continuously opens up new
market segments.
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Appendix
2.6.1 Multi-product Monopoly with Diﬀerent Costs of Quality (Quality Stage)
Linear Costs 20
Proﬁts at stage 1 are:
piMP =
θH
4
+
(V + ρ(a∗)− δa∗)(2θL + V + ρ(a∗)− δa∗)
4θL
− γθH − γθL (2.6.1)
Looking at ﬁrst order conditions we get:
∂piMP
∂θH
=
1
4
− γ = 0 (2.6.2)
∂piMP
∂θL
= − 1
4θ2L
(V + ρ(a∗)− δa∗)2 − γ < 0 (2.6.3)
Optimal qualities are:
θ∗H = θ if γ <
1
4
(2.6.4)
θ∗H = θ if γ >
1
4
(2.6.5)
θ∗L = θ (2.6.6)
The degree of diﬀerentiation depends on the cost parameter γ.
• If γ < 14 the platform chooses to maximally diﬀerentiate the two channels.
• If γ > 14 the platform chooses to duplicate the minimum quality
In the ﬁrst case proﬁts become:
pi∗MP =
θ
4
+
(V − δa∗ + ρ(a∗))(2θ + V − δa∗ + ρ(a∗))
4θ
− γ(θ + θ) (2.6.7)
In the uniform case equilibrium values are:
a∗H = a
∗
L = a
∗ =
1− δ
2
(2.6.8)
20Both linear and quadratic costs are assumed to be separable. See Section 2.2.
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s∗H =
θ + V − (1−δ)(1+3δ)4
2
(2.6.9)
s∗L =
θ + V − (1−δ)(1+3δ)4
2
(2.6.10)
B∗H =
1
2
(2.6.11)
B∗L =
1
2
− θ − V − (
1−δ
2 )
2
2θ
(2.6.12)
pi∗MP =
θ
4
+
(V + ( 1−δ2 )
2)(2θ + V + ( 1−δ2 )
2)
4θ
− γ(θ + θ) (2.6.13)
Quadratic Costs
Proﬁts at stage 1 are:
piMP =
θH
4
+
(V + ρ(a∗)− δa∗)(2θL + V + ρ(a∗)− δa∗)
4θL
− 1
2
γθ2H −
1
2
γθ2L (2.6.14)
Looking at ﬁrst order conditions we get:
∂piMP
∂θH
=
1
4
− γθH = 0 (2.6.15)
∂piMP
∂θL
= − 1
4θ2L
(V + ρ(a∗)− δa∗)2 − γθL < 0 (2.6.16)
Optimal qualities are:
θ∗H =
1
4γ
(2.6.17)
θ∗L = θ (2.6.18)
The degree of diﬀerentiation depends on the dimension of the technological constraint with respect to
the cost parameter γ.
• If θ < 14γ the platform chooses a quality above the minimum.
• If θ < 14γ < θ the platform chooses a quality above the minimum but below the maximum.
• If θ < 14γ the platform chooses to reach the upper bound of the range θ.
Hence,with θ < θ < 14γ , we get a result of maximal diﬀerentiation and proﬁts become:
pi∗MP =
θ
4
+
(V − δa∗ + ρ(a∗))(2θ + V − δa∗ + ρ(a∗))
4θ
− 1
2
γ(θ
2
+ θ2) (2.6.19)
In the uniform case equilibrium values are:
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a∗H = a
∗
L = a
∗ =
1− δ
2
(2.6.20)
s∗H =
θ + V − (1−δ)(1+3δ)4
2
(2.6.21)
s∗L =
θ + V − (1−δ)(1+3δ)4
2
(2.6.22)
B∗H =
1
2
(2.6.23)
B∗L =
1
2
− θ − V − (
1−δ
2 )
2
2θ
(2.6.24)
pi∗MP =
θ
4
+
(V + ( 1−δ2 )
2)(2θ + V + ( 1−δ2 )
2)
4θ
− 1
2
γ(θ
2
+ θ2) (2.6.25)
2.6.2 Monopoly (Single-Product)
Monopoly (Single Product): Viewers' and Advertisers' Shares
By considering the individual indiﬀerent between accessing the monopoly platform or not accessing at
all, we obtain the demand function by viewers.21
β0M =
sM + δaM − V
θM
(2.6.26)
Since individuals are uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, the demand for the monopoly platform
is simply given by the fraction of population with a taste for quality greater than β0M :
BM = (1− β0M ) =
(
V + θM − sM − δaM
θM
)
(2.6.27)
The amount of advertising for the platform becomes:
aM = 1− F
(
rM
BM
)
(2.6.28)
Having deﬁned the demand function of viewers and advertisers, for given prices rM and sM , we solve
the game backwards, from stage three. Therefore by simultaneously solving the equations (2.6.27) and
(2.6.28) we get:
rM (sM , aM , θM ) = F
−1(1− aM )(V + θM − sM − δaM
θM
) (2.6.29)
This equation describes how the advertising charge reacts to changes in subscribers' price, advertising
and quality.
21This section summarizes the results for a single-channel monopoly case and it builds on the model of Battaggion and
Drufuca (2014). We present results either for a monopoly choosing the mimimum quality and for a monopoly choosing
the maximum quality.
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Monopoly (Single Product): Subscription Fee and Advertising Intensity
According to the above assumptions, the platform maximizes proﬁts, subject to a positivity constraint
on advertising level. {
max
aH ,sH
ΠM = BM (sM + ρM )−K
s.t.aM ≥ 0
(2.6.30)
First order conditions with respect to the advertising spaces aM and subscription fee sM are respect-
ively:
∂ΠM
∂aM
=
∂BM
∂aM
sM + rM + aM
∂rM
∂aM
≤ 0 (2.6.31)
and
∂ΠM
∂sM
= BM +
∂BM
∂sM
sM + aM
∂rM
∂sM
= 0 (2.6.32)
Then, according to the literature, we deﬁne the advertising revenues per viewer as:
ρ(ai) =
airi
Bi
=
aiF
−1(1− ai)Bi
Bi
= aiF
−1(1− ai) (2.6.33)
We assume ρ(ai) to be concave in the interval a ∈ [0, 1]. Given that ρ(ai) = 0 for ai = 0 and ai = 1,
the function is single-peaked.
Using the deﬁnition (2.6.33) for the monopoly platform we can rewrite optimality conditions, proving
the following Proposition.
Proposition 17. The optimal advertising level of the monopoly single-channel broadcaster is:
ρ′(aM ) = δ
Proof. Given (2.6.33) for the monopoly platform
ρ(aM ) =
aMrM
BM
=
aMF
−1(1− aM )BM
BM
= aMF
−1(1− aM ) (2.6.34)
we have:
rM =
BMρ(aM )
aM
(2.6.35)
Therefore optimality conditions (2.6.31) and (2.6.32) rewrite into (2.6.36) and (2.6.37):
sM
∂BM
∂aM
+ rM + aM
[(
BMρ(aM )+
∂BM
∂aM
ρ(aM )
)
aM−BMρ(aM )
a2M
]
≤ 0 (2.6.36)
BM + sM
∂BM
∂sH
+ aM
∂rM
∂sM
= 0 (2.6.37)
By easy calculation, (2.6.36) and (2.6.37) become respectively:
∂BM
∂aM
(sM + ρ(aM )) +BMρ(aM ) ≤ 0 (2.6.38)
∂BM
∂sH
(sM + ρ(aM )) +BM = 0 (2.6.39)
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Given that
∂BM
∂aM
= − δ
θM
and
∂BM
∂sM
= − 1
θM
, we get:
∂BM
∂aM
= δ
∂BM
∂sM
(2.6.40)
Therefore, plugging in (2.6.38) and (2.6.39), we get the following system:δ
∂BM
∂sM
(sM + ρ(aM )) +BMρ
′(aM ) ≤ 0
∂BM
∂sH
(sM + ρ(aM )) +BM = 0
(2.6.41)
Finally, if aM > 0 the above inequality is satisﬁed with equality. Therefore, given that ρ(aM ) is
single-peaked, aM is uniquely determined by the following condition:
ρ′(aM ) = δ.
We can now solve for the equilibrium values, as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 18. With ρ(aM ) concave, we obtain the equilibrium price s
∗
M and demand B
∗
M as function
of quality, revenues per viewer and advertising level.
Proof. By plugging the expression for BM in the optimality condition (2.6.39) we obtain:
s∗M =
V + θM − ρ(a∗M )− δa∗M
2
(2.6.42)
Then,
B∗M =
V + θM + ρ(a
∗
M )− δa∗M
2θM
(2.6.43)
Proposition 18 shows the result of proﬁt neutrality. Indeed, an increase in revenues on the advertising
side are counterbalanced by a decrease on the subscription fees.
Monopoly (Single Product): Platform's quality
In order to solve the quality stage, we maximize the monopoly proﬁt, ΠM (s
∗
M , a
∗
M , r
∗
M , θM ), with
respect to the quality, θM . We obtain the following FOC, subject to θM ≥ 0 :
∂ΠM (s
∗
M , a
∗
M , r
∗
M , θM )
∂θM
=
(V + θM + ρ(a
∗
M )− δa∗M ) (θM − ρ(a∗M ) + δa∗M )
4θ2M
= 0
(2.6.44)
Unfortunately, in this general framework we cannot calculate the equilibrium value of θ∗M .
By calculating the second order conditions we show the convexity of the proﬁt function:
∂2ΠM
∂θ2M
=
(ρ (a∗M )− δa∗M )2
2θ3M
≥ 0 (2.6.45)
Given convexity, the monopoly platform will reach one of the boundaries, choosing θ or θ¯. Hence we
describe two possible local equilibria, each of them characterized by a speciﬁc conﬁguration of the
technological range.
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Proposition 19. In equilibrium, under the technological constraint ΘRL =
[
θ, θ¯
]
with θ = ρ (a∗M )−
δa∗M , the monopoly platform chooses the maximum quality.
Diﬀerently, under the technological constraint ΘRH =
[
θ, θ¯
]
with θ > 0 and θ = ρ (a∗M )− δa∗M , the
monopoly platform chooses the maximum quality.
Proof. In the ﬁrst case we restrict ourselves on the increasing slope of the proﬁt function. By comparing
monopoly proﬁt functions in θ and θ¯, respectively:
Π∗M (θ) =
(θ + ρ (a∗M )− δa∗M )2
4θ
−K
Π∗M
(
θ¯
)
=
(θ¯ + ρ (a∗M )− δa∗M )2
4θ¯
−K
we get:
Π∗M
(
θ¯
)−Π∗M (θ) > 0
For θ ∈ ΘRL proﬁt are convex and increasing in quality. Therefore to maximize proﬁt the monopoly
platform sets θ∗M = θ¯.
In the second case, we restrict ourselves on the decreasing slope of the proﬁt function. By comparing
monopoly proﬁt functions in θ and θ¯, respectively we get:
Π∗M
(
θ¯
)−Π∗M (θ) < 0
For θ ∈ ΘRH proﬁt are convex and decreasing in quality. Therefore to maximize proﬁt the monopoly
platform sets θ∗M = θ.
Considering the uniform case, we can suggest some interesting insights. By easy calculation, in the
uniform case with ρ (aM ) = aM (1− aM ), we obtain:
a∗M =
1− δ
2
(2.6.46)
s∗M =
V + θM − δa∗M − ρ(a∗M )
2
=
V + θM −
(
1−δ
2
) (
1+3δ
2
)
2
(2.6.47)
B∗M =
1
2θM
[
V + θM +
(
1− δ
2
)(
1− δ
2
)]
(2.6.48)
According to the equilibrium solutions of stage 3 and stage 2, the proﬁt function - in the uniform case
- becomes:
Π∗M = B
∗
M (s
∗
M + ρ
∗
M )−K =
1
4θM
(V + θM +
(
1− δ
2
)2
)2 −K (2.6.49)
Given our result on quality if we consider the case of ΘRL, we obtain equilibrium values for subscription
fees and viewers' demand:
s∗M =
V + θ¯ − ( 1−δ2 ) ( 1+3δ2 )
2
(2.6.50)
B∗M =
1
2θ¯
[
V + θ¯ +
(
1− δ
2
)(
1− δ
2
)]
(2.6.51)
Π∗M =
1
4θ¯
(V + θ¯ +
(
1− δ
2
)2
)2 −K
For the case of technological range ΘRH equilibrium results are unchanged but for quality.
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Monopoly (Single Product): Viewers' surplus
Viewers' surplus is:
SCM =
ˆ βI
0
(u0) dβ +
ˆ 1
βI
(uM ) dβ
=
1
2
(
1− β2I
)
(θM ) + (1− βI) (V − sM − δaM )
Substituting equilibrium values for βI , sM , aM and θM , we get
SCM (θ) =
1
8θ
(
V + ρ(a∗)− δa∗ + θ)2 (2.6.52)
if ΘRL and
SCM (θ) =
1
8θ
(V + ρ(a∗)− δa∗ + θ)2 (2.6.53)
if ΘRH.
Part II
Political Economy of Mass Media
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Chapter 3
Information, Media and Elections: Incentives
for Media Capture 1
3.1 Introduction
The political race to public oﬃces is not limited to electoral competition between candidates but it
also includes issues on information acquisition by the electorate. How political information is collected
and selected by sources of information and when news are acquired by voters, are essential elements to
be considered. In situations of uncertainty about the quality of political candidates, media outlets play
an essential role by making available valuable information for electoral decisions. By learning more
about candidates, voters are more likely to replace bad types with good ones. However, this may arise
a risk of attempts to media's freedom. If media are meant to discipline politicians, we would expect
politicians to view them as a threat. In particular, if they are oﬃce-motivated agents, they will ﬁnd
ways to silence critics and to foster positive coverage. 2
Related literature on media capture
Despite the essential role played by news media in modern democracies, the economic literature has
started analysing the market for news only recently. However, this literature has grown rapidly over a
large range of research questions. In particular, there is a growing number of contributions discussing
the role and the eﬀects of news media on political and public outcomes and inquiring the existence of
distortions in the market for news. For a complete overview of the literature on the political economy
of news media, there are two extensive surveys: Prat and Strömberg (2011)and Sobbrio (2014).
Focusing on the interaction within the media industry and between the media and other agents, an
issue of particular interest has been the possibility for media to provide distort information. Media
outlets may compete for audiences by presenting information in a biased way (media bias as news
slanting). Diﬀerently, distortion may come for outside, when media are prevented from performing
their informational task (media capture). These phenomena may prevent the functioning of the market,
skew electoral competition and produce negative political outcome. 3
Regarding media bias as news slanting, the literature has identiﬁed two diﬀerent forces creating a
bias in media reporting: a supply-driven bias and a demand-driven media bias. The ﬁrst arises from
idiosyncratic preferences of agents involved in the production of news (ideological bias of reporters
Baron (2006)) whereas the second bias occurs in equilibrium because of cognitive bias of audiences
(Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005), Chan and Suen (2008), Sobbrio (2014)) or because of reputational
1This chapter refers to the paper Drufuca 2014 "Information, Media and Elections: Incentives for Media Capture",
Working Papers (2013-) 1402, University of Bergamo, Department of Management, Economics and Quantitative Methods.
2I would like to thank Paolo Bertoletti for his revision and helpful comments. This paper has also beneﬁted from
the discussion and comments of seminar participants at the 4st EARIE Annual Conference.
3See Blasco and Sobbrio (2012).
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issues in presence of heterogeneous beliefs (Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) ). Instead, media capture is
a form of distortion which is linked to interaction between media and agents outside the industry.
Media capture may arises from diﬀerent sources. On one side, in an electoral context where agents have
common interests, it may come from incumbent candidates trying to hide their true quality in order to
be re-elected or it may come from the government trying to misreport the real value of public project
in order to extract tangible rents. In this sense media capture can be considered as the conseguence
of an incumbency advantage. For instance, Besley and Prat (2006) present a model of incumbency
advantage and endogenous media capture, stating conditions under which capture is more likely to
occur and describing its eﬀects on political outcome. They show how in a situation of asymmetric
information about the quality of candidates, an increase in the number of news media is likely to make
capture more diﬃcult and to rises turnover of politicians. Diﬀerently, Prat and Strömberg (2011) build
a model of retrospective voting and endogenous coverage, showing that political equilibria depend on
how informed diﬀerent social groups are and that an increase in news coverage increases on average
the Incumbent's vote share and the eﬀort of politicians towards informed groups.
On the other side, media capture may come from other sources when there are no common interest
among agents. If the electorate is heterogeneous, news media can collude with interest groups or
lobbies (Corneo (2006) ) or with the richest groups of voters (Petrova (2008)).
Regarding the empirical literature, there is a strong evidence suggesting that media capture exists both
within and cross-country 4. However, the nature of the evidence does not allow for strong conclusions
regarding causal eﬀects. The most convincing case is provided by McMillan and Zoido (2004), who
reconstruct the system of bribes created during Alberto Fujimori's presidency of Peru 5 providing
direct proof of the existence of capture. Moreover, their analysis identiﬁes patterns that are consistent
with the theoretical resultas of Besley and Prat (2006).
My contribution and plan of work
I provide a simple theoretical framework composed by three stages: provision of news, acquisition of
information and elections. The objective is to identify which incentives exist for individuals to get
informed before elections and why politicians may spend resources to control information. The model
is similar to the one of Besley and Prat (2006), where choice-relevant information is traded in a market
for news just before elections. In this market media outlets are specialized in gathering and transferring
news to an homogeneous audience. Incumbent candidates may interact with these media outlets in
order to distort information and to maximize the probability of holding their oﬃce.
Diﬀerently from their setting, I consider an heterogeneous environment where voters decide whether
or not to access media's contents to get informed about the quality of candidates, determining
endogenously a demand for news. In particular, my work analyses the endogenous acquisition of
information by voters with heterogeneous costs and it shows under which conditions media capture
may arise.
The work is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, I present the setup and the timing of the game. In
Section 3.3 I look for equilibrium solutions in a simpliﬁed version without media capture and with a
truthful reporting monopolist media. I consider all the stages involving voters, looking for conditions
ensuring the existence of equilibrium strategies in order to determine endogenously the demand for
news. Then I derive equilibrium solutions respectively for media outlets' stage and politicians' stage.
Comparative statics is done by considering canges in the relevant features (parameters, number of
ﬁrms, quality of signal, etc.). Finally, in Section 3.4, since equilibrium strategies obtained show the
existence of incentives to corruption, I introduce the possibility of media capture. Incumbent's choice
about capturing media will be inﬂuenced by the conditions deﬁned in previous stages, since victory is
determined by priors, posteriors, price and demand for news.
4Cross-country evidence of capture: Brunetti and Weder (2003); Djankov et al. (2003). Within-country evidence
of capture: Di Tella and Franceschelli (2011); Petrova (2009); Dyck and Zingales (2004); Dyck, Volchkova and Zingales
(2008); Gambaro and Puglisi (2010).
5Fujimori had been president from 1990 to 2000.
71
3.2 The Model
3.2.1 Set up
In a framework of electoral competition, information about candidates may aﬀect individual decisions
concerning both allocation of private resources and political choices. Indeed, political news are valuable
during elections since they help individuals to choose the best candidate or to anticipate the possibility
of a bad one. This relevant information can be traded in a market for news by outlets specialized in
gathering and transferring news.
Getting informed is however a costly activity which involves, besides a price of accessing news, oppor-
tunity costs composed essentially by time and cognitive eﬀort. These opportunity costs of processing
information can be linked to individual characteristics (such as QI and education 6), resulting in diﬀer-
ent individuals devoting more or less time to news consumption. Exploiting this intuition, I consider
an audience composed by rational individuals, heterogeneous regarding their costs of information,
who use news as support for electoral choices and private decisions. This heterogeneity allows me
to identify a group of informed individuals and a group of uninformed ones, in order to derive an
endogenous demand for news depending on priors about candidates' types, access-price, information
costs and quality of news.
When elections come, voters have to choose between re-electing the Incumbent and choosing an Oppon-
ent. Voters are uncertain about the quality of candidates and, consistently with part of the literature
on media bias, I model this uncertainty as a game of incomplete information. Two states of the world
are possible, a bad politician (x = 1) and a good politician (x = 0). These states correspond to
diﬀerent types of politician running for elections. The Incumbent and the Opponent have the same
distribution of types: Nature selects good with probability 1− p and bad with probability p. Since
Incumbent's type is realized before elections, media outlets receive some information about it and
individuals can update their beliefs about Incumbent's quality by accessing media's content.
Viewers Each individual derives the following pay-oﬀ when a politician of type x is in oﬃce:
U(x) + T × I(ai, x)− Ci − PA (3.2.1)
Voters derive a direct utility U(x) from the type of politician holding the public oﬃce. I assume U(x)
to be invariant across individuals and that U(1) = 0 and U(0) = 1. This direct utility is a common
evaluation of the state: a bad politician is considered by everyone as a negative situation. Due to the
shared nature of this evaluation, each candidate has incentive to signal a good state in order to be
elected.
In addition, voters may incur in a gain in consumption conditioned by the state and by the choice of
a private action ai. If individuals correctly anticipate the state, they can overwhelm it by matching
it with a correct private action. This additional gain in utility varies across individuals and it is
expressed as an indicator function which take value 1 if the action matches the state (ai = x) and zero
otherwise. Moreover, the impact of choosing the correct action is set in general terms as T , which can
be greater, equal or lower than the direct impact of the state.
Since media receive some information about the type of Incumbent running for the oﬃce, individuals
can improve their priors by accessing news. The costs of getting informed are composed by the price
of news PA and individual costs of information Ci. We can consider PA as an access cost and Ci as
individual opportunity costs of processing news in valuable information. Voters are heterogeneous in
their costs of information Ci
7 which are assumed to be uniformly distributed on a positive support.
6In a recent paper, Battaggion and Vaglio (2012) considered issues of information acquisition in an heterogeneous
environment, linking opportunity costs to individual levels of information.
7These costs may depend on individual characteristics. Intuitively and consistently with the previous intuition,
acquiring information on the political state is a costly activity in terms of time, eﬀort and individual capabilities. A
good proxy for these costs can be the inverse of individual education: education reduces the costs of acquiring information
in terms of psychic costs, eﬀort and time. See Battaggion and Vaglio (2012).
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Media Outlets Media outlets receive information about the type of Incumbent competing in the
political arena and they may report it to voters by supplying news. News are reporting strategies of
signals received by media about the type of politician in oﬃce. In this perspective, it is reasonable to
overlook the issue of news creation by assuming no costs of production.
According to the media capture literature (see Besley and Prat (2006)), media outlets receive a signal
just about the negative event. 8 If the Incumbent is of a good type, media recive an empty signal
s = ∅ with probability equal to 1. Instead, if the Incumbent is of a bad type, the signal is s = b (true
signal) with probability q and s = ∅ (a false signal which is the same signal as in the case of a good
politician) with probability 1− q. In this kinf of framework q is treated as the quality of signals. 9The
empty signal s = ∅ can be interpreted as the absence of news about the Incumbent being bad.
Media outlets have two sources of revenues: audience-related revenues and policy-related revenues.
Each of them refers to the interaction of media outlets with their audience 10 and with the Incumbent.
audience-related revenues = PA ×D(C, PA, q) (3.2.2)
policy-related revenues = y (3.2.3)
Audience-related revenues are standard in the literature and they depend on the price of the service,
the ﬁxed price of accessing media content PA, and the demand for news. By assuming that each
individual can just consume one piece of information, the demand for news can be identiﬁed with the
number of individuals willing to pay for accessing the media content given the price, their information
costs and quality of news. 11
On the other side, policy-related revenues derive from the interaction between media outlets and
politicians in oﬃcec revenues are introduced when there is possibility for media to non-truthfully
report signals and when politicians have means and incentives to capture outlets. They can oﬀer a
bribe y to each outlet: y is set in general terms and it may represent monetary bribes but also any
other attempt to silence critics and to foster positive coverage. For each outlet, y has value 0 when the
bribe is refused and it is positive otherwise. Notice that these are unconditional payments for what
concern the election of the Incumbent.
Politicians Several motivations can explain why politicians compete for holding public oﬃces. They
can be moved by policy outcomes and they desire to implement their preferred policies because of
ideology or to favour special interest groups (partisan politicians); others may seek personal satisfaction
from being in power or merely seek the beneﬁts of holding the oﬃce (opportunistic politicians).
The issue of motivation has been prominent in the study of elections which has tried to understand
whether candidates view public oﬃce as a mean or as a goal in itself. One stream of literature, following
Hotelling (1929) and Downs (1957) considers opportunistic oﬃce-motivated and rent-motivated can-
didates, whereas an opposite stream proposed by Wittman (1977; 1983), Calvert (1985) and Alesina
(1988) considers them as policy-motivated and partisan. Recently, this diarchy of opposite views has
been criticized by Persson and Tabellini (2000) as an imperfect understanding of ideology in politics.
They argue that either opportunism or partisanship is always the best assumption and that the two
are not necessarily mutually exclusive, rising new attention to the issue of motivations. A new stream
of models tried to respond to the challenge posed by Persson and Tabellini, integrating both oﬃce
motivations and policy motivations (see Besley and Ghatak (2005) and Callander (2008) ) 12.
8I considered also the possibility of a framework with a double-signal structure. However I do not present results on
this alternative setting since they do not add any useful insight.
9In this framework q is treated as an exogenous variable. In a possible extension, it could be interesting to consider
q as the result of a investment decision and let it be part of the media's maximization strategy.
10I do not consider a speciﬁc kind of audience. Media outlets considered can be of any kind (newspaper, television,
radio, etc.). I usually refer to media's audience as viewers. However this term, doesn't imply any restriction to the kind
of audience. Sometimes I use the terms consumers, individuals and voters to name audience.
11C stands for the uniform distribution of individual costs of information.
12For a complete discussion of the literature on political motivation see Persson and Tabellini (2000) and Besley
(2006).
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In this model I consider a situation of opportunistic rent-seeking politicians, who care about winning
the election but also about extracting tangible rents for themselves 13. By assuming politicians to
be rent-seeking oﬃcers, it is possible introduce incentives to capture media in order to give a certain
signal, since these oﬃcers just care on the probability of being re-elected and not on the policies they
have to implement.
The possibility of media capture, is an exclusive feature of incumbency, one of the structural advantages
of candidates in oﬃce over challengers during elections. Even if the Challenger 14 has the same prior
probabilities on states, he has no means to inﬂuence media's reports and always acts as as a passive
agent . In this framework, Incumbent's pay-oﬀs are
ER−
n∑
j=1
yj (3.2.4)
Obviously, Incumbent's rent is expressed in expected terms and has to be conditioned on the probability
of being elected. The Incumbent gets a positive rent R if elected and 0 otherwise; in both cases, he has
to subtract the total cost of bribing if he decides to corrupt media outlets. The total cost of bribing
is the sum of bribes yj accepted by each outlet j. Since the bad state reduce utility of all voters, the
Incumbent has the incentive to capture media in order to give a positive signal and to maximize the
probability of being elected; however he will corrupt media only if the net rent from holding the oﬃce
ER−∑ yj is positive . In addition to the costs of bribing, a politician can incurs in the possibility of
being detected and punished while corrupting media.
3.2.2 Timing
The game can be summarized as follows. There are three stage, one for each kind of actor, namely
politicians, media outlets and voters. Voters' stage is composed by three diﬀerent sub-stages.
• Stage 1: Politicians Stage: Incumbent's Capture strategies
• Stage 2: Media Stage: Pricing and Reporting strategies
• Stage 3: Voters Stage: Information Decision, Action Choice and Electoral Choice
The timing of the game is the following:
- Nature selects Incumbent's type (B or G); the Incumbent and media observe signals this type;
- the Incumbent decide whether or not to corrupt media by oﬀering a bribe;
- media decide their reporting strategies: to accept the bribe or to truthfully report the signal;
- voters decide ether or not to get informed; informed voters observe the report and update beliefs;
- all individual chooses private actions;
- elections are held between the Incumbent and an Opponent; the elected politician implements policy
according to his type (pay-oﬀs realization).
I characterize perfect bayesian equilibria of this game, solving backward the stages for voters, media
outlets and politicians.
3.3 Equilibrium under Truthful Reporting
I start with a simpliﬁed version of the model where I eliminate the possibility of capture by taking
for granted that media have a strategy of truthful reporting of signals (r = s) and by assuming the
absence of revenues other than market proﬁts (no policy-related revenues). Hence, in all stages, I just
13See chapter 4 in Persson and Tabellini (2000).
14I refer to the candidate challenging the Incumbent both as Opponent and as Challenger.
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consider signals and I do not take into account the choice of Incumbent to bribe or not media outlets.
Both the Incumbent and the Opponent act as passive agents. Moreover, media market is assumed
to be non-competitive: I consider a monopolist media outlet that maximizes proﬁts from the sale of
news by choosing an optimal access price to its content (PA). This simpliﬁed model is fundamental
to check if it is possible to ﬁnd the conditions needed to guarantee incentives for the Incumbent to
corrupt media, once policy-related revenues are introduced, and it will be used as a benchmark.
3.3.1 Voters
I consider all the stages involving voters, looking for conditions ensuring the existence of equilibrium
strategies. At ﬁrst, each individuals have to decide whether or not to be informed, taking into account
costs and beneﬁts from accessing news; secondly, they have to decide which private action to choose,
knowing that it will interact with the type of the politician elected; ﬁnally, they have to select which
candidate they should vote for. It is important to point out that the electoral stage involves a simple
model of retrospective voting with no pivotal considerations and no individual preferences for candid-
ates or parties (sincere voting). Voters compare candidates just on the base of expected utilities from
their types. 15 Moreover, I exclude the presence of costs of voting and the possibility of abstention. 16
Electoral stage
At the electoral stage voters have to choose between two competing candidates with a certain probabil-
ity of being of bad type: the Incumbent and an Opponent. As already stressed, they vote sincerely for
the candidate providing the highest expected utility. Expected utilities depend on priors and signals
about the type of politicians competing. The distribution of types is the same for the two candidates;
however, Incumbent's type is realized before the electoral stage and voters can access information
about him through media reports. The main diﬀerence between the expected utility from the In-
cumbent (EUI) and the expected utility from an Opponent (EUO) is that the ﬁrst must incorporate
the information received from media, if voters are informed. Individual actions are taken before the
electoral choice and are considered as given at this stage.
Since only a part of voters acquire information, I distinguish between uninformed individuals and
informed ones: in the ﬁrst case the expected utilities from Incumbent and Opponent are equal since
there is no update, the two politicians have the same distribution of types and are no no ideological
preferences. By assuming that individuals vote just considering expected utility without taking into
account the probability of victory of candidates (no pivotal voting strategy), the only reasonable
behaviour for uninformed voters is the mixed strategy of voting with 50% of probability for each
candidate. 17 On the other hand informed individuals condition their choice on the report received
from media by updating their prior beliefs.
15The baseline of the election game is a pure adverse-selection model where the policy outcome is a function solely of
the politician's type.
16Every individuals will be voters. Hence, I use the two terms has synonymous.
17It is possible to relax this assumption by considering a more general mixed behaviour, but it will complicate the
analysis without adding any insight.
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Figure 3.3.1: Game scheme for uninformed
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Figure 3.3.2: Game Scheme for informed
In the simpliﬁed version of the model I consider a situation of truthful reporting (r = s) where each
media report the signal received about Incumbent's type. In this situation, I consider signals s instead
of reports r also in voters' stages.
Equilibrium moves in the electoral stage are obtained excluding degenerate values for the probability
of negative event (p) and for the quality of signals (q) and assuming T ∈ (−1, 1). The latter condition
implies that the impact of private action I(ai, x) is inferior (in percentage) with respect to the direct
impact of the state on utility. I describe the equilibrium voting behaviour for informed individuals in
the following proposition:
Proposition 20. Given probability p ∈ (0, 1) and probability q ∈ (0, 1) and assuming T ∈ (−1, 1), an
informed individual prefers - and thus votes - the Opponent if he receives a report s = b ; instead he
prefers the Incumbent if he receives a report s = ∅. This behaviour is optimal independently from the
action in the previous stage and from the sign of their impact (T ) .
[see proof 3.6.1 in the Appendix]
Proposition 20 states that an informed individual does not vote for the Incumbent if he receive bad
news about him. In case of absence of bad news, he is is willing to re-elect him. This kind of behaviour
is essential to induce media capture by politicians: since voters prefers the Opponent if they receive a
signal about the Incumbent being bad, the latter has an incentive to silence media in order to increase
the probability of winning the election.
Action Choice stage
From the electoral stage, under the assumption of p ∈ (0, 1) q ∈ (0, 1) and T ∈ (−1, 1) (see Proposition
20), individuals correctly anticipate that they will vote for the Opponent if they receive news about
the Incumbent being of bad type, whereas they will prefer the Incumbent with 50% probability if
uninformed.
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Figura 3.3.3: From electoral stage: backward solution
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Figura 3.3.4: From electoral stage: expected pay-oﬀs
At this stage individuals choose their private actions in order to compensate the possibility of a negative
state. If the state is bad they should set ai = b = 1 and ai = g = 0 otherwise. In choosing their
action informed individuals take into account their expected utility conditioned on the report received
from media and their behaviour in the electoral stage; uninformed individuals condition their choice
on priors. In the following proposition I derive equilibrium choice of actions. Assumptions on priors
and signal's quality are identical to those in Proposition 20, whereas I slightly modify the condition on
the impact of private action (T ), assuming it to be positive and inferior (in percentage) with respect
to the direct impact of the state on utility.
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Proposition 21. Given probability p ∈ (0, 1) and probability q ∈ (0, 1) and assuming T ∈ (0, 1),
an individual will choose his private action according to the information received, the probability of
negative event and the quality of media's signal:
1. If s = b, informed chooses
a) a = b if p > 1/2
b) a = g if p < 1/2
2. If s = ∅, informed chooses
a) a = b if p > 1/2 and (1− p) < p(1− q)
b) a = g if p < 1/2 and (1− p) > p(1− q)
c) a = g if p < 1/2
3. Uninformed chooses
a) a = b if p > 1/2
b) a = g if p < 1/2
[see Proof 3.6.2 in the Appendix]
To summarize, from the electoral stage imposing that p ∈ (0, 1) q ∈ (0, 1) and T ∈ (−1, 1) individuals
anticipate that they will vote for the Opponent if they receive news s = b and for the Incumbent if
s = ∅. Moving to the action choice stage, pure optimal moves exist only by considering separately
when the negative event is ex-ante more (p > 1/2) or less (p < 1/2) likely to occur. 18 Hence, from
now on, I consider these two situation separately looking for equilibrium behaviours.
When p < 1/2 , informed individuals vote according to the report received and used it to update
priors probabilities, but they behave as uninformed always choosing ai = g = 0. Instead, when
negative state is ex-ante more likely, the kind of report becomes important. In this situation, when
individuals receive bad news about the Incumbent (s = b), the signal is likely to be correct and they
act consistently (ai = b = 1); if individuals don't receive news about the Incumbent being bad when
is more likely that the state is b , the quality of signals q 19 has to be high to make them believing
the signal. We can interprete p(1− q) as the probability of a false signal. Hence, informed individuals
uniform ai to the report. if the probability of a false signal is suﬃciently low (p(1− q) < 1− p); vice
versa, they act as uninformed by choosing always ai = b = 1.
Information stage
Information stage concerns individual choice about getting informed. Since information is a costly
activity, some individuals may ﬁnd proﬁtable to remain uninformed. If voters have suﬃciently high
costs of information, these may overcome the gains of being informed. Costs are composed by two
parts: in addition to a ﬁxed access price PA set by media, individuals have to sustain individual inform-
ation costs Ci when they decide to get news. Information costs are a fundamental in this theoretical
settings since they represent the element of heterogeneity. Information costs are heterogeneous across
individuals and they can be thought as linked to personal characteristic (education, as example). In
order to capture this heterogeneity,Ci is assumed to be distributed over a positive support;
20 the cu-
mulative distribution of individual with a suﬃciently low cost of information will rappresent the share
of informed voters. At this point, I distinguish the expected utility of an uninformed individual from
18I overlook the threshold case of p = 1/2.
19Recall that in the simpliﬁed version r = s.
20A complete discussion is provided in the next section.
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that of informed one by introducing costs of information and compute them exploiting equilibrium
strategies derived in the previous stage. 21
Expected utility of informed individuals Informed individuals take into account the price of
accessing media PA and their personal information costs Ci. Their expected utility depends on the
state, on private actions and on the signal received by media,22 having assumed truthful reporting.
If individuals are informed, they should have found convenient to sustain the costs of information in
order to condition their choice on the news they have accessed and to update their beliefs about the
Incumbent.
EU(s, ai)− Ci − PA (3.3.1)
where EU(s, ai, ) is the expected utility from the future politician in oﬃce, conditioned on the received
signal s and given private action ai.
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Figure 3.3.5: Equilibrium moves in electoral stage for informed individuals
Informed individuals condition their choices both on the distribution of politicians' types and on news'
content. Diﬀerently from uninformed individuals, they take into account the kind of signal received
(s) and its quality (q).
Lemma 4. Given p ∈ (0, 1), q ∈ (0, 1) and T ∈ (0, 1), the expected utility of an informed individual
is:
• (CASE A) EU = pq[(1− p) + T (1− p)] + (1− p)[1 + T ]− Ci − PA if p < 1/2
• (CASE B) EU = pq[(1− p) + Tp] + (1− p)[1 + T ]− Ci − PA if p > 1/2 and (1− p) > (1− q)p
21When I compute these utilities I consider two diﬀerent cases: a situation of high probability of the bad state
(p > 1/2) and a situation of low probability of the bad state ( p < 1/2). By considering these two situations separately, I
am able to derive the expected utilities since I know voters equilibrium strategies for the other voters' stages (individual
action and electoral choice).
22Since report and signal don't diverge r = s.
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• (CASE C) EU =pq[(1−p)+Tp]+p(1−q)[T ]+(1−p)−Ci−PA if p > 1/2 and (1−p) < (1−q)p
[see Proof 3.6.3 in the Appendix]
Expected utility of uninformed individuals There are no diﬀerences among uninformed indi-
viduals: by not reading, individuals do not sustain information costs (heterogeneous element). In this
case there is no possibility of update since no report is received.
EU(ai) (3.3.2)
where EU(ai) is the expected utility from the future politician in oﬃce, given action ai.
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Figure 3.3.6: Pay-oﬀ in the action stage for uninformed individual
In the electoral stage, uninformed voters are assumed to vote 50% for the Incumbent and 50% for
the Opponent since there are no preferences other than the utility derived from the type of politician
elected and the expected pay-oﬀ of matching private actions. Without information, the expected utility
from the two candidate is the same and it is realistic to assume that individuals choose this mixed
strategy. Hence, the only decision is about private actions (a = g or a = b ).
Lemma 5. Given p ∈ (0, 1), q ∈ (0, 1) and T ∈ (0, 1), the expected utility of an uninformed individual
is
• EU = (1− p) + Tp if p > 12
• EU = (1− p) + T (1− p) if p < 12
[see Proof 3.6.4 in the Appendix]
Voters are heterogeneous in their costs of processing news Ci and this determines that a share of them
will ﬁnd convenient to acquire information since their expected utility is greater than in case of no
information. To be this the case, I need expected utility of informed, included all information's costs,
to be grater than the expected utility of informed at least for some value of Ci. This is true if the
diﬀerence between the two expected utilities is greater than zero, since both PA and Ci are positive;
after that I compute the cost CI (one for each case) identiﬁying the individual indiﬀerent. In each
parameter region, given the distribution of Ci, the indiﬀerence condition obtained will determine the
share of informed individual.
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Lemma 6. Given p ∈ (0, 1), q ∈ (0, 1) and T ∈ (0, 1), the individual indiﬀerent between acquiring
news or remaining uninformed - if he exists - is identiﬁed by:
• (CASE A) CI = p(1− p)q(1 + T )− PA if p < 12
• (CASE B) CI = p[q(1− p) + T (p− 2)] + T − PA if p > 12 and if (1− p) > (1− q)p
• (CASE C) CI = p(1− p)q(1− T )− PA if p > 12 and if (1− p) < (1− q)p
[see Proof 3.6.5 in the Appendix]
The existence of CI depends on the equilibrium price PA, determined endogenously by the proﬁt
maximization problem of media outlet. As it will be explained in the next section 3.3.2, the conditions
ensuring the existence of CI and a proper share of informed individuals depend on the degree of
heterogeneity of information costs Ci. In the special case of information costs uniformly distributed
over the unitary support (0, 1), the optimal price guarantees the existence of a positive share of informed
individuals without assuming further conditions. For a complete discussion see Extra Appendix.
3.3.2 Media Outlets
Media outlets process information in news that can be purchased by voters. Outlets receive a signal s
about Incumbent's type before the electoral stage and they make a report about this signal to informed
voters. At this stage, media outlets should decide their report strategy (r) and their access price (PA)
in order to maximize both market-proﬁts and revenues coming from the Incumbent. However, in the
benchmark model, I focus just on the decision about prices, ruling out the possibility of capture by
government. Media outlets follow a strategy of truthful reporting of signals (s = r) and they receive
just market-proﬁts (audience-related revenues). The demand of news is derived endogenously as the
share of informed individuals. 23 Individuals always considers media as a neutral ﬁlter of information
about the Incumbent: this means that they are not aware of the possibility of corruption and news
distortion but just of the possibility of mistake.
The framework considered is a non-competitive market for news with one monopolist media outlet.
I ﬁrst derive the demand for news and the maximization strategy of the outlet. In the process of
producing news the outlet does not incur in costs of production and its activity is just to report signals
received about Incumbent's type: the monopolist media outlet maximizes proﬁts by setting an optimal
access price to its contents. Secondly, I consider the eﬀects of changes in priors, quality of signals and
heterogeneity of individuals on equilibrium quantities and prices. Finally I consider a more speciﬁc
case with a distribution of costs on a unitary support.
Demand for news and Proﬁt's maximization
In the previous section, I obtained the cost CI identifying the individual indiﬀerent between acquiring
information or remaining uninformed . Given CI , it is possible to identify voters willing to get
informed as those individuals with a cost inferior to CI . The share of informed individuals is therefore
computed as the cumulative density function of CI . I assume Ci to be uniformly distributed on a
positive support, with a minimum cost of information a and a maximum cost b. 24 Each cost Ci
has a density of 1b−a . The extent of the support (b − a) can be seen as the degree of heterogeneity
among individuals. By assuming voters to consume just one piece of news, I can consider the share
of informed individuals as the demand for news. If in all cases it exists a cost CI associated to
the individual indiﬀerent between acquiring information or remaining uninformed, I can express the
demand for news as the cumulative density function CDF (CI).
23By assuming that each informed individual can consume just one piece of news, the number of individuals willing
to acquire information (signal's report) can be a proxy for the demand for news, given price PA, their information costs
Ci and the quality of news q.
24Ci ∼ U(a, b) with a ≥ 0 and b > a.
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Lemma 7. (Demand for news )
Given p ∈ (0, 1), q ∈ (0, 1), T ∈ (0, 1) and positive heterogeneous costs of information distributed
uniformly, the demand for news faced by the monopolistic media outlet is:
• (CASE A) demand = p(1−p)q(1+T )−PA−ab−a if p < 12
• (CASE B) demand = p[q(1−p)+T (p−2)]+T−PA−ab−a if p > 12 and if (1− p) > (1− q)p
• (CASE C) demand = p(1−p)q(1−T )−PA−ab−a if p > 12 and if (1− p) < (1− q)p
In all cases demand for news is increasing in the quality of signal q and decreasing in access price PA.
Moreover, demand depends on the degree of heterogeneity (b− a). 25
In order to ensure that demand is positive - which means to have proper shares of informed and
uninformed individuals - I have to impose conditions on the lower bound of information costs a and a
limit on prices. 26
By now I consider the maximization of audience-related revenues by the monopolist media, given the
demand for news obtained in Lemma 7.
In order to maximize its market proﬁts, the monopolist set an optimal access price P ∗A to its content
which is a function of relevant parameters and degree of heterogeneity as stated in the following
proposition.
Proposition 22. (Optimal price and optimal quantity)
Given p ∈ (0, 1), q ∈ (0, 1), T ∈ (0, 1) and positive heterogeneous costs of information Ci ∼ U(a, b),
the monopolistic media outlet ﬁxes the proﬁt-maximizing price P ∗A to:
• (CASE A) P ∗A = p(1−p)q(1+T )−a2 if p < 12
• (CASE B) P ∗A = p[q(1−p)+T (p−2)]+T−a2 if p > 12 and if (1− p) > (1− q)p
• (CASE C) P ∗A = p(1−p)q(1−T )−a2 if p > 12 and if (1− p) < (1− q)p
[see proof 3.6.6 in Appendix]
In all cases prices are increasing in the quality of the signal q and they take into account the probability
of states of nature and the minimum cost of information a . Proﬁts and optimal quantities are aﬀected
in the same way with respect to the quality measure q and in addition they take into account the
degree of heterogeneity - measured by (b − a) - of individuals. 27 Prices, quantities and proﬁts are
positive if some requirements are met: in order to obtain an informed share included between 0 and 1,
optimal prices must satisfy the conditions stated for news' demand. 28 In particular, restrictions are
imposed on the support of information costs' distribution (a and b) by requiring a minimum degree of
heterogeneity among voters.
Proﬁts' maximization with Ci ∼ U(0, 1).
So far I considered a general situation of a unit mass of individuals heterogeneous which are distributed
uniformly over a generic positive support (a, b). As previously stated, this set-up requires further
conditions on a and b in order to guarantee that the demand for news is positive and that a share of
uninformed individuals exists. 29 These restrictions complicate the analysis by increasing the number
25For a complete description of these eﬀects see Extra Appendix.
26For a detailed analysis of these restrictions see Extra Appendix.
27For a complete description of these eﬀects see Extra Appendix.
28See Extra appendix.
29See Extra appendix.
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of conditions required without adding any important insight. In order to simplify the analysis I consider
a special case: a uniform distribution with a unitary support. In this setting it means to consider a
uniform distribution of information costs Ci ∼ U(a, b) with a = 0 and b = 1.
Lemma 8. (Modiﬁcation of proposition 22)
Given p ∈ (0, 1), q ∈ (0, 1), T ∈ (0, 1) and heterogeneous costs of information Ci ∼ U(0, 1), the
monopolistic media outlet obtains positive proﬁts by ﬁxing the proﬁt-maximizing price P ∗A to:
• (CASE A) P ∗A = p(1−p)q(1+T )2 if p < 12
• (CASE B) P ∗A = p[q(1−p)+T (p−2)]+T2 if p > 12 and if (1− p) > (1− q)p
• (CASE C) P ∗A = p(1−p)q(1−T )2 if p > 12 and if (1− p) < (1− q)p
This simpliﬁcation does not change results of previous stages since it just aﬀects the computation
of optimal prices and proﬁts in the media's stage. With this distribution, the level of heterogeneity
is suﬃcient to obtain, after maximization, an informed share SI ∈ (0, 1) and an uninformed share
SU = 1− SI ∈ (0, 1) in all cases and for every p ∈ (0, 1), q ∈ (0, 1) and T (0, 1). 30
3.3.3 Politicians
Having deﬁned equilibrium strategies for voters and media, it is possible to determine the expected
shares of votes for the two candidates. In particular, ex-ante expected shares of votes and ex-post
share for the Incumbent are determined after having observed the signal. In the simpliﬁed version of
the model both the Incumbent and the Opponent can't modify their type and they can't interfere with
the provision of news. Since they are unable to exert eﬀort in order to improve their probability of
victory, they act as passive agents. Once the possibility of media capture is introduced, Incumbent's
objective will be re-election and he will actively try to extract the maximum tangible rent for himself.
Individuals always considers media as a neutral ﬁlter of information about the Incumbent: this means
that they are not aware of the possibility of corruption and news distortion but just of the possibility
of mistake.
Expected shares of votes from informed group and uninformed group
In a deterministic retrospective voting model it is possible to compute the probability of victory
of one candidate by "counting" how many voters prefer him to his challengers. In this model, the
number of votes for each politician it is determined by considering optimal moves in the electoral
stage. Simmetrically with the previous section, I keep the distinction between uninformed individuals
and informed ones and I derive for each candidate his share of expected votes ex-ante and ex-post.
Lemma 9. (Expected votes from uninformed share 31) From the uninformed group, the Incumbent and
the Opponent expect the same number of votes, namely half of the uninformed share:
SU
2
=
1− SI
2
(3.3.3)
30See Extra appendix.
31In this case ex-ante and ex-post expected shares of votes coincide. These votes are expected due to the fact that
the composition (in terms of dimension of the groups) depends on priors.
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Uninformed individuals obtain the same expected utility from the Incumbent and from the Opponent.
32 In absence of partisan consideration diﬀerent from expected utility (no ideological preferences
or party aﬃliation), uninformed individuals are assumed to vote using a mixed strategy, choosing the
Incumbent in the 50% of cases and the Opponent in the remaining 50%. On the basis of this behaviour,
each candidate will obtain half of the votes of the uninformed group.
Diﬀerently, informed individuals receive from media additional information on the realization of In-
cumbent's type and they condition their electoral choice on news. If the they receive bad news (r = b)
they vote for the Opponent; if instead they don't receive bad news (r = ∅) they vote for the Incumbent.
33
Lemma 10. (Ex-ante Expected votes from informed share 34) The Incumbent and the Opponent have
an expected share of votes from the informed group that depends on news :
Opponent's share = SI × pq (3.3.4)
Incumbent's share = SI × [p(1− q) + (1− p)] (3.3.5)
[See Proof 3.6.7 in the Appendix]
Expected shares of votes
By considering both votes coming from the uninformed share and those from the informed one, it is
possible to assess the expected number of votes for each candidate. These ex-ante expected shares
of votes are obviously functions of the composition of the electorate (SI and SU ), the probability
of negative event and the quality of news. In a framework of truthful reporting media and passive
politicians, there is possibility for both candidates to win the oﬃce. In Lemma 11 and Proposition
23, I assess under which conditions the expected share of one candidate exceeds the 50%+1 of votes -
namely when it is greater than 12 - making him the expected winner. I also compute ex-post shares of
votes, which will be used in the next section.
Lemma 11. (Ex-ante Expected Votes)
Each candidate competing in the electoral arena has an expected share of votes which depends on the
probability of negative event (p), on the quality of signals (q) and on the composition of the electorate
(SI and SU ). These expected shares of votes are, respectively:
VO =
1− SI
2
+ SI × pq (3.3.6)
VI =
1− SI
2
+ SI × [p(1− q) + (1− p)] (3.3.7)
The diﬀerence between votes expected by the Incumbent (VI) and those by the Opponent (VO) lays
in the share coming from informed individuals. In this sense the informed individuals become pivotal.
This is due to the fact that the uniformed group always vote half for each candidate. The informed
32The two candidates have the same prior probabilities on types and uninformed individuals condition they private
actions just on the probability of negative event.
33This electoral behaviour has been derived as equilibrium in section 3.3.1.
34Ex-post expected votes will diﬀer in this case, since Incumbents know the realization of signals. If media receive
a signal s = ∅, in case of truthful reporting, he expect to be voted by the whole informed group; instead, if s = b he
expect to obtain no votes from the informed group.
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individuals instead condition their electoral choice on news and their votes are inﬂuenced by changes
in types' distribution and quality of signals.
If the probability p of bad type increases (ceteris paribus) it aﬀects both the share of votes going to
the Incumbent and those received by the Opponent: pq and p(1 − q) increases but (1 − p) decreases,
making the overall eﬀect on Incumbent's votes depending on which eﬀect prevails.
If the reduction in (1−p) is stronger than the increment of pq , an increase of negative state's probability
implies an increase of votes received by the Opponent and reduction of those received by the Incumbent.
A rise in signal's quality (ceteris paribus) beneﬁts the Opponent since since pq increases and p(1− q)
decreases. Looking at each diﬀerent cases, it is possible to disentangle this ambiguity and to assess
which eﬀect prevails.
Proposition 23. .
The Incumbent is expected to win iﬀ pq < 12 : a suﬃcient condition is that p < 1/2, while p > 1/2 and
q > 1/2 are suﬃcient to expect the victory of the Opponent .
[see Proof 3.6.8 in the Appendix]
Proposition 23 states under which conditions the Incumbent and the Opponent are expected to win
and which are the eﬀects of better signals. It is fundamental to notice that the quality of signals has
a double eﬀect: an increase in q increments Opponent's expected votes and increase the range of
parameter supporting the case in which individuals match their private actions to news received (Case
B). Quality intervenes both on winner's selection and on voters' behaviour. A suﬃciently high q
(q > 12 ) increases Opponent's probability of victory since it makes more likely to receive a negative
news about the Incumbent. This becomes crucial when the negative state is more likely to occur
(p > 12 ). Moreover, q reduces the range of p (it is required a higher p) supporting the case of no-
matching between report and private actions (case C). With high-quality news, individuals choose an
indiscriminate behaviour a = b only if the negative event is more likely than the good one.
Notice that the ex-post share of votes are deterministic: if s = b the Opponent receives votes from the
informed group and half from the uninformed group, expecting a victory; the opposite hold in case of
s = ∅.
3.4 Media Capture: Incentives
What happens when the possibility of media capture is introduced? Does the Incumbent have any
incentive to spend resources in corrupting media? When a media should accept bribing and when
refuse it? There exist a trade-oﬀ between audience-related revenues and policy-related revenues? All
this question are fundamental in order to assess under which conditions media capture may arise.
The present section deals with the possibility for the Incumbent of oﬀering media a compensation
for silencing negative signals. I ﬁrst analyse what happens to expected shares of votes when the
monopolist outlet is captured, in order assess whether or not this may change chances of victory
for the Incumbent. Then, I check if the Incumbent has the incentives to invest part of the rent in
corruption even in presence of a possibility of and for which level of bribing media silences negative
signals. Recall that Individuals always considers media as a neutral ﬁlter of information about the
Incumbent: this means that they are not aware of the possibility of corruption and news distortion
but just of the possibility of mistake.
3.4.1 Expected Shares of Votes
What happens to expected shares of votes when the monopolist media is captured? Having the only
existing media outlet corrupted means that the only report is r = ∅. This implies that all informed
individuals vote for the Incumbent:
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VI =
1
2
+
1
2
SI (3.4.1)
In this case, the Incumbent wins elections with certainty if at least on voters is informed. Instead, the
Opponent looses for sure, since he expect to receives just half of the votes of uninformed individuals:
VO =
1
2
− 1
2
SI (3.4.2)
3.4.2 Incentive to Capture
Obviously, the Incumbent has the incentive to corrupt media if there are some informed voters and
if media receive a negative signal. However, when it is proﬁtable for him? Beneﬁts from corruption
have to overcome costs, that is the rent from holding the oﬃce R has to be greater than the necessary
amount of bribes:
ER > bribes
ER >
n∑
j=1
yj (3.4.3)
In addition to the amount of bribes paid the Incumbent may run into other costs of corruption,
namely the possibility of being detected. If a politician is caught corrupting and silencing media, it
is reasonable to assume that he will incur in some forms of punishment. Here the punishment is the
removal from the oﬃce and the loss of all beneﬁts. The more politicians corrupt media, the more
evidence is possible to collected against them. I call γ the probability of detection and I assume it to
be an increasing function of the number of media captured nc: γ = 0 if nc = 0 and γ → 1 as nc →∞.
This implies that costs of corruption are increasing in the number of media outlets.
Hence, the Incumbent faces a trade-oﬀ between increasing his probability of victory by corrupting
media and decreasing the probability of being detected.
R ∗ prob(VI > 1
2
)−
n∑
j=1
yj −Rγ > 0
R ∗ (pvictory − γ) >
n∑
j=1
yj (3.4.4)
where prob(VI >
1
2 ) = probability of victory = pvictory(p, q, nc, s).
In case of monopoly
R ∗ prob(VI > 1
2
)− y −Rγ > 0
R (pvictory − γ) > y (3.4.5)
When media outlets accept bribes? In this framework, individuals always considers media as a truthful
reporter; moreover they don't have any preference for the content of the report. That is, if they decide
to buy the news they will do it both if it is a bad or a good news. An alternative intuition for this
kind of behavior is to assume that individuals buy news before knowing the content (eg. subscriptions
to newspapers). Hence, individuals don't make any distinction between news and the demand for
information is not aﬀected by the kind of report. Outlets accept to be captured for any value greater
than zero since there is no real trade-oﬀ between market proﬁts and policy-related revenues (bribes).
yj > 0 (3.4.6)
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If the only condition on bribes is non negativity, the equilibrium strategy for the Incumbent is to set
a bribe enough close to zero in order to preserve his rent. Hence the Incumbent should corrupt an
optimal number of media n∗c , suﬃcient to have
R ∗ (p(n∗c)− γ(n∗c)) ' 0 (3.4.7)
p(n∗c) > γ(n
∗
c) (3.4.8)
In case of monopoly it is always the case that pvictory > γ in case of media capture. This pessimistic
result predicts media capture under monopoly in any situation diﬀerent from the case p < 12 : when
the positive event event is more likely than the negative one, the Incumbent expects to win even if
media are not silenced. In this case the risk of incurring in the punishment is not worth it.
When the number of media outlet increases it is possible to obtain an intermediate result where the
Incumbent corrupts a suﬃcient number of media in order to be re-elected and not detected. For the
time being I can only assess that there is always room for media capture and that as the number of
outlets increases there is no incentive to corrupt the whole market. A further analysis on the shape of
pvictory and of γ should tell us if there exist situations under which it does not exists a n
∗
c such that
p(n∗c) > γ(n
∗
c). .
3.5 Conclusions
The model developed so far produces a number of predictions on the relationship between the media
industry, the electorate and political candidates.
The main conclusion is that information is a fundamental element for electoral choices and that any
attempt to increase quality of news and to reduce information's costs can have positive eﬀects on the
selection of politicians. Quality intervenes both on winner's selection and on voters' behaviour. A
high quality (q > 12 ) increases Opponent's probability of victory in case of high probability of a bad
Incumbent, since it makes more likely to receive a negative news. Moreover, with high-quality news,
individuals condition more their actions on information and they choose an indiscriminate behaviour
only if the negative event is very likely.
Regarding the possibility of media capture, my result both conﬁrms and contradicts the one obtained
by Beasley and Prat (2006). They found that media pluralism provides eﬀective protection against
capture since incentives to capture the media market decrease as the number of outlets increases.
Indeed they assume individuals to prefer and buy only informative news (r = b) 35 and that once
reported, news become public. The conclusion is that to make capture eﬀective an Incumbent has to
bribe the whole market. Hence, as number of outlets increases also costs of corruption increase, making
capture less likely. In this way they obtain a dichotomous result: the media industry is independent
or it is capture.
Instead, I obtain an intermediate result: as the number of outlets increases, it exists an optimal level of
corruption which does not coincide with the whole market. If the possibility of detection is included,
the Incumbent faces a trade-oﬀ between increasing the probability of winning the oﬃce and being
punished. Further analysis on the eﬀect of capture on these two probabilities and on the eﬀects of
competition is needed.
Diﬀerently from what Besley and Prat (2006) state, there is always incentive to corruption and media
market is never completely independent. This pessimistic result predicts complete media capture under
monopoly in any situation diﬀerent from the case of low probability of negative event (p < 12 ).
Therefore, the possibility of media capture is an important issue we should worry about. Since it is
robust to increases in competition, it is fundamental to induce media outlets to privilege accuracy over
remunerations from news's distortion in order to reduce incentives to corruption.
35Media outlets face a trade-oﬀ between markets proﬁts and policy related revenues.
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The analysis developed here is simple, and much remains to be done to obtain a complete picture of
the issues involved.
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Appendix
3.6 Proofs of lemmas and propositions
3.6.1 Proof of proposition 20
The proof is twofold. First I compute expected utilities for informed voters given individual actions.
Secondly I look for equilibrium strategies. Information received about the Incumbent is incorporated
in the update of types probability: in case of informed individuals I use posteriors for computing the
expected utility from Incumbent. In the expected utilities from the Opponent I use priors.
1. If the report is s = b posteriors are:
pr(b|s = b) = pr(s = b|b)× pr(b)
pr(s = b)
= 1 (3.6.1)
pr(g|s = b) = pr(s = b|g)× pr(g)
pr(s = b)
= 0 (3.6.2)
2. If the reportl is s = ∅posteriors are:
pr(b|s = ∅) = pr(s = ∅|b)× pr(b)
pr(s = ∅)
(3.6.3)
=
(1− q)p
(1− p) + (1− q)p
pr(g|s = ∅) = pr(s = ∅|g)× pr(g)
pr(s = ∅)
(3.6.4)
=
1− p
(1− p) + (1− q)p
Expected utilities are computed for four diﬀerent combinations :
1. In case of signal s = b and action ai = b, the expected utilities (I use posteriors 3.6.1 and 3.6.2)
from the two candidates are respectively:
EUI(ai = b , s = b) = (3.6.5)
= U(b)× pr(b|s = b) + U(g)× pr(g|s = b) + E[T × I(a = b)]
= T
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where E[T × I(a = b)] = T × pr(b|s = b)
EUO(ai = b , s = b) = EUO(ai = b) = (3.6.6)
= U(b)× pr(b) + U(g)× pr(g) + E[T × I(a = b)]
= (1− p) + Tp
where E[T × I(a = b)] = T × pr(b)
2. In case of signal s = b and action ai = g, the expected utilities (I use posteriors 3.6.1 and 3.6.2)
from the two candidates are respectively:
EUI(ai = g , s = b) = (3.6.7)
= U(b)× pr(b|s = b) + U(g)× pr(g|s = b) + E[T × I(a = g)]
= 0
where E[T × I(a = g)] = T × pr(g|s = b)
EUO(ai = g , s = b) = EUO(ai = g) = (3.6.8)
= U(b)× pr(b) + U(g)× pr(g) + E[T × I(a = g)]
= (1− p) + T (1− p)
where E[T × I(a = g)] = T × pr(g)
3. In case of signal s = ∅ and action ai = b, the expected utilities (I use posteriors 3.6.3 and 3.6.4)
from the two candidates are respectively:
EUI(ai = b , s = ∅) = (3.6.9)
= U(b)× pr(b|s = ∅) + U(g)× pr(g|s = ∅) + E[T × I(a = b)]
=
1− p
(1− p) + (1− q)p + T ×
(1− q)p
(1− p) + (1− q)p
where E[T × I(a = b)] = T × pr(b|s = ∅)
EUO(ai = b , s = ∅) = EUO(ai = b) = U(b)× pr(b) + U(g)× pr(g) + E[T × I(a = b)](3.6.10)
= (1− p) + Tp
where E[T × I(a = b)] = T × pr(b)
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4. In case of signal s = ∅ and action ai = g, the expected utilities from the two candidates are
respectively:
EUI(ai = g , s = ∅) = (3.6.11)
= U(b)× pr(b|s = ∅) + U(g)× pr(g|s = ∅) + E[T × I(a = g)]
=
1− p
(1− p) + (1− q)p + T ×
1− p
(1− p) + (1− q)p
where E[T × I(a = g)] = T × pr(g|s = ∅)
EUO(ai = g , s = ∅) = EUO(ai = g) = (3.6.12)
= U(b)× pr(b) + U(g)× pr(g) + E[T × I(a = g)]
= (1− p) + T (1− p)
where E[T × I(a = g)] = T × pr(g)
Having computed the expected utilities in the diﬀerent cases, I can now look for the equilibrium beha-
viour. Since there is no dominant strategies, I check under which conditions the following behaviour
is an equilibrium strategy: if s = ∅, independently from the action chosen, it is optimal (the expected
utility is greater) to choose the Incumbent; if s = b, independently from the action chosen, it is optimal
(the expected utility is greater) to choose the Opponent.
To have this result it must be that, given the diﬀerent parameters p, q and T :
EUO(ai = b) > EUI(ai = b , s = b)
(1− p) + Tp > T
T < 1
EUO(ai = g) > EUI(ai = g , s = b)
(1− p) + T (1− p) > 0
which is satisﬁed if T > −1
EUI(ai = b , s = ∅) > EUO(ai = b)
1− p
(1− p) + (1− q)p + T ×
(1− q)p
(1− p) + (1− q)p > (1− p) + Tp
(1− p) + T (p− pq)− (1− pq)[(1− p) + Tp]
1− pq > 0
if I exclude p = 0, p = 1, q = 0 and q = 1 , I impose that the denominator is > 0. The numerator
is positive if T < 0 or if T > 0 and T < 1. Hence the conditions ensuring EUO(ai = b) > EUI(ai =
b , s = b) are T < 1, p ∈ (0, 1) and q ∈ (0, 1).
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EUI(ai = g , s = ∅) > EUO(ai = g)
1− p
(1− p) + (1− q)p + T ×
1− p
(1− p) + (1− q)p > (1− p) + T (1− p)
1
(1− p) + (1− q)p [(1− p) + T (1− p)] > (1− p) + T (1− p)
if I exclude q = 0 and p = 0, then 1(1−p)+(1−q)p > 1 and the condition is satisﬁed.
To recap, the conditions required are:
p ∈ (0, 1) (3.6.13)
q ∈ (0, 1) (3.6.14)
T ∈ (−1, 1) (3.6.15)
3.6.2 Proof of proposition 21
Moving to the action stage, I look for equilibrium moves with regards to the choice of private action ai.
It is important to recall that these actions are chosen given equilibrium electoral choices (Proposition
20). Hence all condition from the electoral stage hold. Informed individuals correctly anticipate who
is going to win the election, namely the candidate they choose. Hence, in the evaluation of expected
utilities for an informed individual, I use posteriors propabilities just when s = ∅, since voters are
choosing the Incumbent. Instead, when s = b , individuals choose the Opponent and priors are needed
in computing the expected utility. To identify equilibrium actions, I compare expected utilities from
each candidate, given signals and electoral choices.
When the report is s = b , all informed individuals will choose to vote for the Opponent. The expected
utilities deriving from choosing a = g anda = b are respectively:
EUO(a = g) = (1− p) + T (1− p) (3.6.16)
EUO(a = b) = (1− p) + Tp (3.6.17)
By comparing these two expected utilities, it is clear that it doesn't exist a choice giving an expected
utilities that is always greater. However under some conditions, a private action is preferable to the
other. If T ∈ (0, 1), EUO(a = b) > EUO(a = g) if p > 1/2 while EUO(a = b) < EUO(a = g) if
p < 1/2.
If T ∈ (−1, 0) the opposite result holds. I restrict the analysis on the more realistic case of a positive
impact of private action, T > 0: if p > 1/2 it is optimal to choose a = b if s = b; if p < 1/2 it is
optimal to choose a = g if s = b.
If instead the report is s = ∅ , all informed individuals will choose to vote for the Incumbent. The
expected utilities deriving from choosing a = g and a = b are respectively:
EUI(a = g) =
1− p
(1− q)p+ (1− p) + T
1− p
(1− q)p+ (1− p) (3.6.18)
EUI(a = b) =
1− p
(1− q)p+ (1− p) + T
p(1− q)
(1− q)p+ (1− p) (3.6.19)
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To state which expected utility is bigger, I compare the second element of the right side of these two
equation. If T ∈ (0, 1), the sign of the inequality depends on p and q. Again, the threshold value is
p = 1/2.
If p < 1/2 then ∀q ∈ (0, 1) we have (1− p) > p(1− q), implying EUI(a = g) > EUI(a = b); whereas if
p > 1/2, also q matters
if
(1− p) > p(1− q)
⇒ EUI(a = g) > EUI(a = b)
if
(1− p) < p(1− q)
⇒ EUI(a = g) < EUI(a = b)
If T ∈ (−1, 0) the opposite result holds.
Therefore the existence of an optimal private action on the sign of T and on the size of p and, in
some cases, on the level of q. This helps in mapping some regions of parameters. I focus on the more
realistic condition that T ∈ (0, 1), obtaining the following results:
• if p > 1/2 (HIGH PROB. OF NEGATIVE STATE) and (1 − p) < p(1 − q) it is dominant to
choose a = b if s = ∅ (and individual chooses Incumbent)
• if p > 1/2 (HIGH PROB. OF NEGATIVE STATE) and (1 − p) > p(1 − q) it is dominant to
choose a = g if s = ∅ (and individual chooses Incumbent)
• if p < 1/2 (LOW PROB. OF NEGATIVE STATE) it is dominant to choose a = g (for each value
of q ∈ (0, 1)) if s = ∅ (and individual chooses Incumbent)
3.6.3 Proof of lemma 4
Given the results of Proposition 20 and Proposition 21 , three parameter regions are identiﬁed for the
case of informed individuals
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• if p < 1/2 individuals choose a = g whatever is the report (CASE A)
• if p > 1/2 and (1− p) > (1− q)p individuals choose a = b if s = b and a = g if s = ∅ (CASE B)
• if p > 1/2 and (1− p) < (1− q)p individuals choose a = b whatever is the signal (CASE C)
The reason for this additional case is that now the quality (q) of the signal matters if we have a high
probability of negative state.
CASE A (p < 1/2)36
Notice that in the branch s = b informed individuals correctly anticipate the Opponent will win.
N
G s = ∅ a = g
1
1-p
B
s = ∅ a = g
1-q
s=b a = g
q
p
EUO(a = g)− C = (1− p) + T (1− p)− C
U(B) + TI(a = g)− C = −C
U(G) + TI(a = g)− C = 1 + T − C
ActionsSignal
Types
Figure 3.6.1: Case p < 1/2
N
G s = ∅
1
1-p
B
s = ∅
1-q
s=b
q
p
Types
((1− p) + T (1− p)− C)
(−C)
(1 + T − C)
Figure 3.6.2: Case p < 1/2: pay-oﬀs
36C summarizes both information cost Ci and access price PA.
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EU(a = g) = pq[(1− p) + T (1− p)− C] + p(1− q)[−C] + (1− p)[1 + T − C] (3.6.20)
= pq[(1− p) + T (1− p)] + (1− p)[1 + T ]− C
CASE B (p > 1/2 and (1− p) > (1− q)p )
N
G s = ∅ a = g
1
1-p
B
s = ∅ a = g
1-q
s=b a = b
q
p
EUO(a = b)− C = (1− p) + Tp− C
U(B) + TI(a = g)− C = −C
U(G) + TI(a = g)− C = 1 + T − C
ActionsSignal
Types
Figure 3.6.3: Case p < 1/2 e (1− p) > (1− q)p
N
G s = ∅
1
1-p
B
s = ∅
1-q
s=b
q
p
Types
((1− p) + Tp− C)
(−C)
(1 + T − C)
Figure 3.6.4: Case p < 1/2 e (1− p) >)1− q)p: pay-oﬀs
EU = pq[(1− p) + Tp− C] + p(1− q)[−C] + (1− p)[1 + T − C] (3.6.21)
= pq[(1− p) + Tp] + (1− p)[1 + T ]− C
CASE C (p > 1/2 and (1− p) < (1− q)p )
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N
G s = ∅ a = b
1
1-p
B
s = ∅ a = b
1-q
s=b a = b
q
p
EUO(a = b)− C = (1− p) + Tp− C
U(B) + TI(a = b)− C = T − C
U(G) + TI(a = b)− C = 1− C
ActionsSignal
Types
Figure 3.6.5: Case p < 1/2 e (1− p) >)1− q)p
N
G s = ∅
1
1-p
B
s = ∅
1-q
s=b
q
p
Types
((1− p) + Tp− C)
(T − C)
(1− C)
Figure 3.6.6: Case p < 1/2 e (1− p) > (1− q)p: pay-oﬀs
EU(a = b) = pq[(1− p) + Tp− C] + p(1− q)[T − C] + (1− p)[1− C] (3.6.22)
= pq[(1− p) + Tp] + p(1− q)[T ] + (1− p)− C
3.6.4 Proof of lemma 5
As stated in the previous section, given results from proposition 20 and proposition 21:
if a = b
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N
G
1-p
B
p
(T )
(1)
EUI(a = b) = EUO(a = b) = (1− p) + Tp
if a = g
N
G
1-p
B
p
(0)
(1 + T )
EUI(a = g) = EUO(a = g) = (1− p) + T (1− p)
obtaining the following equilibrium strategies:
• if p > 1/2 then a = b → EU = (1− p) + Tp
• if p < 1/2 then a = g → EU = (1− p) + T (1− p)
3.6.5 Proof of lemma 6
In lemma 5 and lemma 4, we derived the following expected utilities for informed and uninformed
individuals37:
Uninformed Informed
p < 1/2 (1− p) + T (1− p) pq[(1− p) + T (1− p)] + (1− p)[1 + T ]− C
p > 1/2 e (1− p) > (1− q)p (1− p) + Tp pq[(1− p) + Tp] + (1− p)[1 + T ]− C
p > 1/2 e (1− p) < (1− q)p (1− p) + Tp pq[(1− p) + Tp] + p(1− q)[T ] + (1− p)− C
CASE A
Expected utility informed Expected utility uninformed
pq[(1− p) + T (1− p)] + (1− p)[1 + T ]− Ci − PA (1− p) + T (1− p)
The diﬀerence in expected pay-oﬀs (gain from information) has to be bigger than costs (Ci and PA),
so that an individual ﬁnds proﬁtable to acquire information
37C summarizes both access cost PA and information cost Ci
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pq[(1− p) + T (1− p)] + (1− p)[1 + T ]− (1− p)− T (1− p) ≥ Ci + PA
pq[(1− p) + T (1− p)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
≥ Ci + PA
Since the left-hand side of the inequality is greater than zero, I am sure that exists at least one Ci which
make convenient to get informed. Therefore, I can derive an indiﬀerence condition or a proﬁtability
condition:
p(1− p) ≥ Ci + PA
q(1 + T )
The cost CI corresponding to the indiﬀerent voter is then
CI = p(1− p)q(1 + T )− PA (3.6.23)
CASE B
Expected utility informed Expected utility uninformed
pq[(1− p) + Tp] + (1− p)[1 + T ]− Ci − PA (1− p) + Tp
In order to have information acquisition I need the diﬀerence in expected utilities (gain from informa-
tion) to be grater than costs (Ci and PA)
pq[(1− p) + Tp] + (1− p)[1 + T ]− (1− p)− Tp ≥ Ci + PA
pq − p2q + T (1 + p2q − 2p) ≥ Ci + PA
The diﬀerence in expected utilities has to be grater than costs:
pq − p2q + T (1 + p2q − 2p) ≥ Ci + PA
It is possible to show that the negative parts of the LHS are compensated by the positive ones given
the conditions of the case:
p ∈ (1
2
, 1)
(1− p) > (1− q)p
The last condition can be written as:
q >
2p− 1
p
Checking the sign of the LHS for the lowest value of q, that is for q = 2p−1p :
(1− T )(3p− 2p2)− (1− T ) > 0
which is positive since p ∈ ( 12 , 1). Given that ∂(pq−p
2q+T (1+p2q−2p))
∂q = p(Tp − p + 1) > 0, the sign of
the inequality is the same for every q > 2p−1p .
Hence:
pq + T + (T − 1)p2q − 2pT︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
≥ Ci + PA
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From this inequality I know that exists at least one cost making proﬁtable to get informed and I can
compute the indiﬀerence condition and the cost of the indiﬀerent individual
CI = p[q(1− p) + T (p− 2)] + T − PA (3.6.24)
CASE C
Expected utility informed Expected utility uninformed
pq[(1− p) + Tp] + p(1− q)[T ] + (1− p)− Ci − PA (1− p) + Tp
The diﬀerence in expected utilities (gain from information) has to be greater than costs (Ci and PA)
pq[(1− p) + Tp] + p(1− q)[T ] + (1− p)− (1− p)− Tp ≥ Ci + PA
pq[(1− p)− T︸︷︷︸
<1
(1− p)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
≥ Ci + PA
since the left-hand side is bigger than zero, it is possible to ﬁnd at least one cost Ci making the
individual to acquire news. The indiﬀerent voter is identiﬁed by the cost
CI = p(1− p)q(1− T )− PA (3.6.25)
3.6.6 Proof of proposition 22
Proﬁt maximization requires the setting of an optimal price P ∗A, which is the only control variable for
the media outlet. I show computations just for the ﬁrst case.
In Case A (p > 12 ), from lemma 7, the demand for news is given by
CDF (CI) =
CI − a
b− a (3.6.26)
=
p(1− p)q(1 + T )− PA − a
b− a
Audience related revenues are set as:
PA × CDF (CI) = PA × [CI − a
b− a ] (3.6.27)
= PA × p(1− p)q(1 + T )− PA − a
b− a
Proﬁt maximization problem gives the following results:
max
PA
{PA × p(1− p)q(1 + T )− PA − a
b− a }
∂{PA × CDF (CI)}
∂PA
= 0
1
b− a{[p(1− p)q(1 + T )− PA − a] + PA[−1]} = 0
P ∗A =
p(1− p)q(1 + T )− a
2
(3.6.28)
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The optimal quantity of news is obtained by substituting back P ∗A in the demand :
demand (P ∗A) = CDF (CI(P
∗
A)) (3.6.29)
=
p(1− p)q(1 + T )− a
2(b− a)
Maximization proﬁts are:
Π∗ = P ∗A × CDF (CI(P ∗A)) (3.6.30)
=
[p(1− p)q(1 + T )− a]2
4(b− a)
Optimal prices, quantities and proﬁts for Case B and Case C are derived in the same way.
Case P ∗A demand(P
∗
A) Π
∗
Case A p(1−p)q(1+T )−a2
p(1−p)q(1+T )−a
2(b−a)
[p(1−p)q(1+T )−a]2
4(b−a)
Case B p[q(1−p)+T (p−2)]+T−a2
p[q(1−p)+T (p−2)]+T−a
2(b−a)
{p[q(1−p)+T (p−2)]+T−a}2
4(b−a)
Case C p(1−p)q(1−T )−a2
p(1−p)q(1−T )−a
2(b−a)
[p(1−p)q(1−T )−a]2
4(b−a)
Table 3.6.1: Results from maximization
3.6.7 Proof of lemma 10
I compute the probability that an informed individual receives a certain kind of news and I use it to
derive the shares of votes obtained by the two candidates as
Incumbent's share: SI × pr(s = ∅)
Opponent's share: SI × pr(s = b)
N
G
s=∅
1
1-p
B
s=∅
1-q
s=b
q
p
Figure 3.6.7: Signal's structure
Probabilities of each kind of news are
Pr(s = b) = pq
Pr(s = ∅) = p(1− q) + (1− p)
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Votes received by each candidate are:
Opponent = SI × Pr(s = b)
= SI × pq
Incumbent = SI × Pr(s = ∅)
= SI × [p(1− q) + (1− p)]
3.6.8 Proof of Proposition 23
A candidate wins if he obtains the 50%+1 of votes or more - that is if V > 12 .
From equation 3.3.6, the Opponent gets:
VO =
1
2
× (1− SI) + SI × pq
=
1
2
+ SI × (pq − 1
2
) (3.6.31)
where SI is the informed share. SI ∈ (0, 1) if conditions set in part 3.3.2 hold. VO > 12 only if pq − 12
is positive, that is pq > 12 . when this is not possible if p <
1
2 .
From equation 3.3.7, the Incumbent gets:
VI =
1
2
× (1− SI) + SI × [p(1− q) + (1− p)]
=
1
2
+ SI × [p(1− q) + (1− p)− 1
2
] (3.6.32)
VI >
1
2 only if p(1− q) + (1− p)− 12 > 0 that is if p(1− q) + (1− p) > 12 .
A suﬃcient condition to expect a victory of the Incumbent is that p < 12 . Otherwise, when p >
1
2 it is
suﬃcient to have q < 12 .
Figure 3.6.8:
Looking at ﬁg. 3.6.8, it is possible to notice how a higher q increases the range of p > 12 supporting
case B (and reduces those supporting case C) where individuals set ai = b if s = b and ai = g if s = ∅.
Extra Appendix
3.7 Conditions on shares
3.7.1 Informed Share and Uninformed Share
I use the share of informed individuals SI as the demand for news faced by the monopolistic media
outlet. The uninformed share is derived as the complementar share SU = 1− SI .
Dimensions of both shares depend on the case considered and they are function of relevant parameters
(p, q and T ) and of the distribution (speciﬁcally, a and b) of information costs :
CASE CASE'S CONDITIONS INFORMED SHARE38
Case A p < 12 SI =
p(1−p)q(1+T )−a
2(b−a)
Case B p > 12 and 1− p > p(1− q) SI = p[q(1−p)+T (p−2)]+T−a2(b−a)
Case C p > 12 and 1− p < p(1− q) SI = p(1−p)q(1−T )−a2(b−a)
Conditions imposed so far do not ensure that shares are both included in (0, 1): I check which conditions
have to be imposed on parameters and prices - both before and after maximizazion - in order to have
proper shares.
3.7.2 Checks on voters' shares
I need to ensure that
informed share = SI ∈ (0, 1)
uninformed share = SU ∈ (0, 1)
by which SU = 1− SI
If shares depend just on information cost Ci there is no problem since these costs are assumed to be
distributed uniformly with mass 1.
38These are shares resulting from the maximization solution.
103
104
informed
(0,0) Ci
f(Ci)
1
b−a
a bCI
However, the CI identifying the indiﬀerent voter is derived as fuction of other parameters (p, q, T e
PA):
Case Case's Conditions Indiﬀerent individual's cost of information39
CASE A p < 1/2 CI = p(1− p)q(1 + T )− PA
CASE B p > 1/2 e (1− p) > (1− q)p CI = p[q(1− p) + T (p− 2)] + T − PA
CASE C p > 1/2 e (1− p) < (1− q)p CI = p(1− p)q(1− T )− PA
Hence, I should check wheter or not in all cases the condition CI ∈ (a, b) is veriﬁed: this will ensure me
that shares will be included between 0 and 1. This kind of inspection must be done on shares obtained
both before (demand for news with generic PA) and after maximization (demand for news at optimal
price P ∗A).
Pre-maximization check
Shares are included between 0 and 1 if the indiﬀerence cost CI is included between a and b; that is
CI > a
CI < b
To be this the case, I impose in the diﬀerent cases the following conditions:
CASE INDIFFERENCE COST CONDITIONS40
Case A CI = p(1− p)q(1 + T )− PA PA < p(1− p)q(1 + T )− a
PA > p(1− p)q(1 + T )− b
Case B CI = p[q(1− p) + T (p− 2)] + T − PA PA < p[q(1− p) + T (p− 2)] + T − a
PA > p[q(1− p) + T (p− 2)] + T − b
Case C CI = p(1− p)q(1− T )− PA PA < p(1− p)q(1− T )− a
PA > p(1− p)q(1− T )− b
39These CI are those obtained before maximization.
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In all case, conditions result in a restriction on distribution's support of information costs - namely a
and b - mainly because prices have to be positive (PA ≥ 0). I analyse case by case which are these
restriction.
CASE A
In this situation, conditions so far are:
q ∈ (0, 1)
p ∈ (0, 1
2
)
T ∈ (0, 1)
a ≥ 0
b ≥ 0
b > a
PA ≥ 0
I impose restrictions on prices so that CI ∈ (a, b):
PA < p(1− p)q(1 + T )− a (1)
PA > p(1− p)q(1 + T )− b (2)
To simplify I deﬁne A ≡ p(1− p)q(1 + T ), rearraging (1) and (2)
PA < A− a (1)
PA > A− b (2)
Depending on the conditions of this case, A ∈ (0, 12 ); indeed:
A = p︸︷︷︸
∈(0, 12 )
(1− p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈( 12 ,1)
q︸︷︷︸
∈(0,1)
(1 + T )︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈(1,2)
The size of A implies the existence of a lower bound on the distribution support that is a ∈ (0, 12 ): if
a ≥ 12 it doesn't exist a PA ≥ 0 such that (1) is satisﬁed. The minimum information cost (a) cannot
be too high.
Restrictions on b are not necessary since the larger b becomes, the more easily condition (2) is satisﬁed;
if b ≥ 12 condition (2) is satisﬁed for every PA ≥ 0.
PA > A− b
for sure ≥0︷︸︸︷
PA︸︷︷︸
≥0
vs
for sure < 0if b > 12︷ ︸︸ ︷
A︸︷︷︸
∈(0, 12 )
− b︸︷︷︸
≥0
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Hence, in order to have CI ∈ (a, b) and to obtain a share belongig to (0,1) it is necessary to satify the
following system of conditions 
a ∈ [0, 12 )
b > 0
b > a
PA < A− a
PA > A− b
with A ≡ p(1− p)q(1 + T )
and A ∈ (0, 12 )
CASE B
In this situation, conditions so far are:
q ∈ (0, 1)
p ∈ (1
2
, 1)
T ∈ (0, 1)
1− p > p(1− q)
a ≥ 0
b ≥ 0
b > a
PA ≥ 0
I impose restrictions on prices so that CI ∈ (a, b):
PA < p[q(1− p) + T (p− 2)] + T − a (1)
PA > p[q(1− p) + T (p− 2)] + T − b (2)
deﬁning B ≡ p[q(1− p) + T (p− 2)] + T
PA < B − a (1)
PA > B − b (2)
Depending on the conditions of this case, B ∈ (0, 12 )41; indeed:
B = p︸︷︷︸
∈( 12 ,1)
[ q︸︷︷︸
∈(0,1)
(1− p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈(0, 12 )
+ T︸︷︷︸
∈(0,1)
(p− 2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈(− 32 ,−1)
] + T︸︷︷︸
∈(0,1)
The size of B implies the existence of a lower bound on the distribution support that is a ∈ (0, 12 ): if
a ≥ 12 it doesn't exist a PA ≥ 0 such that (1) is satisﬁed. The minimum information cost (a) cannot
be too high.
41See graphs for case B in section 3.7.4 at the end of Appendix A
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Restrictions on b are not necessary since the larger b becomes, the more easily condition (2) is satisﬁed;
if b ≥ 12 condition (2) is satisﬁed for every PA ≥ 0.
PA > B − b
for sure ≥0︷︸︸︷
PA︸︷︷︸
≥0
vs
for sure < 0if b > 12︷ ︸︸ ︷
B︸︷︷︸
∈(0, 12 )
− b︸︷︷︸
≥0
Hence, in order to have CI ∈ (a, b) and to obtain a share belongig to (0,1) it is necessary to satify the
following system of conditions
a ∈ [0, 12 )
b > 0
b > a
PA < B − a
PA > B − b
with B ≡ p[q(1− p) + T (p− 2)] + T
and B ∈ (0, 12 )
CASE C
In this situation, conditions so far are:
q ∈ (0, 1)
p ∈ (1
2
, 1)
T ∈ (0, 1)
(1− p) < p(1− q)
a ≥ 0
b ≥ 0
b > a
PA ≥ 0
I impose restrictions on prices so that CI ∈ (a, b):
PA < p(1− p)q(1− T )− a (1)
PA > p(1− p)q(1− T )− b (2)
deﬁning C ≡ p(1− p)q(1− T )
PA < C − a (1)
PA > C − b (2)
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Depending on the conditions of this case, C ∈ (0, 14 )42; indeed:
C = p︸︷︷︸
∈(0, 12 )
(1− p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈( 12 ,1)
q︸︷︷︸
∈(0,1)
(1− T )︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈(0,1)
The size of C implies the existence of a lower bound on the distribution support that is a ∈ (0, 14 ): if
a ≥ 14 it doesn't exist a PA ≥ 0 such that (1) is satisﬁed. The minimum information cost (a) cannot
be too high.
Restrictions on b are not necessary since the larger b becomes, the more easily condition (2) is satisﬁed;
if b ≥ 14 condition (2) is satisﬁed for every PA ≥ 0.
PA > C − b
for sure ≥0︷︸︸︷
PA︸︷︷︸
≥0
vs
for sure< 0if b > 14︷ ︸︸ ︷
C
∈(0, 14 )
− b︸︷︷︸
≥0
Hence, in order to have CI ∈ (a, b) and to obtain a share belongig to (0,1) it is necessary to satify the
following system of conditions 
a ∈ [0, 14 )
b > 0
b > a
PA < C − a
PA > C − b
with C ≡ p(1− p)q(1− T )
and C ∈ (0, 14 )
Post-maximization check
After maximization, I obtain the following optimal price P ∗A , indiﬀerent cost, demand and proﬁts:
CASE P ∗A CI(P
∗
A) demand(P
∗
A) Π
∗
case A p(1−p)q(1+T )−a2
p(1−p)q(1+T )+a
2
p(1−p)q(1+T )−a
2(b−a)
[p(1−p)q(1+T )−a]2
4(b−a)
case B p[q(1−p)+T (p−2)]+T−a2
p[q(1−p)+T (p−2)]+T+a
2
p[q(1−p)+T (p−2)]+T−a
2(b−a)
{p[q(1−p)+T (p−2)]+T−a}2
4(b−a)
case C p(1−p)q(1−T )−a2
p(1−p)q(1−T )+a
2
p(1−p)q(1−T )−a
2(b−a)
[p(1−p)q(1−T )−a]2
4(b−a)
It is important to notice that P ∗A respects always condition (1) by which CI > a, while condition (2)
for CI < b has to be checked in each case.
CASE A
42See graphs for case C in section 3.7.4 at the end of Appendix A
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P ∗A =
p(1− p)q(1 + T )− a
2
CI(P
∗
A) =
p(1− p)q(1 + T ) + a
2
Using the same notation
P ∗A =
A− a
2
CI(P
∗
A) =
A+ a
2
Condition (1) is satisﬁed since P ∗A =
A−a
2 < A− a.
Condition (2) is satisﬁed if
A− a
2
> A− b
b− a
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
>
A
2︸︷︷︸
∈(0, 14 )
Post-maximization, condition (2) is not satiﬁed for every value of A ∈ (0, 12 ) - which depend on p, q
and T - and for every value of b and of a: I require that b > A2 +
a
2 . However, if b ≥ 12 the condition is
satisﬁed for each a ∈ [0, 12 ) and A ∈ (0, 12 ).
Hence, if a ∈ [0, 12 ) and b ≥ 12 , in case A, I obtain for sure a share of informed voters which is included
between 0 and 1 (before and after maximization)43.
CASE B
P ∗A =
p[q(1− p) + T (p− 2)] + T − a
2
CI(P
∗
A) =
p[q(1− p) + T (p− 2)] + T + a
2
Using the same notation
P ∗A =
B − a
2
CI(P
∗
A) =
B + a
2
Condition (1) is satisﬁed since P ∗A =
B−a
2 < B − a.
Condition(2) is satisﬁed if
43This explain why with Ci ∼ U(0, 1), I obtain always proper shares. See 3.7.3
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B − a
2
> B − b
b− a
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
>
B
2︸︷︷︸
∈(0, 14 )
Post-maximization, condition (2) is not satiﬁed for every value of B ∈ (0, 12 ) - which depend on p, q
and T - and for every value of b and of a: I require that b > B2 +
a
2 . However, if b ≥ 12 the condition
is satisﬁed for each a ∈ [0, 12 ) and B ∈ (0, 12 ).
Hence, if a ∈ [0, 12 ) and b ≥ 12 , in case A, I obtain for sure a share of informed voters which is included
between 0 and 1 (before and after maximization)44.
CASE C
P ∗A =
p(1− p)q(1− T )− a
2
CI(P
∗
A) =
p(1− p)q(1− T ) + a
2
Using the same notation
P ∗A =
C − a
2
CI(P
∗
A) =
C + a
2
Condition (1) is satisﬁed since P ∗A =
C−a
2 < C − a.
Condition (2) is satisﬁed if
C − a
2
> C − b
b− a
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
>
C
2︸︷︷︸
∈(0, 18 )
Post-maximization, condition (2) is not satiﬁed for every value of C ∈ (0, 14 ) - which depend on p, q
and T - and for every value of b and of a: I require that b > C2 +
a
2 . However, if b ≥ 14 the condition is
satisﬁed for each a ∈ [0, 14 ) and B ∈ (0, 14 ).
Hence, if a ∈ [0, 14 ) and b ≥ 14 , in case A, I obtain for sure a share of informed voters which is included
between 0 and 1 (before and after maximization)45.
44This explain why with Ci ∼ U(0, 1), I obtain always proper shares. See 3.7.3
45This explain why with Ci ∼ U(0, 1), I obtain always proper shares. See 3.7.3
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3.7.3 Speciﬁc distribution of information costs: Ci ∼ U(0, 1)
I consider a speciﬁc case of uniform distribution with positive support, namely the case with a = 0
and b = 1: I proceed in checks pre and post maximisation on informed share with Ci ∼ U(0, 1).
CASE A
Before maximization
CI = p(1− p)q(1 + T )− PA
In order to ensure that CI ∈ (0, 1), it is necessary that
CI > 0⇒ PA < p(1− p)q(1 + T )
PA < A (1)
Since A ∈ (0, 12 ), it follows that PA ∈ [0, 12 )
CI < 1⇒ PA > p(1− p)q(1 + T )− 1
PA > A− 1 (2)
Since A ∈ (0, 12 ), condition (2) is satisﬁed for each PA ≥ 0.
Hence the only condition I need to check is (1): access price cannot be too high.{
PA ∈ [0, 12 )
PA < p(1− p)q(1 + T )
After maximization
P ∗A =
p(1− p)q(1 + T )
2
CI(P
∗
A) =
p(1− p)q(1 + T )
2
Both conditions CI > 0 and CI < 1 are satisﬁed since numerator belongs to (0,
1
2 ).
CASE B
Before maximization
CI = p[q(1− p) + T (p− 2)] + T − PA
In order to ensure that CI ∈ (0, 1), it is necessary that
CI > 0⇒ PA < p[q(1− p) + T (p− 2)] + T
PA < B (1)
Since B ∈ (0, 12 ), it follows that PA ∈ [0, 12 )
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CI < 1⇒ PA + 1 > p[q(1− p) + T (p− 2)] + T
PA > B − 1 (2)
Since B ∈ (0, 12 ), condition (2) is satisﬁed for each PA ≥ 0.
Hence the only condition I need to check is (1): access price cannot be too high.{
PA ∈ [0, 12 )
PA < p[q(1− p) + T (p− 2)] + T
After maximization
P ∗A =
p[q(1− p) + T (p− 2)] + T
2
CI(P
∗
A) =
p[q(1− p) + T (p− 2)] + T
2
Both conditions CI > 0 and CI < 1 are satisﬁed since numerator belongs to (0,
1
2 ).
CASE C
Before maximization
CI = p(1− p)q(1− T )− PA
In order to ensure that CI ∈ (0, 1), it is necessary that
CI > 0⇒ PA < p(1− p)q(1− T )
PA < C (1)
Since C ∈ (0, 14 ), it follows that PA ∈ [0, 14 )
CI < 1⇒ PA > p(1− p)q(1− T )− 1
PA > C − 1 (2)
Since C ∈ (0, 14 ), condition (2) is satisﬁed for each PA ≥ 0.
Hence the only condition I need to check is (1): access price cannot be too high..{
PA ∈ [0, 14 )
PA < p(1− p)q(1− T )
After maximization
P ∗A =
p(1− p)q(1− T )
2
CI(P
∗
A) =
p(1− p)q(1− T )
2
Both conditions CI > 0 and CI < 1 are satisﬁed since numerator belongs to (0,
1
4 ).
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3.7.4 Graphs for pre-maximization analysis
Conditions' Check on Case B: Graphs
Figure 3.7.1: Caso B: graﬁco per B ≡ p[q(1− p) + T (p− 2)] + T
con T = 1
f(x) = B(q = 1)
g(x) = B(q = 0, 5)
h(x) = B(q = 0)
Figure 3.7.2: Case B: graph for B ≡ p[q(1− p) + T (p− 2)] + T
with T = 0, 5
f(x) = B(q = 1)
g(x) = B(q = 0, 5)
h(x) = B(q = 0)
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Figure 3.7.3: Case B: graph for B ≡ p[q(1− p) + T (p− 2)] + T
with T = 0
f(x) = B(q = 1)
g(x) = B(q = 0, 5)
h(x) = B(q = 0)
Conditions' Check on Case C: Graphs
Figure 3.7.4: Case C: C ≡ p(1− p)q(1− T )
with T = 0, 5
f(x) = B(q = 1)
g(x) = B(q = 0, 5)
h(x) = B(q = 0)
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Figure 3.7.5: Case C: C ≡ p(1− p)q(1− T )
with T = 0
f(x) = B(q = 1)
g(x) = B(q = 0, 5)
h(x) = B(q = 0)
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3.8 Comparative statics on demand for news
3.8.1 Pre-maximization
Before maximization, the demand for news is:
• (CASE A) demand = p(1−p)q(1+T )−PA−ab−a if p < 12
• (CASE B) demand = p[q(1−p)+T (p−2)]+T−PA−ab−a if p > 12 and if (1− p) > (1− q)p
• (CASE C) demand = p(1−p)q(1−T )−PA−ab−a if p > 12 and if (1− p) < (1− q)p
Eﬀects of PA, q and p
Access price PA has a negative eﬀect on demand in all cases.
Quality q of signals has a positive eﬀect on demand in all cases.
The eﬀect of the probability p of negative events changes according to the case considered. In case A
the eﬀect is positive. In case B and case C the eﬀect is negative. Moreover, in the second situation
the more p increases the more individuals choose actions indiscriminately (case C).
Eﬀects of heterogeneity (b− a)
The eﬀects of heterogeneity strictly depend on the fact of having SI ∈ (0, 1) and SU = 1− SI ∈ (0, 1).
Eﬀect of a (minimum cost of information)
(0,0) Ci
f(Ci)
1
b−a
a a' bCI
Figure 3.8.1: Eﬀect of increase in a
If a increases ceteris paribus (less heterogeneity) , the uninformed share increases (there is no change
in CI and density
1
b−a increases for each Ci) and, since SI + SU = 1, the share of informed decreases.
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(0,0) Ci
f(Ci)
1
b−a
aa' bCI
Figure 3.8.2: Eﬀect of decrease in a
If a decreases ceteris paribus (more heterogeneity) , the uninformed share decreases (there is no change
in CI and density
1
b−a decreases for each Ci) and, since SI + SU = 1, the share of informed increases.
Eﬀect of b (maximum cost of information)
(0,0) Ci
f(Ci)
1
b−a
a b b'CI
Figure 3.8.3: Eﬀect of increase in b
If b increases ceteris paribus (more heterogeneity) , the informed share decreases (there is no change in
CI and density
1
b−a decreases for each Ci) and, since SI + SU = 1, the share of uninformed increases.
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(0,0) Ci
f(Ci)
1
b−a
a bb'CI
Figure 3.8.4: Eﬀect of decrease in b
If b decreases ceteris paribus (less heterogeneity) , the informed share increases (there is no change in
CI and density
1
b−a increases for each Ci) and, since SI + SU = 1, the share of uninformed decreases.
If the increase/decrease in heterogeneity occurs both becaus of a decrese/increase in a and an in-
crease/decrease in b, the ﬁnal eﬀect on demand is ambiguous (the two eﬀects are opposite).
3.8.2 Post-maximization
After maximization, the demand for news is:
• (CASE A) demand = p(1−p)q(1+T )−a2(b−a) if p < 12
• (CASE B) demand = p[q(1−p)+T (p−2)]+T−a2(b−a) if p > 12 and if (1− p) > (1− q)p
• (CASE C) demand = p(1−p)q(1−T )−a2(b−a) if p > 12 and if (1− p) < (1− q)p
Eﬀects of PA, q and p
The eﬀects of q, p are the same as in the pre-maximization.
Eﬀects of heterogeneity (b− a)
The eﬀects of heterogeneity strictly depend on the fact of having SI ∈ (0, 1) and SU = 1− SI ∈ (0, 1).
The eﬀect of b is the same as in the pre-maximization case.
Eﬀect of a (minimum cost of information)
The eﬀect of a on demand is now more complicated since it modify both the extention of the distri-
bution's support and the indiﬀerence cost. These two eﬀects operates in opposite directions, giving an
ambiguous eﬀect.
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(0,0) Ci
f(Ci)
1
b−a
a a' bCI C ′I
Figure 3.8.5: Eﬀect of increase in a
If a increases (less heterogeneity) the uninformed share increases because the density 1b−a increases for
each Ci and it decreases because the indiﬀerence cost CI moves to the right.
(0,0) Ci
f(Ci)
1
b−a
aa' bCIC ′I
Figure 3.8.6: Eﬀect of decrease in a
If a decreases (more heterogeneity) , the uninformed share decreases because the density 1b−a decreases
for each Ci and it increases because the indiﬀerence cost CI moves to the left.
Eﬀect of b (maximum cost of information)
The eﬀect of b is the same as in the pre-maximization case.
If the increase in heterogeneity occurs both becaus of a decrese in a and an increase in b, the ﬁnal
eﬀect on demand is again ambiguous. The eﬀect of a is ambiguous with a direct positive eﬀect and a
negative eﬀect through CI ; the eﬀect of b is positive.
